Working in dangerous contexts: conceptualising leadership in emergency response team by Knox, Merrel
Northumbria Research Link
Citation:  Knox,  Merrel  (2019)  Working  in  dangerous  contexts:  conceptualising  leadership  in 
emergency response team. Doctoral thesis, Northumbria University. 
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/id/eprint/43801/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to access 
the University’s research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on NRL are retained by the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items can be reproduced, 
displayed or performed, and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or 
study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided the authors, 
title and full bibliographic details are given, as well as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata 
page. The content must not be changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any  
format or medium without formal permission of the copyright holder.  The full policy is available online:  
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/pol  i cies.html  
                        
Page 1 of 273 
 
WORKING IN DANGEROUS 
CONTEXTS: CONCEPTUALISING 
LEADERSHIP IN EMERGENCY 
RESPONSE TEAMS 
 
MERREL KNOX 
 
PhD 
 
2019 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Page 2 of 273 
 
WORKING IN DANGEROUS 
CONTEXTS: CONCEPTUALISING 
LEADERSHIP IN EMERGENCY 
RESPONSE TEAMS  
 
 
MERREL KNOX 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of 
the requirements for the award of Doctor 
of Philosophy of the University of 
Northumbria at Newcastle. 
 
 
Research undertaken in the Faculty of 
Business and Law 
 
 
 
April 2019 
 
 
  
Page 3 of 273 
 
Abstract 
This thesis explores processes of leadership in UK public sector Emergency Response 
teams. Leadership has received much attention as a field of study, predominantly in the 
standard organisational context with an emphasis on the functional approaches leaders 
use to manage situations. In conventional operation, the organisational context is 
characterised by relatively low levels of ambiguity, and where there is information, 
resource and time available to enable adaptive responses.  
In comparison to this, few studies have focused on leadership in dangerous contexts, 
characterised by high levels of complexity, where ambiguity is high, and resources and 
time are constrained.  Emergency response teams such as police, fire and ambulance, 
continuously face dangerous situations to their personnel and the public. The focus of this 
study is on specialist operational teams within the emergency services that particularly 
respond to dangerous incidents. Emergency response teams such as police firearms, 
hazardous area response and fire service teams are collectively tasked with 
understanding their environment and co-creating adaptive leadership response strategies.  
This doctoral study contributes to leadership theory in dangerous contexts.  This thesis is 
informed by a social constructionist epistemology, and interpretivist philosophy.  The focus 
of the empirical study is on understanding the constructed meaning of leadership and 
leadership processes of individuals who operate in dangerous contexts, within emergency 
response teams.  The data collection method used for the study is a series of focus 
groups, involving sixty-one participants, adopting a thematic analysis approach and 
applying the principles of progressive focussing.  
This thesis contributes to leadership theory by conceptualising leadership as a complex 
dynamic and fluid process, specifically in relation to emergency response teams operating 
in dangerous contexts. This thesis proposes a new framework for understanding 
leadership for teams working in dangerous environments. It explores the complexity of 
leadership processes and highlights how fluid leadership as a core element can inform 
team training and team development. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an introduction, overview and outline of the structure of the thesis. 
Following this, the central concepts are contextualised and the focus of and motivation for 
the study is outlined. The research question and sub-questions are stated and the 
research objectives that guide the research are addressed. The next section outlines the 
structure of the thesis to help guide the reader through what is covered in each chapter. 
1.1 Focus of the Study 
 
A wealth of research and empirical studies has been conducted in the leadership field 
over the last few decades (Yukl, 2008; Day et al, 2014; Dinh et al, 2014; O’Connell, 2014; 
Baran & Scott, 2010). Much leadership research focuses on conventional contexts, with 
relative operational stability (Baran & Scott, 2010), where the emphasis is on the 
processes leaders adopt  to manage and influence situations characterised by low levels 
of ambiguity; and where there is information, resource and time available to enable 
effective and adaptive responses.  In comparison, few studies have focused on the 
leadership of those operating in contexts characterised by high levels of complexity, 
where ambiguity is high and resource and time is restricted, such as dangerous contexts 
(Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001; Uhl-Bien, Marion & McKelvey, 2007; Hannah et al, 2009). 
Leaders operating in High Reliability Organisations (HROs) often face these contexts. 
Examples of HROs include the emergency services such as police, fire and ambulance 
services.  
Although there are multiple levels of leadership in HROs, this study is specifically focusing 
on specialist operational emergency response teams that are sent to incidents as a result 
of a 999 call. The teams are already formed and working together within a range of 
emergency services. For example: hazardous area response teams in the ambulance 
service, police firearms units, fire service teams and mountain rescue teams. These 
teams face incidents that often have the greatest levels of complexity, either because they 
are over wide areas, have multiple agency attendance and/or have numerous variables 
that require risk assessment. These teams face incidents that carry the greatest threats 
and danger to themselves and others, such as terrorist threats, chemical spillages or 
shootings. These are specialist teams, highly trained to manage dangerous situations. 
In recent years there has been growing societal focus on teams in the emergency 
services in the United Kingdom and their response to dealing with threats, internal and 
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external, to human welfare and property (Dealing with civil contingencies: emergency 
planning in the UK, 2017, p.3). Societies are becoming more unpredictable and volatile, 
with an increasing frequency of incidents, such as shootings and terrorist attacks, 
requiring effective responses from emergency response teams (Hannah, Campbell & 
Matthews, 2010). As a result, there is increasing complexity in the incidents that 
emergency services respond too. Incidents that emergency response teams can face 
include (but are not limited to): armed robbery or hostage situation, chemical and 
hazardous material or spills, large fires, rescue operations in remote locations, water 
rescues, off shore accidents, lost persons, large road traffic incidents and terrorist threats. 
Consequently, this is placing further emphasis on the necessity of inter-operative working 
between what Murphy & Greenhalgh (2018, p.2) refer to as “blue light services”.  
Teams in the emergency services can attend a number of different types of incident, for 
example: incidents that are long term (such as Covid 19), incidents that are spread over 
wide areas (such as natural disaster, terrorist/roaming firearms incidents), and incidents 
requiring multi-agency attendance (such as aircraft crash or multiple casualty events). For 
clarity, this study focuses on short term, single location incidents to which emergency 
teams respond.  Studies addressing other types of incidents would be useful for future 
study and this is outlined in chapter 6. 
Unison, the national union for NHS ambulance workers, stated in an article in the north 
east regional newspaper ‘The Journal’ in 2013, that those responding to 999 calls can 
face a wide range of unexpected and dangerous situations (The Journal, 2013). They 
explained that there is increasing threat on a daily basis to paramedics that respond to 
local calls, often facing violent, drunken behaviours from member of the public. Unison’s 
head of health, said: “Paramedics are faced with a terrible dilemma when they arrive on 
scene and are faced with gangs of drunken thugs. We need greater co-ordination with the 
police to prioritise situations where ambulance crews may be walking into danger” (The 
Journal, 2013).  This report was six years ago, and stories have continued to unfold. BBC 
news reported in 2014 that Police forces introduced cameras on their uniforms to enable 
interactions with perpetrators to be monitored, with one purpose being that the "mere 
presence of this type of video can often defuse potentially violent situations" (Metropolitan 
Commissioner, 2014). 
The recent fire at Grenfell Tower in North Kensington, in 2017; a situation that was 
characterised by high ambiguity and complexity, posed an immediate danger to the public, 
the fire service and the interoperability with other emergency response teams involved. In 
the aftermath, the response to the incident “raised questions about how the emergency 
services, local authorities and other agencies plan for and respond to civil contingencies” 
(Grinwood, 2017, p.3).  
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Attention has focused on the command and leadership of teams in the responding 
agencies to rapidly and effectively address incidents, by sharing information and making 
decisions to effectively resolve the situation (Uitdewilligen & Waller, 2018). The Civil 
Contingencies Act (CCA, 2004) provides a statutory framework for emergency services, 
predominantly for planning for civil contingencies as stated by the Government. The Act 
focuses on response and recovery and is consistently evolving as lessons are learned, 
through examples like Grenfell Tower, and where new concerns emerge.   
This study focuses on localised emergency response teams where planning and control is 
at a regional or team level, dependent on the extremity of incident. For example: the case 
of Raoul Moat in 2010 in the North East, involved a regional search for an armed and 
dangerous man, and a multi-agency response was co-ordinated by the regional command 
structure across all emergency services in the region. Local multi-agency major incidents 
use the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) as procedural 
guidance to co-ordinate their efforts effectively.  In comparison, a locally based fire-
fighting team would more likely respond to a house fire where the procedures are 
team/station situated.  
Both levels of extremity can potentially pose threat to the life and welfare of an emergency 
team responder. This study is exploring specific teams, and not multi-agency incidents or 
large-scale emergency planning of incidents. However, Government policy including the 
CCA and the JESIP framework contain role boundaries within each emergency service; 
and offer useful guidance to local emergency response teams for the purposes of 
managing incidents. Specifically, in their training and adoption of procedures in 
preparation for collaboration and leadership responsibility when working in dangerous 
contexts, co-ordinating larger scale responses and multi-agency working.  
Although there are operational guidelines, the lack of empirical research in leadership 
means there is insufficient knowledge and understanding about how leaders operate in 
dangerous contexts and HROs (Hannah et al, 2009; Hannah et al, 2010), what constitutes 
effective leadership in dangerous contexts (Hannah et al, 2010) and the processes 
leaders enact in dangerous contexts (Baran & Scott, 2010). As a result, further research 
of leadership in contexts characterised by danger, threat and risk is required (Hannah et 
al, 2009), as such research could potentially inform preparation for leadership training 
within HROs. 
In order to address these gaps in knowledge, this research seeks to examine how 
emergency response teams construct leadership and danger, how danger influences 
leadership, focusing on the social processes by which teams enact leadership in 
dangerous contexts. This study draws from theoretical leadership frameworks that speak 
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to leadership within contexts that are characterised by danger and threat and which have 
high levels of ambiguity.  
1.2 Contextualising the Study and Key Concepts 
 
Emergency services; such as police, fire and ambulance face situations dangerous to 
their personnel and those that they protect and serve. Leaders and their teams are tasked 
with making sense (Weick, 1993, 1995, 2005; Hannah et al, 2009) of these contexts, 
creating strategies and employing processes (Baran and Scott, 2010) to avoid potential 
threats and to resolve issues as they emerge (Uhl-Bien et al, 2007). Leadership is tasked 
in these contexts to ensure that, through social processes and interaction, team members 
make sense and have aligned understanding, and produce an effective response (Hannah 
et al, 2009). This is challenged by situations characterised by high ambiguity, weak 
information, rapidly unfolding risks and threats to life. 
Dangerous contexts - Campbell & Hannah (2010, p.3) defined dangerous contexts in a 
similar way to extreme contexts as “those in which leaders or their followers are 
personally faced with highly dynamic and unpredictable situations and where the 
outcomes of leadership may result in severe physical or psychological injury (or death) to 
unit members”. This definition identifies ‘extreme’ contexts as being unpredictable and 
having potentially severe outcomes. This study adopts the term of ‘dangerous context’ 
and understands a dangerous context as, an ambiguous context in which there is 
significant immediate threat, physically, psychologically or materially to individuals or 
organisations and which falls outside the expected normal way of working.  
Dangerous contexts characterised by ambiguity and uncertainty (Hannah et al, 2009), are 
examples of where the perception of the world changes, events often unfolding quickly 
which are unexpected, disrupting the sense making of teams. Throughout this study, 
Weick’s concept of Sense Making will be deployed. This materialises as a process of 
people extracting cues from the social context, retrospectively developing plausible 
understanding (or sense) from the context and enacting (through action) to restore order 
in the context (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2005).  
Leadership and Social leadership processes - It is important to clarify how leadership 
and processes of leadership are conceptualised within this study. This study views 
leadership as the interplay of a multiplicity of social processes. By this, it is meant that the 
study focuses on leadership as it is jointly enacted across the leader and the team, rather 
than individual leader cognitive processing (Bardis, 1978). In the context of danger, 
emphasis is placed on the effectiveness of leadership in producing adaptive responses, 
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and team processes that promote effective leadership, such as team integration and 
interaction (Zaccaro et al, 2001). Lichtenstein et al (2006, p.2) concurs with leadership as 
social, finding leadership to be a process which is “a dynamic which transcends the 
capabilities of individuals alone … product of interaction, tension and exchange rules”. 
 
Leadership is constructed by this study to be a series of social processes. Bardis (1978, 
p.148) described social processes as the “observable, repetitive patterns of social 
interaction that have a consistent direction or quality”. This study interprets this definition, 
suggesting that social processes are ongoing interactions between person to person, 
person to group (or vice versa) or group to group, with an identified purpose and expected 
level of reciprocation in quality of interaction. Although this is a definition from forty years 
ago, the concept of ‘social’ has retained an interactive basis based on communication 
between individuals. 
There are constraints (Colville et al, 2013) to the effectiveness of social processes such 
as Sense Making and the alignment of understanding of leaders and teams working in 
dangerous contexts (Combe & Carrington, 2015). Such constraints arise from situations 
with high ambiguity and complexities that are open to multiple and potential conflicts 
between interpretations of the context (Weick, 1993). Contextual ambiguity, created by 
limited information, failing role structures in this context (Weick, 1993), and the failure of 
leaders and their teams to create a shared understanding (Weick, 1993) and collectively 
make sense of and provide adaptive responses to the situation, is often the cause of a 
situation to become worse, potentially disastrous (Kayes, 2004).    
Mistakes are made when people are not able to make sense of their situation (Kayes, 
2004).  Situations become even more difficult when information about the situation is 
distributed amongst the group members, and each member of the group has interpreted 
the situation differently (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2005). A problem arises for leadership 
in this situation as, in order to take effective action, leadership is tasked with reconciling 
these views (Maitlis,2005; Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2005) and ineffective leadership in 
these instances can result in death or injury (Kolditz, 2007).  
In conventional leadership studies (Day et al, 2014; Dinh et al, 2014), leadership is viewed 
as a social process which enables coordination of efforts across teams to resolve 
problems and deliver organisational objectives.  The role of the leader in dangerous 
contexts is especially important to address.  This is because leader(s) are the people 
relied upon to provide adaptive responses to problems (Mumford et al, 2007). Military 
combat leadership literature suggests leaders need to adapt to the “environmental, 
physiological, cognitive and emotional stressors experienced in a life-threatening 
environment” (Fisher, Hutchings & Sarros, 2010, p.91). Fisher et al, (2010) offer a differing 
Page 16 of 273 
 
perspective of leadership in dangerous contexts by describing it as leadership ‘in 
extremis’. In extremis leadership is defined as “giving purpose, motivation and direction to 
people when there is eminent physical danger, and where followers believe that leader 
behaviour will influence their physical well-being or survival” (Kolditz & Brazil, 2005, 
p.347).  
There are also legal parameters which differentiate the context of civil emergency 
organisations and the military, especially when in a state of ‘armed conflict’.  Examples of 
this include, ‘proportionality’ and ‘distinction’ (MoD, 2004); wherein distinction refers to the 
categorising of combatants and non-combatants, and proportionality refers to the 
acceptable loss of civilian life to achieve specific military strategy.  This is fundamentally 
different to the context facing civil emergency organisations, which seek to protect all 
human life.  Furthermore, in accordance with the Armed Forces Act 2006 (HM 
Government, 2006), a soldier who refuses to undertake orders can be arrested for 
desertion.  Wherein civil response organisations, it is the choice of the individual whether 
to risk their own life in responding to danger.  This is a key differentiating factor.  This 
additional contextual factor of the legal parameters under which the military and civil 
emergency organisations operate is a further reason why the military context does not 
form part of this study. 
Although this study is not focused on military contexts, there are similarities within the 
concept of facing danger, whereby at the critical point of crisis, the leader role and 
leadership provided is pivotal to the outcome of the event. Hence in a situation where the 
outcome can be the difference between life and death of the group members, groups that 
have established common goals, a shared understanding of threats and have a clear 
understanding of process and what is expected from each group member will have 
increased chance of survival (Weick,1993). Hannah, Matthews and Campbell (2010) 
support these leadership processes stating that where group members identify with the 
collective, and they have similar values, they will be “better buffered” from the negative 
elements of the dangerous context or threat (p.173). Addressing calls for further research 
in this context (Burke et al, 2018; Baran & Scott, 2010; Hannah et al, 2009), the next 
section outlines the research questions of this study. 
1.2.1 Research questions 
This study seeks to respond to the under researched area of leadership, which questions 
how individuals lead in extreme contexts (Hannah et al 2009). The overarching research 
question that this study seeks to explore is:  
How is leadership enacted in dangerous contexts? 
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The four additional sub-questions below relate to the overall research question, and will 
be addressed through the study: 
 
• How do teams working in dangerous contexts construct leadership? 
• How do teams working in dangerous contexts construct danger? 
• How does danger influence leadership processes? 
• What are the leadership processes of teams working in dangerous contexts? 
 
1.2.2 Research Objectives 
In order to address the research questions above, the study has set six research 
objectives which will guide each chapter in the thesis.  
 
• To critique and build on existing theory of leadership by developing the concept of 
leadership in dangerous contexts. 
 
• To explore the theoretical area of leadership in dangerous contexts by identifying 
existing leadership processes in the literature. 
 
• To adopt a relevant qualitative methodological framework for data collection and 
analysis to capture the participant voices. 
 
• To conduct thematic analysis of data to generate in depth understanding of leadership 
in dangerous contexts through the lens of teams. 
 
• To add to the existing theoretical area of leadership in dangerous contexts by identifying 
leadership processes. 
 
• To develop a theoretical framework to contribute to theoretical and practical bases for 
enacting leadership in dangerous contexts. 
1.2.3 Motivations for the study 
I am undertaking a doctoral study as a Graduate Tutor, a role I began in December 2013. 
Leadership has always been a topic of interest to me and was the reason I began my 
Undergraduate studies in 2004 focusing on leadership and management. I worked as a 
manager in a utilities company with a team of twelve staff looking to me for leadership. 
After my Undergraduate studies, I began working in education and managed a team of 
professional support staff. My knowledge of leadership was limited so I also focused on 
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leadership and human resource management for my Postgraduate studies and staff 
development for my Master’s degree. I wanted to understand people, learn how to lead, 
develop staff and explore and develop my personal leadership style.  
Just prior to starting my current role, I was involved in a full organisational professional 
support staff re-structure. Through the re-structure, I was exposed to the raw emotional, 
personal and professional impact of such a large change and the ambiguity the change 
process created in the teams, such as reduced staffing and scarce information sharing. 
The restructure process was long, intense and difficult for team members and proved 
challenging for leadership of the team. I was tasked with managing and supporting a team 
experiencing this and, as a result, my interest in leadership developed, specifically in 
times of crisis. 
When researching a suitable topic for PhD study, this experience was fresh in my mind 
and I was concerned at the lack of understanding in the field. My initial thoughts focused 
on organisational change. However, the concept of crisis was of higher interest and 
related more closely to my experiences. My team were plunged into personal and 
professional crisis and my knowledge of how to lead through this level of difficult change 
was limited. An initial exploration of crisis literature soon led me to literature of those 
working ‘In Extremis’ (Fisher et al, 2010).  
These studies relate closely to extreme sports in comparison to taking an organisational 
approach and therefore were not directly relevant for the scope of this study. They were, 
however, useful in providing in-depth knowledge about the nature of challenges faced by 
teams in these environments. My review of the literature finally led me to focus on 
emergency services contexts. These teams presented as a purposeful sample as they 
face danger on a daily basis and the way leadership is enacted was of particular interest 
in order to answer my research question. This also worked well as I felt access to these 
teams would be possible.  
1.3 Potential theoretical contributions  
 
Creswell (2013, p.129) proposes, “good qualitative study begins with the identification of a 
clear problem to be studied”.  The review of the literature, in the following chapter (chapter 
two), demonstrates that there is insufficient knowledge about how leadership is enacted 
within teams operating in dangerous contexts (Hannah et al, 2009; Campbell et al, 2013). 
It is useful to recall at this point how dangerous contexts are conceptualised for this study: 
as having high levels of complexity (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001; Uhl-Bien, Marion & 
McKelvey, 2007; Hannah et al, 2009), where situational ambiguity is high and resources, 
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information and time are restricted or limited. This study responds to gaps in knowledge of 
leadership in dangerous contexts by identifying current contributions in the literature and 
acknowledging where further knowledge is required to explore leadership in teams, in 
order to understand and respond to a dangerous and complex situation (Hannah, 
Campbell & Matthews, 2010). As discussed in chapter two, there are calls from recent 
studies to explore leadership in extreme contexts, more specifically “non-traditional 
leadership structures” (Hayes & Foti, 2013, p.47) where leadership is emergent, thereby 
moving away from more formal leader-centric structures of leadership.   
The literature review establishes that there are limited studies that address teams working 
in dangerous contexts, particularly studies that focus on emergency response teams. The 
most recent study (although differentiated from this study in that they explore extreme 
teams) conducted by Burke et al (2018) acknowledges that there is significant work 
required to unpack leadership in teams; specifically, how leadership manifests in extreme 
environments and the relationship between leadership processes and their importance 
throughout stages of an incident. To answer these calls is to explore leadership in real 
world settings by designing rigorous empirical studies that set out to extend the limited 
current theoretical base (Barnett & McCormick, 2012; Hannah et al, 2010). 
Grint (2005, p.1479), in his exploration of the social construct of leadership, acknowledges 
that there are leadership processes “already tried and tested”.  For example, adopting a 
contingency approach to leadership in the training of police cadets. However, he 
acknowledges that new processual frameworks need to be developed in the leadership 
and management of what he constitutes as ‘wicked problems’ or novel, unanticipated and 
potentially unique environments such as dangerous contexts. This study seeks to build on 
leadership in teams working in dangerous environments through empirical investigation of 
emergency response teams. The study seeks to examine leadership emergence and 
processes within emergency response teams; to develop a theoretical framework which 
addresses the importance of processes identified across the stages of incidents.  
Additionally, methodologically, this study looks to address this gap in knowledge by 
conducting focus groups with the teams that work in dangerous contexts. Focus groups 
are a popular method for gathering qualitative data in studies primarily exploring team 
dynamics (Morrison-Beedy et al, 2001, Zaccaro et al, 2001). Due to limited studies in 
emergency response teams, focus groups with these teams and the unique antecedents 
of a dangerous context can contribute to methodology in this area.  To support this claim, 
recent studies have stated that a shift in focus of studies would be useful, from the leader 
of a group or team to the emergence of leadership within the team and shared processes 
of leadership (Burke et al, 2018; Hayes & Foti, 2013). Current studies on teams working in 
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dangerous contexts do not focus on the team but on the team leader, and therefore this 
study seeks to shift the level of analysis. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter One – Introduction: The chapter outlines the theoretical focus of this study and 
contextualises this, considering the gap in the current literature regarding leadership in 
dangerous contexts and addresses the motivations for undertaking study into leadership 
and the issues facing operational emergency response teams. The research question, 
sub-questions and objectives are outlined. 
Chapter Two – Context of team leadership and leadership processes in dangerous 
contexts: This chapter provides a critical review of the literature in three parts. The first 
part provides a process for the review of the literature. The second part seeks to 
contextualise leadership as it pertains to dangerous contexts. The third part focuses on 
leadership and social leadership processes in dangerous contexts and highlights the 
limitations of current studies. Key categories from the literature include social processes of 
leadership, adaptive leadership, leadership complexity and shared 
leadership/sensemaking. 
Chapter Three – Methodology: This chapter addresses the methodological approach, 
study design and methods used to undertake the study. The researcher’s philosophical 
position of social constructionism is discussed and justified, and the process adopted for 
analysis, namely thematic analysis of the outputs of eight focus groups, is outlined. The 
ethical considerations of this study are also addressed. 
Chapter Four – Findings: This chapter presents the findings of the study. Findings are 
presented as a template of categories, themes and sub-themes which emerged during the 
focus groups. Key categories include participant perception of danger, influence of danger 
on leadership and leadership processes. These are discussed in detail with verbatim 
comments to ensure the participant voice is accurately represented. 
Chapter Five – Discussion and contributions: This chapter highlights where the 
findings of this study challenge, extend or add to the existing knowledge base, and 
provides theoretical contributions. This is undertaken through synthesis of the key 
categories emerging in the findings chapter and current literature in chapter two. Key 
contributions of this synthesis are presented, including conceptualisation of leadership in 
dangerous contexts as being fluid, social leadership processes during the stages of an 
incident and a new process identified of predicting team member actions.  
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Chapter Six – Conclusions and reflections of the study: This chapter outlines how the 
study has addressed the research question, sub-questions, and objectives. Areas for 
future research are also proposed, such as comparative studies between emergency 
response and the military context. The chapter discusses the evaluative framework 
adopted in the study, namely Lincoln and Guba (1995), to ensure the credibility, reliability, 
and validity of the research. Finally, the researcher undertakes a reflective analysis of 
undertaking this study and highlights lessons learned throughout the process.  
1.5 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has introduced the areas of focus in this study. The study is contextualised, 
and the researcher has addressed the motivations for the study. Potential theoretical and 
methodological contributions of the research have been addressed. The research 
question, sub-questions and research objectives have been outlined and will be referred 
to throughout the thesis.  In the next chapter, the context of leadership, team leadership 
and leadership processes will be explored in more depth as part of the critical literature 
review. 
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Chapter 2 - Context of team leadership and leadership 
processes in dangerous contexts 
2.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a critical review of literature in three parts. The first part frames and 
outlines the scope of the literature review. The second part seeks to contextualise 
leadership as it pertains to this study. The third part focuses on leadership and team 
leadership processes. The chapter as a whole addresses the following two research 
objectives: 
• To critique and build on existing theory of leadership by developing the concept 
of leadership in dangerous contexts. 
 
• To explore the theoretical area of leadership in dangerous contexts by identifying 
existing leadership processes in the literature. 
 
The second part of the literature review contextualises leadership, specifically focusing on 
the dangerous contexts in which emergency response teams operate. This sets the scope 
of the research of leadership within the boundaries of this type of working environment. 
Constructions of dangerous contexts are explored, followed by an analysis of the 
components that underpin this understanding. This includes the contextual nuances of 
working in dangerous contexts, and the potential adaptive challenges that dangerous 
contexts elicit. These components will help to determine a provisional conceptualisation of 
dangerous contexts and draw parameters that are used to frame the research of 
leadership and team leadership processes. 
The third part of the literature review is focused on leadership and team leadership 
processes. This section focuses on and builds a provisional conceptualisation of how 
leadership is constructed and how it is enacted through the social processes in dangerous 
contexts. The review of empirical studies in dangerous contexts enabled identification of 
relevant leadership processes.  
Key empirical research studies investigating emergency response organisations working 
in dangerous contexts are analysed. Specifically, team-based leadership styles are 
identified, and leadership processes analysed. Finally, the theoretical implications and 
potential contributions of this study are proposed and discussed. The next section 
discusses how the literature review is framed and how the scope of the literature review is 
outlined. 
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2.1.1 Framing the literature review 
Research into leadership has been vast in recent decades with a wealth of empirical 
research on established and evolving theories (Battilana et al, 2010; Day et al, 2014; Dinh 
et al, 2014; Hannah et al, 2014 & O’Connell, P. 2014).  There is research on leader 
effectiveness (for example; Yukl, 2002), largely focused in conventional organisational 
contexts which are more stable with lower ambiguity (Baran & Scott, 2010). Despite the 
wealth of research identified on leadership, there has been limited research in extreme 
and dangerous contexts; “leadership in extreme contexts may be one of the least 
researched areas in the leadership field” (Hannah et al, 2009, p.897). There have been 
some studies in this area, for example Uhl-Bien et al (2007) and Baran and Scott (2010). 
However, there has been little focus on how leadership is enacted in dangerous contexts. 
Many studies of conventional leadership discuss the concept of effectiveness (Campbell 
et al, 2010) and “fostering team success” (Morgeson et al, 2010, p.5). The focus of these 
studies is to measure effective leadership, developing models and frameworks for a range 
of situations and contexts (Battilana et al, 2010; Day et al, 2014; Dinh et al, 2014; 
O’Connell, P. 2014). Today’s fast paced complex work environments (Marcy & Mumford, 
2010, p.1) are challenging, meaning that “Leaders working in complex systems need to 
personally master the capacity for absorption or learning, adaption or change, and change 
management”. In support of this, Randall and Shullman (2010, p.94) state that 
“organisations are increasingly complex, and their operating environments are 
increasingly ambiguous and demand faster solutions”. This requires adaptive responses 
from leaders and their teams. Research in the last decade acknowledges that leaders are 
operating in a “new environment” (O’Connell, 2014, p.184).  
Not enough is known about dangerous contexts, with Hannah et al (2009, p.898) stating 
that dangerous contexts have characteristics that create “unique contingencies, 
constraints and causations” that will influence leadership, in comparison to more 
conventional situations. Campbell (2010) concurs, suggesting that context directly 
influences leadership and, even more significantly, that there is a correlation between the 
extremity of the context and the impact it has on leadership.  Osborn et al, (2002) 
suggests it is perhaps dangerous contexts where adaptive leadership is needed the most.  
Understanding how leadership is enacted in dangerous contexts is important because the 
adaptive responses of teams can mean the difference between life and death. Adaptive 
leadership is discussed in the literature (Lord and Hall, 2005; Nelson et al, 2010) in terms 
of its importance to conventional leadership. Authors cite the lack of studies of adaptive 
leadership in dangerous contexts, proposing this theory needs to be broadened into the 
dangerous context (Yukl and Mahsud, 2010; Norton, 2010). 
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Exploring current constructions of dangerous contexts is useful to this study as the 
process of analysing recent studies will provide further contextual parameters for the 
study. Current leadership literature has little empirical research in contexts (Hannah, 
Campbell & Matthews, 2010) characterised by risk of severe physical, psychological or 
material harm. Military based studies, which investigate a specific type of danger, 
unsurprisingly state that these contexts are where leadership is most critical (Yammarino, 
2010; Campbell et al, 2010).   
The literature review began with a broad range of conventional leadership studies and 
narrowed as the scope became increasingly refined to the most relevant contemporary 
studies of leadership in dangerous contexts. A limitation of extant studies is the ability to 
observe leadership within dangerous contexts. Campbell et al (2010) state the challenge 
involved in achieving observation of those working in dangerous contexts, as researchers 
would possibly face danger by doing this.  
Burke et al (2018) concur with this, stating there are challenges due to contextual 
ambiguities, and acknowledging that there are few primary sources of data emerging from 
studies.  This therefore limited the sources of primary insight into dangerous contexts. The 
literature instead appeared to be drawn retrospectively from secondary sources such as 
government or organisational reports and inquiries into large, extreme incidents or multi-
casualty events.  
A limited number of primary sources of data, can potentially limit researcher 
understanding of responding teams, specifically leadership processes guiding decision 
making, and the contextual influences. This is a potentially significant theoretical gap as 
although theory can be generated from logical induction (Whetten, 1989) it is 
acknowledged that stronger contribution to theory is generated by accessing the 
constructed reality of the participants directly (Lee, 2014). 
In setting the boundaries of this research, there are military studies which are referenced 
and discussed within the review, as they address the concept of leadership, danger and 
responses to danger. The study is not focused on military contexts, however, as there are 
contextual differences between the nature of operational combat and emergency 
response teams, and differences between the relationship of rank, command and control 
between military and public sector organisations. It is acknowledged in the final section of 
the review that investigation into the differences between emergency response teams and 
the military may warrant future study.  
Similarly, although it is acknowledged that individual leader behaviours and traits 
contribute to the enactment of leadership processes and they are therefore referred to, 
these are not the primary focus of this study, which has the team as the unit of analysis.  
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Finally, the study does not address leadership in conventional working contexts; for 
example, a marketing team working in a conventional (non-dangerous) office 
environment. Leadership processes identified in conventional team leadership literature 
are analysed to provide a baseline to inform investigation into leadership processes in 
dangerous contexts. The review, however, concentrates on providing analysis of studies 
conducted in dangerous contexts and focuses primarily on empirical studies of emergency 
response teams. 
The next section discusses the contextualisation of leadership. It discusses the role of 
emergency response teams working in context, addresses understandings of dangerous 
contexts and sets the scene and the parameters of leadership in teams working in 
dangerous contexts. 
2.2 Contextualising leadership 
 
A first step to contextualising leadership in this study is to view it through the lens of 
leadership as enacted within an emergency response team. In doing so, the research 
boundaries stated above become clarified. This section discusses the importance of 
context in leadership research, the place of emergency response teams in high reliability 
organisations and explores constructions of dangerous contexts in contemporary 
literature. 
Context is of specific importance to the consideration of leadership. Leadership response 
is broadly dependent on the nature of the context, situational requirements and 
contingencies, as will be shown. Campbell et al (2010) state that leadership literature has 
somewhat neglected the ‘context’ of leadership stating that there is still not enough 
empirical data to show how leaders assess situations. This is with specific reference to all 
leadership literature, not only dangerous context literature. Leadership is contextualised 
when confronting danger “such that specific causations and contingencies occur that are 
not present in non-dangerous contexts” (Hannah et al, 2010, p.157). Leadership research 
in dangerous contexts places emphasis on contextual influences and adopting contextual 
approaches to leadership. In such environments, there is difficultly in removing leadership 
from the context and when discussed from a social constructionist perspective, the 
context is inseparable from the phenomenon (Crotty, 1998).  
Despite this, a contextual view of leadership has often been ‘neglected’ in the current 
leadership literature (Osborn et al, 2002, p.797). This study supports Osborn et al in 
suggesting that leadership is inherently contextualised: “socially constructed in and from a 
context … change the context and the leadership changes” (Osborn et al, 2002, p.798).  
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Although this study does not seek to contribute to emerging contextual leadership theory, 
this theory is relevant to the way that the term leadership is conceptualised. For example, 
Osborn et al (2002, p.797) conceptualise leadership as not being only found within the 
individual leader and intrapersonal processes but as a social and interpersonal process, 
influenced inherently by the situation. 
If this study adopted a situational approach to leadership, this would present limitations, 
as the situation in a dangerous context is dynamically changing and therefore resistant to 
efforts to provide a specific set of prescribed responses for leaders and followers. Studies 
of dangerous contexts note that each situation has its own “unique attenuators and 
intensifiers”, such as time and levels of complexity (Hannah et al, 2009, p.898). There 
have been calls for further research into contextual factors influencing leadership in an 
effort to enhance leadership theory and “operational definitions of leadership” (Hannah et 
al, 2009, p.898; Fisher, Hutchings & Sarros, 2010, p.116). In this regard, the nature of 
danger presents the argument that teams working in dangerous contexts require further 
in-depth understanding of leadership processes to be effective and therefore, this is where 
leadership is needed the most (Campbell et al, 2010). The following section addresses the 
contextual and situational challenges facing high reliability organisations and the 
emergency response working context. 
2.2.1 High Reliability Organisations and Emergency Response Teams 
Emergency response teams, such as police, fire and ambulance are teams working in 
High Reliability Organisations (HROs) (Sutcliffe, 2011). Those working in Emergency 
services do so in the knowledge that there is a potential to work every day in a dangerous 
context (Baran & Scott, 2010; Weick, 1995). Emergency services such as the Police, 
Ambulance and Fire Services (as well as military organisations) are described by Hannah 
et al (2009) as organisations that focus on safety and crisis prevention. Teams face the 
potential of threat to their lives and those to whom they are responsible every day. Teams 
often arrive at scenes that are disturbing, dangerous to them and others; have high levels 
of ambiguity, and are chaotic (Busby & Iszatt-White, 2014). Busby and Iszatt-White (2014, 
p.69) discuss dangerous contexts as highly demanding environments, where ‘reliability’ is 
a key construct central to effective working, describing the term as “an important 
competency made possible by organisation”. There is significant focus on the process of 
organising, seeing the concept of reliability as fundamental to the purpose of organising.   
The concept of the HRO, developed by researchers at the University of California, 
Berkley, focuses on providing safe and reliable performance in dynamic contexts 
(Sutcliffe, 2011).  Building on this, the introduction of concepts such as ‘safe’ and 
‘performance’ implies the existence of organisational processes in place to manage and 
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measure the dynamic context. Yet there are few studies which have attempted to 
measure these processes or the contextual influences (Weick, 1995). Hannah et al’s 
(2009) analysis extends this, suggesting a need for HROs to develop processes which 
can anticipate dynamic change. Previous research has explored how leaders exhibit 
influence over others (Yukl, 2002), by looking at leader behaviours, processes and 
antecedents such as experience and knowledge. Weick (1993) states that to ensure the 
creation and maintenance of coherent understanding in dynamic and turbulent contexts, it 
is important to maintain relationships and facilitate collective action processes.  
Although the focus of this review is not at the organisational level and therefore does not 
seek to analyse HROs; it does acknowledge that these organisations have established 
cultures with idiosyncratic methods of operating, which influence team behaviour. For 
example, current literature suggests that HROs are organisations that demand perfection 
(Sutcliffe, 2011) because, as has already established, the consequences of getting things 
wrong can be disastrous for those that rely heavily on them. Klein et al (2006, p.616) 
support this claim, stating that a characteristic defining HROs is that “organisational 
members cannot adopt trial and error or experimental learning processes”, as there can 
be consequences to the general public and to the teams for which designated leaders in 
this environment are responsible.  
There is an expectation of dependability on HROs to do what others cannot and achieve 
what others will not (Busby & Iszatt-White, 2014, p.69). The expectation for the standards 
of performance in HROs is detailed in their internal documentation, performance targets. 
and regulation. Weick and Roberts’ (1993, p.357) study of flight operations on aircraft 
carriers, for example, looked at situations which required continuous operational reliability, 
stating that “some organisations require nearly error free operations all the time because 
otherwise they are capable of experiencing catastrophes”.  Emphasis is also placed by 
Busby and Iszatt-White (2014, p.69) on the potential for errors to have “catastrophic 
consequences”. 
Baran and Scott (2010, p.47) support the need for adaptive leadership responses stating 
that HROs typically have “many formal procedures and guidelines intended to enable and 
constrain crisis responses” and support the notion that leaders need to embark on a 
process of negotiation to form a response. This suggests that it is necessary for the leader 
to account for all aspects of their environment to achieve the adaptive response required 
for a successful outcome.  To achieve this involves individual, collective and shared 
understanding of all parties involved. Leaders working in dangerous contexts do not and 
cannot work alone.  
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The focus of this study, and the unit of analysis, is the team. This is because emergency 
responders working in dangerous contexts are organised and structured into teams, in 
order to be able to respond to the wide range of situations which can occur. Leadership in 
such teams needs to respond to contexts that have unknown and unexpected risk factors, 
where the actions of team members can have unintended consequences, and where 
there is significant potential for error. An effective leadership role in these circumstances 
is to create order from the chaos (Weick, 1995). Dangerous contexts have unique causes 
and contingencies which influence the ability of leaders to create order, due to complex 
and dynamically changing circumstances.  
Campbell et al (2010, p.S2) support this by stating that work into teams facing danger is 
essential if “behavioural scientists are ever to generate ideas, theories and techniques to 
better prepare individuals to lead in such contexts and to overcome the leadership 
challenges such environments pose”. For emergency response teams, this notion of 
developing leadership capabilities across team members is essential as their responses 
can make the difference between life and death. Having discussed the responding 
organisation context, the following section explores contemporary constructions of the 
nature of danger. 
2.2.2 Exploring constructions of dangerous contexts 
In this section, this study’s definition of dangerous contexts, and how this differs from 
concepts such as extreme and crisis contexts, is discussed. 
There is limited research that addresses leadership using the term extreme contexts 
(Hannah et al, 2009 & 2010; Yammarino et al, 2010; Samuels et al, 2010; Fisher et al, 
2010) This section discusses literature which refers to extreme contexts, often used 
interchangeably with dangerous contexts. Distinctions between the two concepts are 
useful to this research as different components apply to make an incident extreme. As a 
reminder to the reader, dangerous contexts (primarily identified in military leadership 
literature) are where risks of severe physical harm to organisational members or their 
constituents exist (Hannah et al, 2010). 
Although there are several similarities in the varying definitions of extreme contexts, 
leadership literature does not propose a definitive definition and instead authors have 
chosen to provide definitions and parameters which relate to their study’s contexts. 
Common themes can, however, be identified which align with the focus of this study. 
Namely, that there is ambiguity and uncertainty, and that there are unique properties that 
influence leadership processes and therefore team adaptive capacity. As there is no firm 
definition that has the consensus from previous researchers in the crisis literature, this 
study draws from Hannah et al (2009) and makes differentiation between the term’s crisis 
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and an extreme context by highlighting the variable of danger to oneself or others. This 
study is consistent in that it maintains that the context is non-routine, and out-with 
conventional operation.  
Hannah et al (2009), contributes to leadership in dangerous context literature by 
distinguishing between extreme contexts, extreme events and crisis. This is to 
demonstrate that each term requires a separate but related definition. Hannah et al (2009) 
acknowledge that an extreme context or event can exhibit characteristics that can also 
align within the definitions of crisis.  There is significant leadership literature that 
addresses the term ‘crisis’ as a specific context for understanding leadership; in particular, 
leader cognition; adaptive leadership and effective leader performance (Osborn et al, 
2002; Baran & Scott, 2010; Vessey et al, 2011; Morrell & Brammer, 2014; Mumford et al, 
2007 & 2015; Combe & Carrington, 2015; Partlow et al, 2015). For the purposes of this 
study, the term ‘dangerous’ is adopted as it describes the immediate potential harm facing 
emergency response teams.  
There is limited literature defining a dangerous context and little consensus regarding the 
criteria that distinguish an extreme context from a crisis. This is highly subjective and 
influenced by the perspective of leaders in these contexts, and their interpretation of the 
event or situation. In response to this, the literature exploring perspectives of crisis and 
extreme contexts was explored to enhance the lens through which literature of leadership 
in dangerous contexts was analysed. Each term represents a different set of 
characteristics from which parameters were established for this study.  
Extreme events are “discrete events of ‘intolerable magnitude, where the goals (life or 
safety) are not just of high priority but are imperative, and at that point unique properties 
bear on leadership that are not present at lower levels of threat or crisis” (Hannah et al, 
2009, p.898). This concept of extremity is closely aligned in this situation with danger, 
where life and safety are at risk, but this is not always the situation. An extreme event may 
not involve danger but could be of a significant magnitude.  Extremity is interestingly 
distinguished from crisis, as potentially being on a continuum based on the potential for 
risk or harm.   
Hannah et al (2009) further emphasise this distinction of the term ‘Crisis’, describing it as 
a lesser (in magnitude) event or context. They define a crisis as “an episode or event of 
low probability and characterised by ambiguity of cause, effect and means of resolution” 
(p.899). Similar definitions categorise crisis as an ‘uncertain event’ (Coombs, 2012) and a 
“messy and paradoxical situation” (Holt & Cornelissen, 2014). Hannah et al (2009, p.899) 
additionally describe crisis as “a threat to high priority goals which occurs with little or no 
response time”. Whilst some correlation between the characteristics of the terms Crisis 
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and Extreme contexts is relevant to this research, the literature acknowledges that Crisis 
is also used as a term to explain “relatively mundane contexts” (Hannah et al, 2009, 
p.899) and this is not where this research will be focused.  Extreme contexts have a 
similar definition and are described as: 
“an environment where one or more extreme events are occurring that may 
exceed an organisation’s capacity to prevent and result in an extensive and 
intolerable magnitude of physical, psychological or material consequences to-or in 
close physical or psycho-social proximity to-organisation members” (Hannah et al, 
2009, p.897). 
The definition provided by Hannah et al (2009) focuses on situations where there is a risk 
of severe physical harm to the leader and their followers. This does not mean that danger 
to life needs to exist to class a context as extreme, nor does it mean that a low level of 
extremity indicates less danger to life. Extremity is often judged on the scale and scope of 
damage or effect (Hannah et al, 2009). Police officers, doctors and emergency response 
teams may face extreme contexts on a daily basis, for example, road traffic incidents, 
house or commercial fires, but the risk may not be to them as individuals but to others, 
patients and members of the public. It may also not be the risk of life but injury, harm or 
threat either psychological or physical. 
As a reminder to the reader from chapter one and based on the previous discussions, this 
study adopts the term of ‘dangerous context’ and understands a dangerous context as, an 
ambiguous context in which there is significant immediate threat, physically, 
psychologically or materially to individuals or organisations and which falls outside the 
expected normal way of working.  
There have been calls for further research into contextual factors influencing leadership to 
enhance leadership theory and “operational definitions of leadership” (Fisher, Hutchings & 
Sarros, 2010, p.116).  Eberly, Bluhm, Guarana, Avolio and Hannah (2013) adopt a 
transformational leadership approach to examine follower turnover in extreme contexts. 
Their study emphasises that leadership effectiveness might be “amplified or attenuated” in 
extreme contexts, highlighting the importance of adopting a contextualised view of 
leadership. Hannah et al (2009) concur that leadership is contextualised in their 
examination of leadership in extreme contexts; providing a typology, shown below as 
Figure 2.1.  
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Figure 2.1   – Typology of leadership in extreme contexts (Hannah et al, 2009, p.899) 
 
The typology is useful to this study as it is the first attempt by researchers to make sense 
of the concept of extremity levels and to conceptualise leadership differently, combining 
this with contextual causes and contingencies contributing to extremity levels. The focal 
point of the typology is the box titled ‘level of extremity’. The level of extremity is the 
influencing factor on leadership providing an adaptive response to the incident. The 
typology proposes that there are several dimensions of consideration for constructing 
levels of extremity in contexts.  
The location in time; Hannah et al (2009) propose that levels of extremity may not 
always be at their highest during an extreme incident. Using Chernobyl as an example, 
the level of extremity was highest in the aftermath of the incident due to radiation.  The 
magnitude and probability of an extreme event or dangerous incident occurring is a 
consideration and dependent on the level of extremity anticipated or unanticipated which 
will influence adaptive responses. Hannah et al (2009) also highlight that this is also 
dependent on the team formation, for example the number of people in the team. 
Extremity will be perceived as higher to an individual than to a team, where an illusion of 
safety may be perceived. 
Physical or psycho-social proximity is another dimension. Proximity in these two ways 
can assist leadership or hinder it, contributing to the level of extremity of an incident 
(Bass, 1998). For example, if a leader is open and shares information with the team and 
the team are socially integrated, they may be seen as more trustworthy. If the leader is 
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distanced physically or psychologically from the team, this may cause additional levels of 
complexity and extremity but also prove difficult for the enactment of leadership to provide 
appropriate adaptive response.  
The form of threat is a dimension that contributes to levels of extremity; whether the 
threat is physical, psychological or to external material elements. In the case of physical 
threat to life as in dangerous contexts, leadership may be to enact processes that create 
decisive action and adaptive responses. The form of threat will change, and leadership 
needs to react to this change. This study seeks to explore forms of threat further because 
understanding these types of threat in emergency response can help with planning, 
preparation and training for leadership in these contexts. 
Attenuators and intensifiers; the typology also addresses attenuators and intensifiers 
that add complexity to extreme incidents. Attenuators refer to the resources available to 
the organisation, the individual, such as resilience, and the team, such as their social 
network. Levels of extremity are impacted by the organisation, individual and team ability 
and capacity to respond to the evolving situation. Intensifiers, such as time and 
complexity, may involve immediate danger during an incident but an extreme context 
(large disasters) may involve time to compose an adaptive leadership response. 
Level of extremity; As previously mentioned, Hannah et al (2009) note that each context 
has its own unique attenuators and intensifiers, and this will determine the adaptive 
leadership response. Although context influences leadership, we would expect those 
effects to be greater and perhaps different from context to context, but this becomes 
prominent when the context becomes more extreme or dangerous (Hannah & Campbell, 
2010).  
Based on the review of the typology of extreme contexts, leaders continually face 
competing goals (Weick et al, 2005). There is an inherent tension between the 
requirement to be efficient and timely against the goal of safety. Both goals are static in 
that they will not change as both are equally important in achieving high reliability but to 
achieve both requires the negotiation of differing parties responsible for each. De Meuse 
et al (2010, p.119) support this, stating that leaders are often faced with novel situations 
“that render existing routines” an inadequate way of working. The deviation from the norm 
then creates a new experience for the leader where De Meuse et al (2010) indicate that 
there is a potential to learn from these experiences, thus becoming “learning agile” and 
able to “perform in novel and first time situations” (p.120). For example: the importance of 
leader’s sense making under extreme contexts becomes clear when it is understood that 
novel and complex conditions can be interpreted and understood in different ways 
(Wolbers & Boersma, 2013).  
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The next part of the literature review addresses leadership and team leadership 
processes. This literature addresses the process that was undertaken to identify the 
theoretical gap in the literature, for the purposes of justifying the contribution of this study, 
and to ensure a robust and systematic process of identifying relevant literature and 
leadership processes. 
2.3 Leadership and team leadership processes 
 
This next section critically reviews contemporary leadership literature, adopting a social 
process approach to leadership and considers the strengths and limitations of studies of 
teams in dangerous contexts and emergency response. 
2.3.1 Leadership as a social process 
Much recent leadership theory has focused on leader/follower relationships (Drath, 
McCauley, Palus, Van-Velsor, O’Connor & McGuire, 2008; Dechurch, Hiller, Murase, Doty 
& Salas, 2010) and the processes of interaction to achieve shared goals. Their research, 
however, often has an individual leader-centric focus. There is limited focus on the social, 
interactive processes of leadership as it is enacted in teams. Despite this apparent lack of 
focus, leadership is viewed as a “process of social influence” (Burke et al, 2018, p.717), 
for example, employing processes such as problem solving as social and interactive 
endeavours. Leadership is further conceptualised as a social process of influencing 
cognitive development through processes of sensemaking, problem solving, planning, and 
developing between team members (Fleishman et al, 1991). 
Lichtenstein et al (2006) states leadership and leadership processes to be relational, inter-
personal and inter-subjectively created. Social processes in this instance are generated in 
the interactions among team members and enacted in context. Hannah and Matthews 
(2010) also state that team processes are representative of social interactions and the 
result of these interactions are demonstrated in the emergent states of the teams. For 
example, cohesion can be viewed as a positive emergent state (Hannah & Matthews, 
2010) for a team and an adaptive outcome. They conceptualise cohesion as a process 
that enables effective leadership and is also an outcome of effective leadership. Eberly et 
al (2013, p72) highlight the importance of “achieving higher order goals through 
communicating purpose”, demonstrating social interaction through human communication 
(Bardis, 1978), in this case the integration and interaction between followers. 
The elements of this discussion which this study adopts as forming a definition of 
leadership is that it is a social process, inter-subjectively created and enacted across the 
team, not simply focused on the individual leader. 
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Regarding the context of this study’s scope, there are few studies within the context of 
danger (Burke et al, 2018); consequently, definitions of leadership in this context are also 
scarce. Adopting an overarching leadership definition is difficult based on the few studies 
investigating the context.  To build a working definition, it is necessary to address studies 
that deviate from conventional contexts and focus on situations that are not perceived as 
normal. An example of this is the financial crisis, or ‘credit crunch’ of 2008 (McConnell, 
2011). Studies of crisis define leadership as managing uncertainty, ambiguity, and levels 
of complexity, as variable factors that one can’t control or eliminate.  
Baran and Scott (2010) extend this definition of leadership. They adopt a complexity 
leadership lens, adding in the element of danger, in the context of the US fire department 
responding to 911 calls. Their research specifically discusses the concept of organising 
ambiguity, which is prompted by dangerous situations and its associated complexities. 
Their focus was on ‘near-miss’ reports from firefighters; specifically, the unexpected 
elements of the context that can suddenly pose danger. An example of this is where 
firefighters were sure a floor was safe to walk on, but where the only means of 
ascertaining this, and therefore managing the ambiguity, was to physically walk on the 
floor.  
Litchenstein et al (2006, p2) discuss leadership as operating within complexity, stating that 
“Leadership theory must transition to new perspectives that account for the complex 
adaptive needs of organizations”. They propose that leadership is a dynamic and 
interactive process, is contextually driven and responds to the adaptive needs and 
requirements of an organisation.   
The definition adopted in this study utilises the key words that currently appear in 
definitions where the context of leadership is highly complex, the situation is ambiguous 
and requires an adaptive response, which may differ from procedure or a normal 
anticipated response. 
Based on this discussion and drawing from the current theoretical literature, the definition 
of leadership that is adopted for this study is: The social process of intra-personal and 
intra-group interaction to achieve goals, by reducing contextual ambiguity and generating 
adaptive outcomes (A synthesis of Lichtenstein et al, 2006; Baran & Scott, 2010; Burke et 
al, 2018; Bardis, 1978; Eberly et al, 2013).  This view sets the unit of analysis at the team 
level. As this study focuses on the relational dynamic, viewing leadership as co-
constructed and inter-subjectively enacted, individual behaviours and traits are excluded 
from the concept of leadership processes.  This aligns with the social constructionist 
approach of this study. 
Page 35 of 273 
 
2.3.2 Team cognition 
Recent researchers of team leadership have given more attention to the processes of 
leader cognition in comparison to social processes (Partlow et al, 2014; Marcy & Mumford 
2010; Mumford, 2007; Combe & Carrington, 2015). This study focuses on teams and does 
not focus on individual leader cognitive processes. This study does however, include the 
concept of team cognition, as the unit of analysis is the team. The current status of the 
research that addresses processes is predominantly quantitative in nature, focusing on 
the interpersonal process of leader cognition (Partlow et al, 2015; Mumford, Watts & 
Partlow, 2015; Vessey, Barrett & Mumford, 2011; Marcy & Mumford, 2010).  As a result, 
there is little focus into the lived experiences of those working in dangerous contexts; their 
insights of leading and sense making.  These aspects are important to inform 
constructions of leadership and the enactment of leadership processes so that teams can 
learn from these experiences and insights. 
What is unclear in the literature are the leadership processes employed during dangerous 
incidents. Campbell et al (2010) posed the query; does the dangerous environment 
warrant a different type or kind of leadership? Studies of leadership in dangerous contexts 
have not identified the processes that appear in these contexts in a way that forms a 
narrative of leadership through an incident.  An example that demonstrates this is the 
case of Mr de Menezes in 2005, who was shot by an armed response police officer on the 
London underground and was later found to be innocent. The incident investigation report 
concluded how officers’ shared sense making within the situation had collapsed earlier in 
the day as more and more information was interpreted by the team incorrectly. Yet the 
comprehension of this lack of ‘sense making’, a process of generating knowledge and 
understanding a situation from the social interactions between team members, was not 
visible until the moment one officer fired the shot; the moment where it was too late to 
rectify the response.    
The officers had experienced what was described as a “new organisational routine” 
(Colville et al, 2013, p.1201), implemented the day before, in preparation for events of that 
nature and had not enacted this new series of processes and procedures before. This 
incident is a useful example of how leadership influences teams facing disruption through 
lack of information, time and clear decisions and this incident is addressed further on in 
this chapter when the enactment of leadership in dangerous contexts is discussed. 
Drawing from the example of Mr de Menezes in 2005, the influence of leaders and their 
thought processes are a primary source of data. However, research has tended to focus on 
the individual cognitions of leaders; for example, mental models, leader’s vision formation 
and forecasting models (Marcy & Mumford, 2010; Partlow et al, 2015). Less attention 
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appears to have been given to the generation of meaning amongst groups and the influence 
this has on the current approaches to leadership and therefore team adaptive responses. 
In contrast, leader cognition research is useful to understand as its relevance is dependent 
on the approach that individual studies take to sense making and how the authors 
conceptualise and adopt the term sense making; for example, researchers identify sense 
making as either an individual or collective process. As a result, there has been some 
interest in “how leaders think” about disruptive and crisis situations (Mumford, Friedrich, 
Caughron & Byrne, 2007). Later in the chapter (section 2.3.11), sense making is addressed 
as a social, collective leadership process. 
2.3.3 Process of reviewing the leadership literature 
The approach adopted to identify leadership processes in the dangerous context literature 
was to identify general team leadership literature and extract these processes. The basis 
of the processes used for this study is Morgeson et al (2010), who provided a synthesis of 
the literature, identifying functions of leadership, albeit their conceptual paper was not 
relating to teams working in dangerous contexts. The processes were grouped into two 
phases of enactment, ‘transition’ and ‘action’ based leadership functions. I reviewed the 
current literature and mapped leadership processes against Morgeson et al’s (2010) 
typology of leadership functions, with the purpose of gaining a holistic picture of the 
processes discussed in the literature.   
The purpose of this study’s review was not to exhaust team leadership literature but to 
provide a mechanism that would filter studies from the vast amount of team leadership 
literature and enable comparison between the amount and type of leadership processes 
appearing in conventional context studies against those appearing in dangerous context 
studies. All leadership process definitions in each study were also collated using this 
method, in order to inform this study’s leadership process definitions in the context of 
danger. 
Categorisation of the studies was undertaken as both team type: conventional, emergency 
response, or military; and context: military, emergency, emergency response, or multi-
disciplinary. Leadership processes were then identified in extreme and dangerous context 
literature, including military studies and studies that discuss leadership in extreme 
environments, such as polar expeditions and mountaineering teams. Leadership 
processes were also identified from current emergency response literature such as 
studies by Baran and Scott (2010) and Weick (1993). 
As the process map has deepened thematically and systematically, the researcher began 
to extract studies that matched the research boundaries, namely; 
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• Articles that address ‘Dangerous Contexts’, 
• Articles that focus on leadership in teams, whether as directive leadership or 
shared leadership, 
• Articles that discuss leadership processes or functions. 
These articles were then grouped as either empirical studies or conceptual articles and 
the definitions of the processes identified in the studies were extracted. The researcher 
therefore had two process maps, one for leadership in all contexts and one for leadership 
in teams in dangerous contexts, which is discussed later in the chapter. 
To demonstrate the current status of the literature in dangerous or emergency contexts, 
table 2.1 below shows a summary of the conceptual articles and empirical studies that 
appear in the literature. The criteria for inclusion into this table was that the article would 
be in the context of danger or extreme environments (a range of team types was included, 
such as military or multi-disciplinary crisis response teams) and/or was focused on 
emergency response teams.   
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Table 2.1 - Summary of leadership and team leadership literature in dangerous or 
emergency contexts 
 
 
Nineteen studies were identified, which fulfilled the criteria of focusing on either dangerous 
environments or emergency response teams. Ten of these studies were based on or 
included the military context, which, as earlier established is a dangerous context for 
teams, but with substantial differences regarding the nature of the danger facing teams. 
There are thirteen empirical studies in military, emergency and crisis response involving 
Author Year Type Focus Team type Context 
Burke et al 2018 Empirical Team leadership Dangerous & 
Extreme teams  
Extreme 
environments 
Uitdewilligen & 
Waller 
2018 Empirical Information sharing and 
decision making 
Multidisciplinary 
teams 
Emergency & 
Crisis situations 
 
Schmutz et al 2018 Empirical Team reflexivity Dangerous & 
Extreme Action 
Teams 
Emergency 
Response 
 
Ramthun & 
Matkin 
2014 Empirical Shared Leadership Dangerous Military Military 
Veestraeten et al 2014 Empirical Team Learning Dangerous Military Military 
Colville, Pye & 
Carter 
2013 Empirical Leadership/ Sense 
making  
Dangerous & 
Complex teams 
Emergency 
Response 
Wolbers & 
Boersma 
2013 Empirical Collective sense making Dangerous ERT Emergency 
response 
Laurence 2011 Conceptual  Leadership Complexity 
& Culture 
Dangerous Military Military 
Campbell et al 2010 Conceptual Leadership Theory Dangerous & Military Emergency 
Response & 
Military 
Baran & Scott 2010 Empirical Leadership Dangerous Emergency 
Response 
Fisher et al 2010 Empirical Leadership 
competencies 
Dangerous Military 
Hannah et al 2010 Conceptual  Leadership Theory Dangerous Military Military 
Samuels et al 2010 Empirical Leadership Theory Dangerous Military Military 
Sweeney 2010 Empirical Team Trust Dangerous Military Military 
Yamarinno et al 2010 Conceptual  Team Dynamics Dangerous Military Military 
Hannah et al 2009 Conceptual Leadership framework Dangerous/ All All 
 
Klein et al 2006 Empirical Leadership/Leader Extreme Action 
Teams 
Emergency/ 
trauma 
Kayes 2004 Empirical Team leadership Dangerous Extreme 
environment 
Weick 1995 Empirical Collapse of sense 
making 
Dangerous Emergency 
response 
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emergency services. Of the thirteen studies, there are only four empirical studies that 
focus on emergency response in the context of danger, thus providing significant limitation 
to current understanding in this contextual and theoretical area.  
This study focuses on the context of public sector emergency response in dangerous 
environments. As mentioned earlier, there is acknowledgement that there is overlap in the 
way emergency response teams and the military operate, and how teams may respond in 
the face of life-threatening situations, but the differences are significant enough to warrant 
specific focus only on emergency response teams. Campbell et al (2010, p.S3) 
acknowledge in support of this view that each type of dangerous or extreme environment 
makes “distinctive demands” on leadership and each context will therefore require 
distinctive leadership approaches and processes.  
There have been two special issues of academic journals containing empirical and 
conceptual accounts of dangerous and extreme contexts. The first set of studies appear in 
a special issue by the Journal of Military Psychology (2010) focusing primarily on military 
contexts (Yamarinno et al, 2010; Sweeney, 2010; Samuels et al, 2010; Fisher et al, 2010 
and Hannah et al, 2010). These studies address leadership competencies and processes 
such as team trust and shared leadership and team learning. The second set of studies 
addressed extreme and emergency contexts more relevant to this study because of their 
non-military focus, appearing in the Journal of Organisational Behaviour (Burke et al, 
2018; Uitdewilligen & Waller, 2018 & Schmutz et al, 2018).  
The most recent study specifically in dangerous contexts (Burke et al, 2018) highlights 
extreme contexts such as polar expeditions, mountain climbing, such as Himalayan 
expeditions, and ocean sailing, including the three capes. These are considered to be the 
most dangerous stretches of ocean sailing due to the size of waves and wind speed. All 
three expedition types are based on teams striving to succeed in highly dangerous and 
volatile conditions. These are very recent studies and important to address as they 
provide justification for further empirical work to be conducted in dangerous and dynamic 
environments, to enhance theoretical understanding (Burke et al, 2018).  
All processes identified in successive empirical studies or conceptual articles reviewed 
were mapped against existing processes from those previously reviewed. If the process 
did not appear, a new process was created. This chosen approach was underpinned by a 
methodology of progressive focusing (Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012). The process of mapping 
leadership processes in the literature is further discussed during chapter three- 
Methodology.   
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Nine articles focusing on emergency response teams appear in the literature reviewed, of 
which only four contain the criteria of being focused on emergency response teams that 
were facing danger to themselves. Table 2.2 below provides a summary of these studies. 
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Table 2.2 – Summary of empirical studies conducted in Emergency Response Team context 
Research Topic Context Epistemology Methodology Findings 
Information 
Management 
during 
Emergency 
Response – 
Wolbers & 
Kees 
Boersma 
(2013) -
multiple 
incident dates 
-results first 
published in 
Stuurman 
(2011). 
Development 
of Collective 
Sense 
Making from 
information – 
Common 
Operational 
Picture – 
Trading Zone 
Disaster 
Exercises 
(Netherlan
ds) 
Analysis of 
Collective 
Sense 
Making 
processes 
– Multi –
organisatio
nal context 
 
Ethnographic 
Study – Multi 
Qualitative 
Methods 
1. Field work – 
Observation of lead 
emergency officers 
in command centres 
- 10 exercises - 
recorded interaction 
2. Recorded 10 
conversations 
3. Interviewed 8 
participants – based 
on recordings asked 
to reflect on the 
collaboration, 
communication, 
their actions and 
decisions 
4. Document Analysis 
for broader 
operational context 
5. Focus on 3 
narratives for 
analysis 
The methods adopted revealed first responder actions and 
interactions in the context of their professional routines. The findings 
demonstrate that ‘it is not just the information that is important for 
coordination but the way in which the information is interpreted and 
subsequently guides the operations of the emergency responders’ 
(p195). The study provided support for the metaphor ‘trading zone’ 
for information through 2 concepts – Actionable Knowledge and 
Reflexivity in action (p196). Issues arising; 
1. Limited understanding in the trading zone of the consequences 
of information for the action and needs of other professionals 
2. Often a dominant narrative which does not allow other 
interpretations to develop 
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Table 2.2 - Continued 
Research Topic Context Epistemology Methodology Findings 
Organising 
Ambiguity – 
A grounded 
theory of 
leadership 
and sense 
making 
within 
dangerous 
contexts – 
Baran & Scott 
(2010) – 
multiple 
incident dates 
Identification 
of Leadership 
processes in 
Dangerous 
contexts 
Firefighters 
– Large 
metropolita
n unit –
South 
eastern 
United 
States 
Grounded 
theory/approach 
– Qualitative – 
Inductive- coding 
strategy of 
reports 
1. Participant Observation visits 
– observe in natural settings 
to assist the analysis of 
documents (40 hours) – Field 
notes 
2. Ethnographic style interviews 
3. Analysis of near miss reports 
(documents) 
The results of the methodological coding strategy revealed 
19 lower order categories of leadership. As an abstraction 
of this data, this collapsed into 8 secondary categories. 
Finally, 3 high order categories and leadership processes 
were proposed as enabling the organisation of ambiguity – 
Framing, Heedful Interrelating and Adjusting. The 
contribution of the study is that they identify “‘a set of 
interrelated processes that help advance theory on 
leadership within dangerous contexts...processes that 
encourage collective sense making and ambiguity 
reduction” (p.64) 
Organising 
to counter 
terrorism- 
Sense 
making 
amidst 
dynamic 
complexity – 
Colville, Pye 
& Carter 
(2013) – 
Officers 
Sense 
making in 
highly 
complex 
situations 
Shooting of 
Jean 
Charles de 
Menzes – 
London 
Undergrou
nd – 
Independe
nt Police 
Complaints 
Commissio
n (IPCC) 
Social 
Constructionist – 
Qualitative Case 
analysis 
Incident report documents were 
analysed to provide data for this 
police report. These were 
collected as part of the 
investigation at the time of the 
incident.  
1. Coding was initially done by 3 
researchers independently. 
2. 3rd Author (experienced police 
officer) developed the case 
and further cluster themes 
developed 
3. Analysis of the relationship 
between themes 
Analysis revealed that the police in this context, introduced 
a novel routine to respond to a novel situation. Doing so at 
the time relied heavily on officers interpreting the routine in 
the same way. However, “an extant frame does not 
necessarily break” (p.1213) with impact on the way people 
relate to the cues and frames they identify. The issue in this 
incident was the number of plausible interpretations for the 
novel situation. The focus of this case analysis was to 
provide lessons learnt during the incident and in the 
theorising of the data to inform future organisations working 
in these dynamic and fast paced contexts. 
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Research Topic Context Epistemology Methodology Findings 
incident date 
22nd July 2005 
The collapse 
of sense 
making – 
Mann Gulch 
Weick (1993) 
– incident 
date August 
5th 1949 
A review and 
analysis of 
the Mann 
Gulch 
disaster 
Firefighting 
teams  
Social 
Constructionist 
Review of documentation of 
inquiry and interviews of survivors 
as retrospective accounts. 
Mann Gulch event was a collapse of Sense-Making; and 
fundamentally, a failure of leadership. The analysis that 
Weick (1993) conducted allows some important insight into 
the way’s groups operate, the relationships between group 
members and the interplay between and social aspect of 
roles and role structure (Weick, 1993, p.636) or lack 
thereof. The nature of the context demonstrates a potential 
for the level of complexity. The amount and intensity of 
complexities increased as danger became more apparent 
and a direct threat to the team. 
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Referencing and analysing the studies identified in the above summary table, the next 
section sets out to frame how danger exerts influences on leadership, the processes of 
leadership and challenges understandings of leadership in comparison to other leadership 
concepts occurring in literature. 
2.3.4 The influence of danger on leadership and team leadership processes 
An account of the disaster of Mann Gulch follows and is discussed in order to provide an 
illustrative example to support understanding of the types of contingencies, attenuators 
and intensifiers present in the dangers faced by emergency response teams, in relation to 
Hannah et al’s (2009) typology of extreme contexts. The account is of the firefighting team 
that were dropped into Mann Gulch in 1949 to put out a forest fire, a fire that was common 
and routine as part of the job. This account is important as its subsequent analysis by 
Weick (1993) in a seminal article on sense-making prompted further investigation of the 
way leadership is enacted in teams facing these kinds of dangers. “Sense Making 
emphasises that people try to make things rationally accountable to themselves and 
others” (Weick,1993, p.635). 
A storm passed over Mann Gulch at 4pm, August 4th, 1949. It is believed that 
lightning set alight a dead tree. At 2.30pm on August 5th, a team of sixteen 
‘smokejumpers’ (Weick, 1993, p.628) flew out from Missoula, Montana in a C-47 
transport aircraft in order to tackle the fire. At the time of Jump, this was a C class 
fire which did not pose a significant threat based on size and perceived extremity 
from the air. There were high winds and one of this crew suffered sickness on the 
aircraft and did not jump. They landed on the south side of Mann Gulch at 4.10pm 
along with their cargo. The parachute that was attached to their radio and 
therefore a vital tool of communication failed to open, and the radio was damaged. 
Ranger Jim Harrison had been fighting the fire alone for 4 hours when the group 
met up with him. They collected their supplies and ate supper. At 5.10pm the 
group began to make their way to the south side of the gulch in order to surround 
the fire. As leaders of the group, Wagner Dodge and Jim Harrison expressed 
concern that the thick forest that they landed near may be a ‘death trap’ (p.628) 
and instructed William Hellman to take the group across to the north side and work 
their way toward the river along the side of the hill. Dodge and Harrison quickly ate 
and re-joined the group at 5.40pm. At the head of the line, Dodge observed the 
flames to his left, on the south slope. 
“Then Dodge saw it” (Weick, 1993, p.629). 200 yards ahead, the fire had crossed 
the Gulch and was heading straight for them. The flames were 30 feet high and 
travelling at 610 feet per minute. Dodge turned the group around and instructed 
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they headed for the ridge at the top of the hill. Moving through high grass the 
flames were catching up to them very quickly. Dodge yelled at the group to ‘drop 
their tools’ (p.629) and watched as he then lit a fire in front of them and ordered 
them to lie down in the area it had burned (the ashes). None of the team followed 
this instruction and they all ran for the top of the hill. As a result of these actions, 
Dodge lived as he lay in the ashes of his ‘escape fire’ (p.629), Two men, Sallee 
and Rumsey made it through a crevice in the rocks on the ridge unburned but the 
rest of the group all perished either at the scene or shortly after.  
13 people died in this disaster, recorded at the time of 5.56pm which was the time 
that the hands on Harrison’s watch melted. Sallee and Dodge walked into the 
Meriweather ranger station at 8.50pm to raise the alarm for help. The dead were 
found in a radius of 100 by 300 yards and it took 450 men five further days to get 
the fire under control. The Forest Service enquiry concluded that “there is no 
evidence of disregard by those responsible for the jumper crew of the elements of 
risk which they are expected to take into account in placing jumper crews on fire” 
(p.629). Despite this, the enquiry concluded that the group would have lived if they 
had followed Dodge’s instruction and lay down in the ashes. 
Weick (1993) conducted a re-analysis of the evidence presented initially by Norman 
McClean (1992) in this disaster, with the purpose of illustrating two areas: why 
organisations unravel and as a result, how can organisations be resilient? Although 
discussions about resilience specifically are not the focus of this study, this account is 
useful to this study in the following ways. Firstly, Weick (1993) concluded that the Mann 
Gulch event was a collapse of Sense-Making; and fundamentally, a failure of leadership. 
Although this study does not seek to answer the questions posed by Weick, the analysis 
he conducted allows some important insight into the ways groups operate, the 
relationships between group members and the interplay between and relational aspect of 
roles and role structure or lack thereof. Secondly, the nature of the context demonstrates 
a potential for the level of complexity. Essentially the amount and intensity of complexities 
increased as danger became more apparent and a direct threat to the team. This 
discussion starts by acknowledging that during the course of the afternoon events, several 
important decisions were made by the leader. 
a. There was a 10:00 fire, meaning they would have it under control by 10am the next 
morning. The jump aircraft pilot had provided this assessment of the fire from above 
before the jump.  
b. The group carried on without radios and therefore cut off from essential 
communication between themselves to services outside the Gulch (such as helicopter 
pilots or other emergency services).  
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c. The leader turned the group around and headed away from the river, which he had 
previously told the group was safe from the fire. 
d. He lit an escape fire and instructed the group members to lie in the ashes 
This account of Mann Gulch demonstrates a clear disruption to leadership and leadership 
processes within the group. There was significant disruption to the processes enabling the 
team to understand their surroundings, to understand the danger they were in (Holt & 
Cornelissen, 2013) and how to respond to the dynamic changing environment.   
At the start of the incident, the information that was received by the team was not 
questioned or challenged, possibly as forest fires were a common or routine occurrence. 
However, this is also likely because there was trust between the team and the leader. The 
team trusted their leader to assess the situation and direct them as he normally would. 
They trusted his and their own experiences of how the job would go, having lunch whilst 
the fire raged on. When the unthinkable and unexpected happened, at the moment of 
crisis, when the team realised that they were not going to outrun the fire and were in 
mortal danger, the trust in the leader failed and they ran.  
Although the leader had conducted a risk assessment of the situation, a lack of 
communication to the team based on time led to a lack of influence from leadership 
processes such as decision making. This example and analysis highlights issues of a 
breakdown in trust in leadership at the moment of facing danger suggesting that despite 
close working relationships and perceived trust, danger has a significant influence on the 
ability of teams to produce effective adaptive responses. Weick (1993) argues that the 
group’s process of decision making, and loss of role system are important contributing 
factors to the problems faced at Mann Gulch. The structure included two leaders, one 
second in command and the rest as crew members. In the moment of crisis, when their 
leader (Dodge) yelled for them to put down their tools, this was the moment when it was 
effectively too late to do anything else to save themselves.   
This study focuses on team enactment of leadership and does not focus on individual 
leaders and followers. Drawing from the Mann Gulch example, it is important to recognise 
the necessity of the leader role, and the influence that leaders have on situations which 
are accompanied by high levels of ambiguity. The next section discusses the role of the 
leader in dangerous contexts. 
2.3.5 The role of the leader in dangerous contexts 
The role of the leader in dangerous contexts is important to address as the leader or 
leaders are the people that are looked to and relied upon in order to provide the answers 
or solutions to problems.  Focusing on the individual leader, Mumford et al (2007, p.521).  
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states that “leadership makes a difference under conditions of crisis”.  Fisher et al, (2010) 
offer a differing perspective of leadership in extreme contexts, describing it as leadership 
‘in extremis’. Their study is focused in a military context.  In-Extremis leadership is defined 
as “giving purpose, motivation and direction to people when there is eminent physical 
danger, and where followers believe that leader behaviour will influence their physical 
well-being or survival” (Kolditz & Brazil, 2005, p.347). Military combat leadership literature 
suggests that in an In-extremis context, leaders need to adapt to the “environmental, 
physiological, cognitive and emotional stressors experienced in a life-threatening 
environment” (Fisher et al, 2010, p.91). Dangerous contexts can draw from these 
definitions for leadership in reference to threat or danger to life. 
Another perspective on leadership in dangerous contexts, but focusing more on the leader 
than leadership, is that the leader is often the person who is deemed to have the most 
‘expertise’ (Nelson et al, 2010) and therefore is looked to in times of uncertainty to provide 
expertise in order to resolve a situation, or “know what to do and how to do it” (White & 
Shullman, 2010, p.96).  Hannah et al (2009) raise the question of the influence of leadership 
in extreme contexts suggesting from their research that leaders can influence the group 
positively by increasing confidence levels or attenuating stress levels. Equally, leader errors 
or omissions can negatively influence the outcome and actions in response to the 
dangerous context (Dynes, 1974). 
2.3.6 Social processes of leadership in the literature 
This section explores the social leadership processes extracted from analysis of studies 
investigating leadership in dangerous contexts. Drawing from the key studies in 
emergency response teams that have been identified, the social processes of leadership 
are shown. Following this, the social processes of leadership are discussed in detail.  
Within the discussion of each process, the positive and negative influences of the context 
on each process will be identified.  
In chapter one (section 1.2), this study highlighted what was meant by the term social 
leadership processes. However, it is important to clarify further how social leadership 
processes are understood for the purposes of this study. This understanding draws from 
conventional leadership theory to identify existing leadership processes and this is 
discussed below. The processes extracted from key studies as they appear in dangerous 
contexts are analysed in depth, with specific focus on the influence of danger on these 
processes. 
Page 48 of 273 
 
2.3.7 Understanding social leadership processes 
In this section, constructs of social leadership processes will be addressed and the 
definition of leadership processes is constructed for this study. Previous discussion of 
leadership identifies it as a social process (Day et al (2014), Litchenstein et al (2006), Uhl-
bien (2006)) and the following section builds on this understanding by clarifying what is 
meant by social leadership processes and how they appear in conventional leadership 
literature and dangerous context literature. 
To begin building a definition for this study, it is necessary to identify previous studies 
examining team leadership process and the address the terminology used in the current 
literature. Morgeson et al (2010) adopts a functional approach to team leadership 
processes. Leadership functions appears to be a term, which is often used 
interchangeably with leadership processes in current literature. For example, sense 
making is conceptualised as a social process (Baran and Scott, 2010) in a study of near-
miss firefighter situational reports in a New York fire station. However, the functions 
defined by Morgeson et al (2010) are the same social interactions taking place as Baran 
and Scott’s (2010) processes. In a further example, Hannah and Matthews (2010) discuss 
goal generation as a process of team leadership in dangerous military contexts, similar to 
“establishing expectations and goals” in Morgeson et al’s (2010) leadership functions. 
Fleishman (1991) identifies leadership as influencing effective team performance and 
cohesion, specifically through the development of (i) team cognitive processes such as 
sense making, planning, solving problems and motivating team members, (ii) impacting 
team affecting processes, such as recruitment, monitoring personnel and resources and 
team motivational states are affected by processes such as planning, co-ordinating, 
directing and developing. Barnett and McCormick (2012) argue that this is not for the 
leader alone to accomplish but for the team, through shared or distributed leadership. 
Yammarino et al (2010) identify processes of leadership in military contexts at the 
individual, dyadic and team levels. At team level, social processes such as 
“communication, face to face interaction and collaboration” were identified. These are 
discussed in relation to identifying shared cognitive structures with a view to “reduce 
variance in team performance, enhance cohesiveness, build positive team climate and 
promote successful goal accomplishment” (p.27). Yammarino et al (2010) demonstrate in 
their conceptual work how team processes can be differentiated from leadership 
functions. Social processes in this example, are enacted and are leadership enablers of 
leadership functions, in order to produce adaptive outcomes, such as a more cohesive 
team. Morgeson et al (2010) conceptualise the latter as a function of leadership and 
appears to be leader centric. The functions presented by Morgeson et al (2010) are broad 
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in nature. This has created calls for the need of researchers to focus on “the contextual 
influences that enhance the efficacy of some leadership actions and diminish others” 
(Zaccaro et al., 2001, p.455).  
This study and its processes definition draws from the definition of leadership adopted, 
previous studies of leadership process and a synthesis of leadership functions in 
conventional leadership literature, conducted by Morgeson et al (2010), who provided a 
taxonomy of leadership functions shown as figure 2.2 below. They developed fifteen 
leadership functions categorised as Transition and Action phases of enactment. The 
phases of enactment were adopted by this study as the basis to map the occurrences of 
processes in conventional and dangerous context literature. It is essential to highlight that 
processes identified in the literature were added as the review developed. The phases 
identified by Morgeson et al (2010) are discussed further on in this section. 
Figure 2.2 – Taxonomy of leadership functions (Morgeson et al, 2010, p.10) 
 
Similar to this study, Burke et al (2018) explore extreme teams and adopt the processes 
and phases by Morgeson et al (2010) to discuss team leadership in extreme team 
environments.  Their study, however, has several limitations. Firstly, they employed 
historiometry, examining archival documentation of the interactions of team members. 
This methodological approach, using secondary sources limits their insights into 
processes of leadership and the reasoning behind decision making processes by team 
members. Secondly, throughout their study and similar to Morgeson et al (2010), the 
focus is on the leader enacting leadership in the teams and the processes are viewed 
from a leader-centric perspective.  
 Transition Phase Action Phase 
Leadership Functions Compose team Monitor team 
 Define mission Manage team boundaries 
 Establish expectations and 
goals 
Challenge team 
 Structure and plan Perform team task 
 Train and develop team Solve problems 
 Sense making Provide resources 
 Provide feedback Encourage team self-
management 
  Support social climate 
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In contrast, this study views leadership as a social process and therefore these functions 
of leadership such as “defining mission” and “training and developing team” are social and 
interactional (Weick (1993), Uhl-Bien (2006) processes between team members and the 
leader, rather than leader/follower processes. For the purposes of this research leadership 
functions and processes are not used interchangeably; instead, this study conceptualises 
functions as social processes of leadership and based on the discussion above, the 
definition of leadership processes that is adopted for this study is: Structured interactions 
generating outcomes adaptive to need.  These include, directive/action-based, and inter-
personal/social interactions, such as recruiting, planning, visioning, directing, sense-
making, motivating, coordinating, monitoring and enabling (A synthesis of Morgeson et al, 
2010; Fleishman et al, 1991; Weick, 1993; Day et al, 2014; Lichtenstein et al, 2006; Uhl-
bien, 2006; Barnett & McCormick, 2012). 
Morgeson et al (2010) identifies two phases in their functional leadership typology: 
transition and action phases of enacting processes. The transition phase is described as a 
“period of time” where the teams’ attention is primarily on formulating a strategy and 
mission planning (Burke et al, 2018). The action phase is again around a period of time 
when the focus is on a strategy to achieve their goals (Burke et al, 2018).  Hannah et al 
(2009) previously introduced the concept of phases of an extreme incident: preparation 
stage, in-situ stage and post event stage. They state the demands on leadership and the 
quality of leadership will change with different stages of an incident. This is based on 
previous experience and exposure to incidents as planning and preparedness and levels 
of extremity within the context, motivate action. This supports Campbell et al (2010), who 
stated that the changing context means that the leadership will change to respond to the 
new context.  
As previously stated, what is not clear in the review of literature addressing leadership 
processes is what happens to leadership when the context is dangerous. More 
specifically, it is important to understand how leadership will be enacted to resolve a 
situation with high levels of ambiguity and uncertainty. Hannah et al (2009) suggest that 
leadership may become more directive based on the level of extremity perceived, 
acknowledging that the answer may be “contingent” (p.905) on the context and suggesting 
the usefulness of further research on exploring the change in people as they move in and 
out of such situations.  
Campbell et al (2010, p.6) build on this, posing the question “what does danger do to 
leadership?” However, they address this question from a physical science perspective, as 
opposed to a social science perspective, which limits the understanding of the influence of 
context on processes of leadership. The issue that they highlight is that identification of 
danger is often only at the exact point of crisis, where the outcome of decisions made in 
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that moment could be the difference between life and death. Hannah et al, (2009) and 
Hannah and Matthews (2010), primarily focusing on military studies, build on this concept 
and propose that processes are not static within one stage of an incident, and that a 
process may appear at a different stage. However, there is a lack of empirical studies 
investigating the differing stages within an incident. Adopting an approach of analysing 
processes that appear at different stages of an incident would increase understanding of 
leadership enacted at the point of danger. This study aims to address this. 
The mapping of processes in dangerous contexts demonstrated that studies often 
mention a process in a conceptual paper, but do not discuss its meaning through 
empirical research. This limited discussion in the literature means that there is still little 
understanding of what and how social processes for leadership are enacted in different 
dangerous contexts. As previously established, leadership will change with the demands 
of the context and yet there remains limited understanding of how danger influences 
processes of leadership. The processes that appear in emergency response teams are 
now discussed. 
2.3.8 Leadership approaches and processes in Emergency Response Teams 
This section will discuss adaptive leadership, complexity leadership and shared leadership 
as theoretical approaches to leadership which appear in current emergency response 
team literature. These leadership approaches will provide a lens to navigate through the 
processes of leadership, showing how leadership is enacted, and how the processes 
influence leadership in the context of danger. 
First, the context is re-addressed to clarify the purpose of discussing several leadership 
theories. This study of leadership is inherently embedded in the dangerous context and 
contextualising leadership in this way necessitates adopting more than one leadership 
theory (Osborn et al, 2002). For example, empirical studies often adopt one overarching 
leadership theory to define their research parameters. To demonstrate this, Baran and 
Scott (2010) adopt complexity leadership theory (which is discussed in the following 
sections) as a basis to frame their approach. Osborn (2002) argues that this poses a 
limitation, in that adopting one theory may inhibit the researcher from seeing all relevant 
features of leadership enacted.  
An example of this is Klein et al (2006). They conducted a study of extreme action teams 
working in trauma departments. Their study is based on emergency response and 
although their study was not one of the four empirical studies directly germane to this 
study, as the criterion of working in danger was not present, the conceptualisation of 
leadership contributes to understanding leadership in complex and urgent temporal team 
contexts. Their study initially draws on four types or styles of leadership: contingent, 
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functional, shared and flexible. Despite not investigating this in the context of danger, the 
nature of the team dealing with trauma incidents posed similar unresolved questions to 
this study; what does leadership look like? How is leadership enacted and by whom? 
(Klein et al, 2006, p.593). In response to these questions, this study identifies the context 
specific influence on leadership and therefore, three leadership approaches are 
discussed. 
A review of processes that appear in current dangerous context literature (including 
military studies), indicates that in comparison to normal/conventional contexts (Appendix 
A) in literature, there are fewer leadership processes appearing in dangerous contexts 
(Appendix B). Appendix A and B are tables summarising the processes that have been 
extracted from the processes in the literature. Definitions have been provided when they 
have been discussed in detail.  
The summary table below narrows the scope of the processes further and identifies the 
leadership processes appearing specifically in emergency response team (ERT) literature. 
Table 2.3 provides a useful comparison with appendix B, showing the progressive 
focusing (Sinkovics and Alfoldi, 2012) of processes appearing in the emergency response 
team literature and overall in the dangerous context literature. Sub-processes appearing 
in the literature are also identified along with definitions of the processes from the 
literature.  
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Table 2.3 – Summary of leadership processes in ERT literature (Adapted from Morgeson (2010) 
Process Sub-processes Definition 
Define Mission Ensures a clear team mission/purpose and direction to achieve goals Where the definition is blank, it is felt that the characteristics provide 
significant description and appropriation of meaning to the 
process/function stated 
Train and Develop Team Ensures new team members are trained to carry out their duties; 
including task specific instruction 
Where the definition is blank, it is felt that the characteristics provide 
significant description and appropriation of meaning to the 
process/function stated 
Sense Making Facilitates team understanding of events/situations and their 
implications 
Leader sense making involves identifying important environmental 
events, interpreting these events given the team’s performance situation, 
and offering this interpretation to the team (Zaccaro et al, 2001) 
(Morgeson, 2005) 
Framing/ help the team make sense of ambiguity Use of formal and informal authority to influence adherence to policies 
and procedures, encouraging vigilance as a social norm and properly 
directing actions of those involved in the situation (Baran & Scott, 2010) 
Heedful interrelating/collective sense making Personally enacting examples of mindful behaviour 
Believing in the reliability of co-workers and depending upon them when 
necessary 
Reducing ambiguity through behaving in accordance with expected roles 
and using the expected division of labour to anticipate others' behaviour 
Personally enacting examples of mindful behaviour (Baran & Scott, 2010) 
Collective mind is conceptualised as a pattern of heedful interrelations of 
actors in a social system. Actors in the system construct their actions 
(contributions), understanding that the system consists of connected 
actions by themselves and others(representation) and interrelate their 
actions within the system (subordination)" (Weick & Roberts, 1993) 
Adjusting/adaptability Maintaining cognizance of surroundings and the environment 
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Rapidly adjusting behaviour due to changing conditions (Baran & Scott, 
2010) 
Monitor Team Monitors team and individual performance and interactions ensuring 
team stay focused on tasks/coordination 
Where the definition is blank, it is felt that the characteristics provide 
significant description and appropriation of meaning to the 
process/function stated 
Solve Problems Implements or helps the team implement solutions to problems, task 
and interaction/inter-personal 
Information use in problem solving refers to the use of information for 
problem identification, development of a plan, which coordinates team 
member expertise, and the communication of the plan to team members 
(Fleishman et al., 1991), (Barnett & McCormick, 2012) 
Support Social Climate Responds promptly to team member needs or concerns Where the definition is blank, it is felt that the characteristics provide 
significant description and appropriation of meaning to the 
process/function stated 
Develop trust in the leader Where the definition is blank, it is felt that the characteristics provide 
significant description and appropriation of meaning to the 
process/function stated 
Develops a positive group culture/social cohesion Where the definition is blank, it is felt that the characteristics provide 
significant description and appropriation of meaning to the 
process/function stated 
Team Cognition/Macro-Cognition/collective metacognition/mental 
models 
Macro-cognition is "the interaction between intra-individual and inter-
individual cognitive processes". Team-cognition is "knowledge 
representations and transformations on those representations which 
occur not only within an individual mind but also between individuals and 
between individuals and the environment" (Fiore et al, 2010, p.204) 
2. A team mental model is the structural representation of an individual 
group members knowledge and level of expertise concerning key 
elements of his or her team environment...enabling them to anticipate 
one another's actions and coordinate these actions in complex, high 
pressure situations in which there is insufficient time for communication 
and planning". (McIntyre & Foti, 2013, p.47) 
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Intragroup trust/shared belief Where the definition is blank, it is felt that the characteristics provide 
significant description and appropriation of meaning to the 
process/function stated 
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This section identifies the collective processes of leadership mapped against current studies 
of emergency response teams, displayed in table 2.3 above. The following sections discuss 
these processes of leadership, beginning with adaptive leadership as both an approach to 
leadership and as a process of leadership appearing in dangerous context literature. 
2.3.9 Adaptive leadership 
Leadership, wherever it is positioned, either as the nominal leader of a team, or the team 
member temporarily adopting a leader role, must adapt responses to a multiplicity of 
complex and conflicting demands.  Although this concept of adaption relates to individual 
cognition, it has direct influence to the social process of leadership in a team, especially 
where all the team members are similarly adapting and cognitively processing (Lord & 
Hall, 2005).  Nelson et al (2010, p.131) support this by stating that there is a consensus in 
the literature that “adaptability has become increasingly important to leaders at all levels 
as the nature of work grows in complexity, change and ambiguity”. As such, 
understanding the core principle of adaption, and how it relates to leadership as social 
processes, is a key element of understanding leadership in dangerous contexts.  
Hannah et al, (2013) state that as a result, leaders must possess “a requisite level of 
complexity that allows them to perceive and assess these complex and changing 
dynamics” (p.393); manage complex and adaptive issues (Marion & Uhl- Bien, 2001) by 
adapting their cognitive capacities in decision making and adopt behaviours to produce an 
effective response.  
Yammarino et al (2010, p.16), addressing leadership in the US Military, with a focus on 
working in dangerous contexts, support the view of a rapid changeable world requiring 
leaders to have the capacities to be adaptable.  Norton (2010) concurs with the 
requirement for leaders to be able to adapt to today’s working contexts and ‘daunting 
challenges’. Norton (2010, p.143) places emphasis on the individual leader having “the 
skill to adjust, adapt and flex their response to unpredictable and potentially catastrophic 
changes”. This suggests the necessity for leaders to be adaptable in a context where the 
outcome has the potential to be extreme or dangerous. The consequences of ineffective, 
non-adaptable leadership can have a catastrophic physical and psychological impact 
(Yammarino et al, 2010). 
Yukl and Mahsud (2010) and Norton (2010), emphasise the importance of the leader and 
leadership adaptability in times of disruption. Kaiser and Overfield (2010) discuss the 
importance and necessity for leader adaptability with specific focus on disruptive contexts 
by stating “in the near-collapse of the global economy, crisis and disruptive change seem 
to be the order of the day. This puts a premium on nimble managers who can adapt on 
the fly”.  As a result, it has become essential to be able to adapt in response to change 
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(Dunford et al 2013; De Meuse et al, 2010; O’Connell, 2014; White & Shullman,2010; 
Kaiser & Overfield, 2010; Nelson, Zaccaro & Herman, 2010; Norton, 2010; Dai, DeMeuse 
& Tang, 2013).  
The concept of adaptability is recognised in the literature by various interchangeable 
terms with the same meaning.  Flexibility for example, Yukl and Mahsud (2010, p.81) state 
“Flexible and adaptive leadership involves changing behaviour in appropriate ways as the 
situation changes”. Similarly, Dunford et al (2013, p.84) describe flexibility in its broadest 
term as “the capacity to respond to changing environmental conditions”. The terms 
adaptability and flexibility have been recognised in Change Management literature (Good 
& Sharma, 2010). (Dunford et al, 2013) stated that since the early twentieth century 
“flexibility was identified as a key element of sustainable commercial enterprise” (Dunford 
et al, 2013, p.84). Table 2.4 below, sets out summarised criteria by which the term 
adaptability has been addressed in the literature. 
Table 2.4 – Criteria for conceptualising adaptability 
 
 
Criteria 
Nelson et 
al (2010) 
Good & 
Sharma 
(2010) 
Yukl & 
Mahsud 
(2010) 
Norton 
(2010) 
Uhl-Bien 
et al 
(2007) 
Kaiser & 
Overfield 
(2010) 
Capability   x x   
Cognitive 
Capacity 
   x x  
Cognitive 
Function 
x      
Behavioural 
Response 
x  x  x  
Complex  x   x  
Multi- 
dimensional 
 x     
Skill    x   
Leadership 
Approach 
      
Leadership 
style 
     x 
Leadership 
Process 
    x  
Social process     x  
Affective 
response 
x      
Strategic   x    
Contextual   x x x x 
Interactive     x  
Informal     x  
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Table 2.4 demonstrates there are numerous elements to adaptability, with definitions 
suggesting adaptive leaders modify their behavioural responses to meet the demands of 
situations (Yukl & Mahsud, 2010). Kaiser and Overfield (2010, p.106) adopted the 
definition of flexible and adaptive leadership as “adjusting one’s leadership style, method 
or approach in response to different or changing contextual demands, in a way that 
facilitates group performance”, thus responding to the contextual and social roles in which 
a leader must be effective. Colville et al, (2013) support this idea of adaption being an 
approach to leadership. Leader adaptation in contrast, offers a deeper level of focus on 
the cognitive dimension, defining adaption as “the level of reflection on, and restructuring 
of mental models based on changes in the internal and external environment” (Mumford & 
Marcy, 2010, p.12).   
Similarly, Zahara and George (2002) draw from Cohen and Levinthal (1990), recognising 
the concept of absorptive capacity. This is the process whereby an individual is faced with 
new information as an external stimulus and seeks to assimilate the new stimulus as 
knowledge. This new knowledge is then used to produce innovative responses or 
innovative performance. This study acknowledges this concept in the wider literature of 
performance/innovation, and in the leadership context, as ‘mental modelling’ (Marcy & 
Mumford, 2010) and ‘vision formation’ (Partlow et al, 2015).  This study does not, 
however, explore individual cognitive processes in depth, as the unit of analysis is the 
team and specifically social leadership processes. 
Nelson et al (2010, p.132) view adaptability as a “functional change (cognitive, 
behavioural and/or affective), in response to actual or correctly anticipated alterations in 
environmental contingencies”.  This view supports the notion that flexible leadership 
behaviour is the “product of cognitive and emotional or motivational factors” (Nelson, 
Zaccaro, & Herman, 2010, p.116) and this notion is strengthened by Norton (2010, p.144) 
who states that leader adaptability is referred to as the “the ability to think through the 
needs of the situation and design their behavioural response accordingly”. A similar 
definition is proposed by Hannah et al (2013, p.393) who define adaptability as the 
“capacity of leaders to adjust their thoughts and behaviours to enact appropriate 
responses to novel, ill defined, changing and evolving decision making situations”. Kaiser 
(2010, p.77) defines adaptability as a skill, suggesting that adapting is something that a 
person does to achieve a desired response.  
There are several consistencies across the conceptualisation of adaptability/flexibility in 
the current literature. Consensus across the academic community on this topic is 
complexity and multi-dimensional (Good & Sharma, 2010) surrounding the exact meaning 
of the term ‘adaptability’ as applied to Leadership. Therefore, few articles have attempted 
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to conceptually define the term, choosing instead to define how it is to be perceived 
contextually within a specific study.  
The empirical and conceptual studies each conceptualise adaptive leadership differently 
and present a differing perspectives of how these contribute towards building a leader’s 
adaptive capacity. Academic study on adaptability has been undertaken with focus on 
Adaptive leadership as a theory (Cojocar, 2008): Adaptable organisations, (Kaiser, 2010); 
Adaptive strategy (Heifetz & Laurie, 1998), studies in cognitive adaption (Taylor, 1983), 
Psychological and Neurological approaches to individual adaptation (Hannah, Balthazard, 
Waldman, Jennings, & Thatcher, 2013), Individual adaptive practices (Wamsler & Brink, 
2014), development of leadership skill to respond to “unfamiliar situations’” (Lord & Hall, 
2005, p.601), and aspects of change management (Glover et al, 2002; Raney, 2014). 
Studies that address adaptive leadership do so to enhance the agenda of leaders facing 
more complex challenges as they progress into more and more demanding roles (Norton, 
2010). 
Yukl and Mahsud (2010) address why adaptive leadership is important for organisational 
effectiveness, offering seven streams of theory and contexts in which leader adaptability 
can be conceptualised. They highlight the importance of developing a repertoire of 
behaviours, contingency theories, situational variables, essential roles and behaviours for 
different leadership roles and making transitions to different roles. It is the response of 
managers to immediate disruptions and crisis, threats and opportunities that require 
“adaptive strategic leadership” (p.32), stakeholder conflict and competing values. They 
focus firmly on the behavioural flexibilities of leaders in each context but also discuss the 
importance of disruptive events as being influential to the adaptive development of 
leaders. 
Good and Sharma, (2010) link the concept of adaption with cognition by proposing a 
model describing the specific flexibilities they believe make up an individual’s adaptive 
capacity. The most relevant to this research being the concept of Cognitive flexibility. 
Cognitive flexibility (Good and Sharma, 2010, p.162) draws from adaptive definitions when 
it is described as the “individual’s ability to shift attention in order to respond to the 
environment in a new way”. Cognitive flexibility is conceptualised by Good and Sharma 
(2010) stating that adaptability is required and demonstrated by leaders, as a response to 
an external event, indicating an adaptive outcome or behavioural response. They 
additionally propose a flexibility framework to enhance understanding of leader flexibility. 
Flexibilities identified include coping, explanatory, emotional, interpersonal, cognitive, 
learning, communication, gender and decision making.  
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These flexibilities were applied using a simplified cyclical three stage process framework. 
The three stages are: 
• Perceiving; namely, noticing the cues in the environment, filtering the information in 
order to act more flexibly. 
• Recognising; the demands of the situation and generation of options for response. 
Meaning that leaders need to create a personal repertoire of possible responses. 
• Action; and deciding on the appropriate action in response to the context.  
The framework proposed allows the researcher to address the flexibilities proposed, in the 
context of leadership. The cyclical nature of this process is that as the context unfolds and 
changes, an adaptive or flexible leader will vary their responses by appraising the cues, 
generating different options which will vary the actions taken (Good & Sharma, 2010). 
White and Shullman (2010) focus on the leader’s effectiveness and ability to deal with 
differing degrees of ambiguity. They suggest that measuring the skill of a leader’s 
“aptitude for ambiguity” (p.94) should be considered for identifying high performers in 
leadership. Their qualitative research involving interviews with business executives 
identified eight clusters of ‘enabling’ behaviours and eight ‘restrained’ behaviours were 
also identified that leaders used to manage their uncertainty and “deny ambiguity” (Kaiser, 
2010, p.78) . This study was limited as it focused purely on an individual level of analysis 
and ambiguity as a psychologically constructed phenomenon. Additionally, there is limited 
discussion addressing the influence of the behaviours identified in their study and how 
these enabled leaders to manage their feelings of uncertainty. Their study did not address 
in depth the influence of context, specifically contextual ambiguity and the variables that 
are within the context. This is an important study, however, as whilst it did not focus on 
behaviours it did provide insight into the current empirical research of leadership in 
contexts of uncertainty, and how adaptive responses are generated. 
Similarly, Kaiser and Overfield’s, (2010, p.106) study, offers a ‘mastery of opposites’ 
conceptualisation of leader effectiveness by quantifying the degree of flexibility. Their 
research assessed the ability to produce adaptive responses as “grounded in complexity 
theory of organisations and leader”. Kaiser and Overfield (2010) proposed a model to 
assess flexibility as a set of opposing but complementary behaviours towards predicting 
leadership effectiveness, and cognitive adaptive processes to developing adaptive 
expertise in different contexts.  
A common characteristic that emergency response teams in HROs share is the level of 
ambiguity that accompanies the events and situations that they routinely face. This study 
infers from the literature that complexity means situations that require working under 
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pressure over sustained periods of time with the potential for disastrous results if an error 
is made; situations that are a combination of ambiguous and often unplanned strands of 
activity that require intervention all at the same time. The next sub-section addresses the 
concept of Complexity Leadership Theory. 
2.3.10 Complexity Leadership Theory 
Stemming from work in the physical sciences, Complexity Leadership theory (CLT) (Uhl-
Bien, Marion & McKelvey, 2007; Uhl-Bien & Marion, 2009; Schneider & Somers, 2006; 
DeRue, 2011) conceptualises leadership as a “complex, interactive dynamic from which 
adaptive outcomes emerge”. CLT views leadership as a paradigm that focuses on 
“enabling the learning, creative and adaptive capacity of Complex adaptive systems” (Uhl-
Bien, Marion & McKelvey, 2007, p.298). Viewing organisations as complex adaptive 
systems (CAS), CAS are emergent, interactive and dynamic (Uhl-Bien et al, 2007) and 
are analysed as “a complex interplay from which a collective impetus for action and 
change emerges when heterogeneous agents interact in networks in ways that produce 
new patterns of behaviour or new modes of operating” (Uhl-Bien et al, 2007, p.299).  
Further to this, leaders are described as interacting but independent agents who are 
bonded by a common goal.  Characteristically, CAS emerge naturally in social systems 
and are quickly able to problem solve, demonstrate creativity, learn and adapt.  
The issues that leaders need to solve are inherently complex (Uhl-Bien, Marion & 
McKelvey, 2007; Uhl-Bien & Marion, 2009). The implication is that the leaders themselves 
must be able to operate at the requisite levels of complexity to deal with these issues. 
Complexity is based on the premise that leadership is conducted in a social system and 
that there are multiple streams of information, action and interaction occurring (Marion & 
Uhl-Bien, 2001) within this social system.  Thus, the requirement for leader cognition is 
high and there is the potential for an overload in complexity to increase leader error in 
leader processing (Marcy & Mumford, 2010, p.2). The overarching framework of 
Complexity Leadership Theory is composed of three leadership functions: 
The Administrative function refers to the actions of individuals in formal management 
positions and roles who are responsible for organising activities (or the bureaucratic 
function). This is a top down leadership structure, favouring authority. CLT in contrast to 
this function recommends that this authoritarian approach to leadership not be at the 
expense of encouraging creativity, learning and adaptability.   
Adaptive Leadership in CLT is ‘agentic’ (Uhl-Bien & Marion,2009, p.638) in that it 
acknowledges that individuals have the capacity to make choices. Both individual and 
collective adaptive leadership is a “dynamic process in which agentic adaptive leaders 
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interact with and engage the potential of emergent complexity dynamics to produce 
adaptive change for an organisation” (Uhl-Bien & Marion, 2009, p.638).  
Enabling Leadership refers to the role of managing the ‘entanglement’ (Uhl-Bien et al, 
2007) between administrative and adaptive leadership in order to move the context to 
enable adaptive leadership to take place. This study recognises the components of this 
framework as contributions to enabling adaptive leadership.  
Baran and Scott (2010) adopted a complexity approach to leadership, focusing on 
emergency response and conducted a study of near miss firefighting reports. As 
previously discussed, this study resulted in three overarching sense-making processes 
being identified: framing, heedful interrelating and adjusting. There is significant emphasis 
placed on the process of sense making. This is because five of the nine studies identified 
in dangerous contexts are grounded in sense making as either a lens to view the current 
organisational picture or have unpicked the processes of sense making as they apply to 
the dangerous context or emergency response team. A review of sense making as a 
concept and how the concept appears in these studies, would appear to provide a richer 
picture of team leadership processes than any other process at present and is discussed 
below. 
2.3.11 Sense making processes  
Sense making is a process that is commonly researched in the area of organisational 
change (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; Regine & Lewin, 2000) where leaders are often 
required to understand the environment in order to adapt to its changing conditions. 
Disruptive contexts and situations such as organisational change prompt leaders’ sense 
making and sense making processes are deemed of critical importance in disruptive 
settings, such as crises or dynamic and turbulent contexts (Yin & Jing, 2014; Maitlis, 
2005), enabling leaders to rationalise and respond (Yin & Jing, 2014). Therefore, 
comprehensively reviewing the sense making literature in relation to this study is 
essential. 
Social processes centre around the sense making capacities of teams facing ambiguity in 
dangerous contexts. For example, the process of decision making is influenced by the 
sense made of the context and immediate situational requirements. 
In conceptualising sense making, elements can be taken from the descriptions of what 
triggers sense making and why sense needs to be made and to then align these elements 
with the descriptions of dangerous contexts. With research focusing on individual leader 
cognition in recent years, such as vision formation and causal analysis (Partlow et al, 
2015; Marcy & Mumford, 2010), less attention has been given to the collective processes 
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of sense making and the interactive accounts of leaders in organisations.  Weick (1993) 
argues that collective sense making is essential in turbulent contexts as it is necessary to 
maintain coherent understanding between individuals to prompt collective action. 
In order to conceptualise sense making, it is necessary to examine the current definitions, 
challenge the different assumptions that these authors have made and use these to 
construct and justify a definition that is appropriate to this study. There are different ways 
to conceptualise sense making: as a process (Weick, 1995; Maitlis & Christianson, 2014, 
p. 57), lens (Sonenshein, 2009; Stensaker & Falkenberg, 2007; Vough, 2012), perspective 
(Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015. P7) and others describe sense making using Weicks’ (1995) 
seven sense making properties, highlighted in table 2.5 below.  
Table 2.5 - Seven sense making properties (Weick, 1995, p.17).  
 
This study briefly addresses these sense making properties and critically reviews these 
against the contextual nature of working in dangerous contexts. Table 2.6 below shows 
how sense making is conceptualised in current studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Grounded in identity construction 
2 It is retrospective 
3 It is enactive of sensible environments 
4 It is social 
5 It is ongoing 
6 It is focused on 
7 Extracted cues and driven by plausibility rather than accuracy 
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Table 2.6 - How sense making is contextualised in studies  
 
Recent definitions adopt and support Weick’s (1995) idea of sense making as a social 
process.  Balogun and Johnson (2004, p.524) describe their view of sense making as a 
“conversational and narrative process through which people create and maintain an 
intersubjective world”.  Supporting this definition, Gephart et al, (2010, p.284-285) state 
that sense making is “an ongoing process that creates an intersubjective sense of shared 
meaning through conversation” but further the definition by stating that shared meaning is 
also made through non-verbal behaviour in settings where people “produce, negotiate and 
sustain a shared sense of meaning”. The breadth of literature on sense making makes 
conceptualising the term difficult (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 
2015). Despite similarities, and that the definitions demonstrate an evolving understanding 
of the concept, there is no consensus, nor expectation of a single definition. 
“While the leadership role in sense making under crises is critical, leaders are likely to 
face two main types of problems common in organizations, which add to the difficulty of 
the task: ambiguity and uncertainty” (Weick,1995, p.94). Studies identify commonality of 
the presence of the term ‘ambiguity’ positioned in the crisis leadership literature. Scott & 
Table 2.6 - Conceptualising sense making Author Term Definition Characteristics 
Weick (1995, p.94) Cognitive Process “Is a process through 
which “people frame 
experiences as being 
meaningful in some 
specific way” 
Retrospective 
Social 
Plausible 
Maitlis & Christianson 
(2014, p.62) 
Cognitive Process Sense making is the 
“process through which 
people work to 
understand issues or 
events that are novel, 
ambiguous or 
confusing, or in some 
way violate 
expectations” 
Individual  
 
Balogun & Johnson 
(2004, p.524) 
Conversational/ 
Narrative Process 
A “conversational and 
narrative process 
through which people 
create and maintain an 
intersubjective world” 
Shared  meaning 
Gephart et al (2010, 
p.284) 
Social/ Discursive 
Process 
Sense Making has been 
defined as the 
“discursive process of 
constructing and 
interpreting the social 
world” 
Non-Verbal behaviour 
Shared meaning 
Interpretation 
 
Sandberg & Tsoukas 
(2015, p.7) 
Perspective A way of viewing the 
world through our lived 
experiences 
Frame of mind 
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Trethewey (2008, p.305) adopt the perspective that it is “the presence of multiple, 
plausible interpretations of what is going on in the environment”. This definition aligns with 
Baran and Scott (2010), from which this study also adopts its definition. An illustration of 
this is in the 1996 Mount Everest disaster, where it is acknowledged that contribution in 
part to the disaster was the multiple conflicting voices of the people on the climb that led 
to a breakdown in communication and disrupted the sense making processes of the team 
(Kayes, 2004).  
Despite the extensive experience and training of the leader in this specific context, there 
was a “failure to appreciate ambiguity” (Kayes, 2004, p.91) and adapt to the contextual 
cues, such as mist and lack of daylight hours remaining, because they were overwhelmed 
by the complexity of the context and the multiple conflicting voices. This resulted in the 
death of eight climbers, including the two most experienced leaders. Kayes (2004) 
analysed this event in the form of a ‘groupthink’ exercise, which highlighted specific group 
based contextual and emotional variables and external situational variables that were 
unique to this event and that influenced the climbing leader’s decision making in an 
extreme context. The study, however, was not clear in its analysis of the accounts they 
were able to review, about how events unfolded, or what contextual cues the climbers did 
recognise. Additionally, there was no indication from the study of the type of sense making 
that was dominant in this context, either collective or individual.  
Referring to an earlier discussion, in the case of Mr de Menezes, Colville et al (2013), 
provide an example of contextual ambiguity, in the shooting of an innocent man on a 
London Underground by a Police Officer leading to tragic circumstances. Colville et al 
(2013) adopted a sense making lens to examine the contextual frames and cues of 
officers working on that day and impacted by the event. The officers experienced a new 
organisational routine that was implemented by a top down, directive approach and its 
purpose was to instruct officers what to do in situations of immediate threat or danger. 
Colville et al (2013, p.1203) pointed out that “lessening ambiguity implies that through 
action, you can learn to discount what might have been going on and reach an answer to 
the question as to what is going on”. The presence of two ‘routines’ (p.1201) for the police 
officers resulted in the loss of effective framing of the situation and cue recognition and 
therefore their ability to adapt effectively to the context. The study by Colville et al (2013) 
supports the characteristics that are identified in HROs and appears to be a common 
limitation of an HRO.  Policies and procedures that govern these organisations can restrict 
leader’s understanding of the situation at hand which, as demonstrated by the Police 
Officers in the shooting of Mr de Menezes, can lead to disastrous errors.  
Colville et al’s (2013) study was limited as the information was based on secondary 
accounts from one official government report into the event which was characterised as 
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ambiguous. Sense making in the study was about “connecting cues and frames to create 
an account of what is going on” (p.1205), but where the Police Officers’ interpretations of 
these frames and cues was interrupted. Colville et al (2013, p.1205) state that in this 
instance, “novelty in the form of dynamic complexity was posing problems for such sense 
making”. These studies and examples of extreme incidents demonstrate the influence of 
ambiguity within a context and raise questions about how leaders navigate in these 
ambiguous circumstances.  
The next section attempts to address this question by defining, characterising and 
analysing sense making within extreme contexts. Sense making and collective sense 
making processes are highlighted alongside relevant empirical studies that have captured 
sense making processes in extreme contexts. 
2.3.12 Shared sense making 
The review of the literature reveals ontological differences in two aspects of sense 
making: where sense making takes place and when sense making occurs. Sense making 
has previously been acknowledged primarily as taking place as an individual process; a 
process that takes place cognitively within the individual (Weick, 1995). Linking back to 
the focus of this study on teams, this study views sense making as a social process, 
whereby ongoing meaning is being created based on the interactions between individuals. 
This is a process which may typically be found within teams. Thus named ‘Collective 
Sense Making’, it is a socially constructed process of creating inter-subjective and shared 
meaning through an iterative and discursive cycle (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014) between 
team members. These discursive processes mean that sense making is seen through 
‘accounts’ or ‘narratives’ (p.95) of individuals. However, these accounts do not indicate 
that there is consensus or agreement as a collective but rather propose that sense is 
captured through the multiplicity of stories.  
Combe and Carrington (2015) attempted to bridge the gap between individual and 
collective sense making by investigating multiple leader cognition as an in-depth case 
study in the health sector.  They evaluated a single crisis context with the purpose of 
finding cognitive consensus. They did not seek to find a collective understanding, but 
instead used multiple data collection techniques to gather responses for the case study 
method with the aim of expanding their perceived lack of research in emerging cognitive 
consensus.  
Wolbers and Boersma (2013) suggest that collective sense making can be weak under 
extreme and ambiguous conditions as collective sense making means that there will be 
multiple interpretations of the context and these interpretations need to align in order to 
produce an adaptive response.  White and Shullman (2010, p.94) also share a similar 
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view of leader collectiveness specific in that it addresses the concept of ambiguity, stating, 
“those that can keep the experience of uncertainty to a tolerable level can embrace the 
ambiguity as an opportunity to bring people and options together to learn and adapt as 
they collectively find their way”.  
On the other hand, HROs provide an example of where the creation of shared meaning 
results in a “tightly coordinated collective action” (Maitlis, 2005, p.23). As previous studies 
discussed: the de Menezes shooting (Colville, 2013); Mann Gulch disaster (Weick, 1995) 
and the Everest disaster (Kayes, 2004); there was a lack of shared sense making 
processes. The idea of shared meaning, however, does not guarantee that the resultant 
meaning is a true reflection of the actual event (White & Shullman, 2010).  
In support of the identification of collective processes, Wolbers and Boersma, (2013) 
describe how emergency services have information management systems in place to 
enhance their attempts to coordinate action when working with multiple organisations.  
Their qualitative empirical study of emergency responders developing collective sense 
making from information in fictional scenarios, states that the purpose of the information 
systems is to provide support for its users to reach ‘situational awareness’ (Wolbers & 
Boersma, 2013; Baran & Scott, 2010).  
The system achieves this by creating a common operational picture (COP). The COP as a 
system allows the information to become more available and accessible and is defined as 
“achieving a sufficient level of shared information among the different organisations, 
participating in disaster operating in different locations” (Wolbers & Boersma, 2013, 
p.188). Their study focused on how emergency responders interpret information and 
attempted to show how this affected responder’s collective sense making. The results of 
their study concluded that in extreme contexts, it is not only the management of 
information for coordination that is important; it is the way that information is interpreted, 
negotiated collectively for relevance and subsequently provides direction for leaders. It is 
the development of shared understanding that is essential for coordination between 
organisations.  
Wolbers and Boersma (2013) focus their study on information management systems at an 
organisational level. The concept of reflexivity was identified as a ‘crucial condition’ with 
which to address the issue of a dominant narrative in the interpretation and negotiation of 
information (Wolbers & Boersma, 2013, p.195).  Their study indicated that a dominant 
narrative can develop that does not consider different interpretations of a context “to 
become visible” (p.196). Although their study was limited in the number of narrative 
accounts collected, they did provide an indication of the social dynamic of extreme 
contexts. 
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Baran and Scott (2010) focus their research in the context of a dangerous setting and in 
the examination of near miss reports of firefighters on the front line. Adopting a grounded 
theory approach and drawing from complexity leadership theory, they conceptualised 
leadership as the process of organising ambiguity. The near miss reports were descriptive 
accounts of “highly ambiguous and emergent crisis situations” where individuals 
experienced “threats to both their physical wellbeing and cognitive information-processing 
abilities” (Baran & Scott, 2010, p.47).  Their study uses a sense making lens and uses 
narratives to identify three overarching sense making processes: Framing, Heedful 
interrelating and Adjusting, drawing from a similar framework by Weick (1995); Creation, 
Interpretation and Enactment framework. 
Figure 2.3 – Framework demonstrating sense making processes for organising 
ambiguity (Baran & Scott, 2010, p. S60)
 
Framing is where leaders collectively identify what is significant to the setting; Heedful 
interrelating processes are where participants create a shared understanding and a 
common interpretation of the situation, based on social interactions of participants. It is the 
process by which leaders engage in sense making, “not as lone cognitive act” but as an 
interpretative process (Baran & Scott, 2010, p.56). Using a collective sense making 
approach contributes to the literature that addresses both leadership and extreme 
contexts. From this social and qualitative approach, researchers begin to obtain a richer 
and more in depth understanding of the way leaders think and understand their context 
(Campbell et al, 2010).  
As mentioned above, Baran and Scott (2010) provide a framework with which to explore 
collective sense making processes further.  These were comprised of eight sense making 
processes, three of which are categorised as actions, which are outside the scope of this 
study: Direction Setting, Role acting and Role Modelling; and five are categorised as 
Heedful 
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collective sense making processes: Knowledge, Talk, Trust, Situational Awareness and 
Agility.  Figure 2.4 below highlights each process and each shared sense making process 
will be discussed in the following sections. 
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Table 2.7 - Sense Making processes Baran & Scott (2010, p.S52) 
 
 
 
Secondary Categories Definition Lowest-order 
Categories 
Situational awareness Maintaining cognizance of 
surroundings and the 
environment 
Continually assessing 
environment for surprises 
Challenging assumptions 
and double checking work 
Direction setting Use of formal and informal 
authority to influence 
adherence to policies and 
procedures, encouraging 
vigilance as a social norm, 
and properly directing 
actions of those involved in 
the situation. 
Ensuring personnel follow 
safety procedures 
Maintaining knowledge of 
team members’ actions 
Reminding team members 
of situational priorities. 
Talk  
Facilitating sense making 
through verbal cues 
Repeating reports until 
meanings are shared 
Negotiating instances of 
conflicting information 
Knowledge  
Using information from both 
prior experience and 
training to purposefully 
guide action 
Comparing current hazards 
with prior experiences 
Reminding team members 
of situational expectations 
Relying on those with the 
most expertise 
Role acting  
Reducing ambiguity 
through behaving in 
accordance with expected 
roles and using the 
expected division of labour 
to anticipate others’ 
behaviour. 
Performing tasks expected 
due to positional title 
Assigning specific roles to 
divide and control work 
Acting appropriately in 
relation to others’ roles 
Agility Rapidly adjusting behaviour 
due to changing conditions 
Thinking and acting quickly 
when plans go awry 
Readjusting priorities in the 
face of change 
 
Role modelling Personally enacting 
examples of mindful 
behaviour 
Wearing personal 
protective equipment 
Following policies and 
procedures 
Trust Believing in the reliability of 
coworkers and depending 
upon them when necessary 
Staying together as a team, 
in proximity and goals 
Avoiding lone actions that 
jeopardize others 
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Framing: As illustrated by the Union Carbide Bhophal incident (Weick 1988); Mann Gulch 
incident (Weick, 1993) and NASA Columbian space shuttle disaster (Dunbar & Garud, 
2009) leaders need to know how to “frame the threats of the crisis” (Yin & Jing, 2014, 
p.98), resulting from identified contextual cues.  The process of ‘Framing’ refers to; “past 
moments of socialisation and cues tend to be present moments of experience. If a person 
can construct a relation between these two moments, meaning is created” (Colville, 2013, 
p.1204). 
Holt and Cornelissen (2014) support this stating that to make sense involves 
“contextualising a particular cue or experience in the context of a learnt frame” suggesting 
that this is a retrospective activity of drawing from previously formed cues, based on past 
experiences of individuals, to begin to make sense of the present event or situation. Weick 
(1995) suggests that crisis is an ‘interruption’ to the cues that we (individuals or 
collectives) would expect to see and recognise.  Maitlis (2005, p.21) argues therefore that 
sense making enables individuals or collectives to rationalise the world in a way that 
enables action. Maitlis and Christianson (2014) draw from Weick (1995) to provide a 
working definition that this study draws from; 
“A process, prompted by violated expectations, that involves attending to and bracketing 
cues in the environment, creating intersubjective meaning through cycles of interpretation 
and action, and thereby enacting a more ordered environment from which further cues 
can be drawn.” Maitlis and Christianson (2014, p.67) 
The collective process of ‘Knowledge’ is identified by Baran and Scott (2010, p.52). 
Knowledge in this instance was categorised under the overarching sense making process 
of ‘Framing’ (p.54) which is described as the use of information from past and equivocal 
experiences and training (Baran & Scott, 2010, p.52). Additionally, the process by which 
leaders must assess the level of risks, and the results from Baran and Scott’s (2010) 
research suggests that those with more experience are better equipped to make this 
assessment. Wolbers and Boersma (2013) found that leaders that had knowledge of the 
organisation’s language, roles and procedures were better able to attribute meaning to 
actions.  
The process of reflexivity was suggested as a means by which multiple perspectives to 
create a shared meaning, are acknowledged. Reflexivity, “allows the professional to 
redirect his or her decisions without being hindered by professional boundaries” (Wolbers 
& Boersma, 2013, p.196). In other words, leaders who work in multi-organisational 
contexts must adapt to this context and this means that there needs to be effective 
information management of the knowledge of multiple agencies and their ways of 
operating for sense to be made.  Leader cognition studies discuss knowledge as a 
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process that informs mental models (Marcy & Mumford, 2010). In turn, mental models can 
serve as a driver for sense making processes.  Complexity leadership is a social 
leadership process, and this indicates that leadership in this instance can be from the 
bottom up. However, the premise that experienced leaders lead less experienced leaders 
in these contexts indicates that leadership in these contexts is a top-down process or 
contains “formal authority” (Baran & Scott, 2010, p.55).  
Organisational structures such as HROs, are formal structures with policies, procedures 
and formal management relationships identified.  Drawing from training and experience, it 
is important for the experienced leader to contextualise the situation, particularly in 
dangerous contexts, more so in comparison to less experienced colleagues. Drawing from 
experience and recognising similar contextual cues allows leaders to begin to make sense 
of the situation, frame the risks appropriately and reduce the potential for errors. 
Heedful interrelating: the process by which group members develop plausible 
interpretations of the environment (Baran & Scott, 2010). It is essentially described as a 
process of reducing ambiguity (p.57). It is not a process that is done individually but rather 
is a process that engages groups in sense making through interaction in order to pin-point 
meaning (p.56). This is important as it is the process by which leaders assess potential 
risks in the environment. Leaders must recognise that as sense making is to enable 
action, each action that is taken can have unintended consequences, with the possibility 
of creating further ambiguity. This in turn leads to further sense making by the group, until 
the ambiguity is reduced, and the situation resolved. Recognising that this is possible and 
taking care is defined as “enacting mindful behaviour” (p.57). Baran and Scott’s (2010) 
research demonstrates that the group attempted to reduce ambiguity through the 
processes of talk and trust. Although it must be acknowledged that a challenge to heedful 
interrelating is the risk of Groupthink as discussed earlier in the Everest disaster (Kayes, 
2004). 
Talk is described as “facilitating sense making through verbal cues” (Baran & Scott, 2010, 
p.52). Talk is categorised under the overarching sense making process of Heedful 
Interrelating.  Further to the definition of Heedful Interrelating, Talk is a communicative 
process by which groups engage in sense making in order to arrive at a shared meaning 
(Baran & Scott, 2010). Communication can be done in a variety of ways and this has 
possible implications.  Recognising that there will be multiple interpretations of contexts, 
the requirement to communicate or to talk, is essential. Firefighters indicated that it was 
important to question orders, not make assumptions and repeat what has been asked, to 
ensure a shared understanding (p.56).  
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Trust is described as the belief in the reliability of colleagues and feeling that they can be 
depended upon (Baran & Scott, 2010). Leaders “enacting mindful behaviour” (p.57) is 
essential for the trust between groups. Leaders need to believe that they can rely on the 
team members they have around them. Working in dangerous contexts requires 
“interpersonal trust” (p.57), for example, when the floor gave way under a firefighter, 
placing him in extreme danger, there was a belief that the team would continue sense 
making, adapt to the context with continuous risk assessment and provide the assistance 
required (Baran & Scott, 2010, p.58). This provides an example of the importance of 
adaptability in contexts characterised by danger. 
Adjusting: described as having the mind-set that is ready to adjust and adapt; otherwise 
described as a “quick, mindful recognition of danger” (Baran & Scott. 2010, p.59). Two 
sense making processes were identified in their research as contributing to working in 
extreme contexts and HROs. 
Situational Awareness is described as “maintaining cognizance of surroundings and the 
environment” (Baran & Scott, 2010, p.52). Also identified in Wolbers and Boersma’s study 
(2013), this suggests that leaders must continuously engage in sense making in order to 
respond to the contextual cues in the environment.  Further to being aware of the 
situation, the process of agility (De Meuse, Dai & Hallenbeck, 2010; Raney, 2014) is used 
interchangeably with adaptability in literature and is described as quickly changing 
behaviour in accordance with the changing conditions (Baran & Scott, 2010).  As this 
review has previously discussed, the characteristics of dangerous contexts suggests that 
leaders are working under particular constraints, one of which is time (Hannah et al, 
2009). Although studies of leaders in dangerous contexts acknowledge that time is a 
critical factor (Hannah et al, 2009; Hannah et al, 2010; Samuels, Craig, Foster & Lindsay, 
2010; Colville et al, 2013), particularly when faced with immediate danger, it is not clear in 
the current literature, how leaders adapt and respond under time critical conditions in 
dangerous contexts.  
Baran and Scott (2010) and Wolber and Boersma’s (2013) studies are useful to the focus 
of this study, as they state the critical need for teams to be adaptive (or adjust) in 
dangerous contexts and demonstrate the importance of leaders being able to adjust to 
ambiguity when the stakes are high, in order to minimise the potential for error in these 
contexts. The collective sense making processes are useful to this study, highlighting 
failure and error of leaders in these contexts. For example, their results suggest that in 
some cases firefighters failed to use knowledge gained from prior experience or use their 
training to engage in “constructive framing” of the event (Baran & Scott, 2010, p.55).  
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Baran and Scott’s (2010) research suggests further research to identify how, using a 
sense making lens, leaders draw from their social mental models and past experiences, 
providing a richer understanding of the results. Their evidence suggests that those with 
less experience may take more risks, fail to organise the external stimuli and recognise 
lessons from “prior equivocal experiences” (p.55) and frame the context inappropriately 
(Baran & Scott, 2010, p.55). Therefore, a question can be raised as to how this 
experience and knowledge influences leaders, their adaptive leadership response and 
their ability to adjust.   
Baran and Scott’s (2010) research highlighted that the process of framing is bounded by 
groups and their collective experiences.  Similarly, Baran and Scott (2010, p.55) recognise 
the influences of the “policies, procedures and formal reporting relationships”  in the 
framing process, describing how  a more experienced firefighter, also higher in rank, 
would attempt to frame the less experienced firefighters interpretations of the event to 
invoke caution into their actions. This indicates some significant influence of the structure 
of HROs on the firefighters. This section has explored the sense making processes of 
Baran and Scott’s (2010) study. The next section discusses shared leadership and the 
processes of shared leadership in dangerous contexts. 
2.3.13 Shared leadership 
The concept of shared leadership is well established in conventional contexts and has 
previously been addressed in the context of decision making teams (Bergman et al, 
2012), yet it remains underexplored within dangerous contexts.  Klein et al (2006) 
references shared leadership in their study of trauma departments and extreme action 
teams, and whilst this is useful to draw from, this was not in the context of danger as 
conceptualised for this study. Their study did not seek to extend the literature in shared 
leadership, but instead focused on the concept as a process of leadership emerging in 
urgent contexts and within a hierarchal structure. 
Researchers have proposed that multiple members of a hierarchical team may display or 
enact leadership within the team, despite there being a formal designated leader (Avolio 
et al, 1996; Ramthun & Matkin, 2014). Pearce and Conger (2003, p.286) describe shared 
leadership as “a dynamic, interactive influence process among individuals in work groups 
in which the objective is to lead one another to the achievement of group goals”. In this 
instance, shared leadership is described as a process of leadership. Burke et al (2018) 
place emphasis on the relationship between formal and informal leadership when 
investigating extreme environments. They reference high-reliability teams, stating that the 
success of teams working in these environments can be dependent on a mixture of 
formal, shared and informal approaches to leadership. For example, in such teams, a 
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focus on knowledge, ability and expertise over rank is key to team success (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2015).  
Referring to the study by Klein et al (2006) in the trauma resuscitation unit, different 
members of staff, with different designated roles gather at the admittance of a trauma 
patient, forming a team that will treat the patient. Klein et al (2006, p.590) conceptualise 
these as “improvisational organisations”. Their study acknowledges that leadership in 
these types of teams does not “reside in one individual” but rather takes on a shared 
approach, viewing leadership in this instance as a style. Their study defines leadership as 
“fluidly flexible” (p.616), moving between shared, hierarchical and de-individualised, and 
dynamically delegated processes.  
Whilst the concept of shared leadership is stated in complex, high intensity contexts, Klein 
et al’s (2006) study was not focused on emergency response with the respondents facing 
danger, there is limited further empirical evidence to support their definition in 
contemporary literature. Conger (1998) highlights the need for qualitative studies focusing 
on leadership processes, because qualitative studies are required to investigate the 
dynamic nature of extreme action teams in depth. With relevance to this study, answers to 
these questions remain vague in the current studies addressing leadership in dangerous 
contexts. 
Ramthun and Matkin (2014) conducted a study in the literature focusing on shared 
leadership in dangerous military contexts.  Ramthun and Matkin (2014, p.244) 
characterise shared leadership as the “distribution of leadership influence across multiple 
team members”. In both definitions, the multiplicity of members, differing knowledge, skills 
and abilities are necessary for a group to enable the concept of sharing leadership within 
the team. Their study describes how shared leadership emerges through mutual 
influence, leadership emergence and dangerous dynamism. Ramthun and Matkin (2014, 
p.253) also acknowledge that the context of the military has differences and that “non-
military teams may possess other characteristics not accounted for”. The process of 
sharing leadership within the team may have different implications for processes in 
emergency response teams. 
Several arguments have formed in the current review of literature and these arguments 
have theoretical implications for this study. In the next section, these arguments and 
implications are reviewed. 
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2.4 Theoretical implications and contributions of this chapter 
 
This section addresses the theoretical implications for the chapter and the study. This 
chapter identifies specific gaps in knowledge of leadership processes in teams working in 
dangerous contexts and where further studies are needed in the current literature.  This 
sub-section addresses these gaps, the potential contributions and re-poses the research 
questions of this study. 
Hannah et al, (2009) highlight the importance of context and identify that different contexts 
will require different forms of leadership and leaders must be able to adjust (Baran & 
Scott, 2010). This study acknowledges that research into different contexts is an ever-
changing endeavour and is continuously evolving to provide researchers with a richer and 
increased construction of leadership (Hannah et al, 2009).  Aligning with Klein et al 
(2006), leadership is viewed as multi-faceted, which supports leadership theories that 
address working in dynamic contexts with unique attenuators and intensifiers (Hannah et 
al, 2009), such as time criticality, low resources, ambiguity, rapid change and threat. The 
concept of pragmatically adopting several theories of leadership therefore provides a 
potentially useful framework (Day et al, 2014) for capturing the complexity of leadership in 
dangerous contexts and how it is enacted.  
Mumford et al (2007, p.539) also state the importance of further research into domain 
specific approaches by stating that “interaction among variables operating in different 
domains needs attention, in part because it will provide a framework for the development 
of more sophisticated theory and better interventions to help leaders think about 
problems”. Developing this call for further research, Baran and Scott, (2010) argue that 
their research into collective sense making processes, and the limitations of their study, 
provides a basis for an extension and more in-depth investigation into these processes.  
Further qualitative research in dangerous contexts would contribute to this limited 
research base.   
Ambiguity is the result of “multiple plausible interpretations” (Weick, 1995, p.45) which the 
leader must filter in order to provide an adaptive response. There is little to explain how 
leaders respond or interpret the “multiplicity of stories” (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014, p.95) 
that are drawn from multiple interpretations and the ambiguity that this must create 
surrounding the context. Building on the uniqueness suggested by Hannah et al (2009), 
Baran and Scott (2010) suggest each extreme context has its own particular risks. As a 
result, leaders in extreme contexts are often negotiating complexity, making timely 
decisions concerning the safety of individuals, and therefore need to understand 
complexity dynamics to determine how to respond in each situation (Porter & Uhl-Bien et 
al, 2007; O’Connell, 2014).  
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Maitlis and Christianson (2014, p.81) discuss narratives as a discursive process and as 
the most used and “preferred form of currency” (Abolafia, 2010, p.349) in sense making 
but they discuss this from the perspective of organisational sense making, rather than 
particular emphasis on the leader in context. Maitlis and Christianson (2014, p.95) state 
that “meaning in an organisation is best captured by a multiplicity of stories”.  They 
describe the narratives told through a lens that construct meaning. This study aligns with 
this idea of a lens and seeks to look through the lens of front line leaders’ narratives. This 
method provides insights into the social construction of meaning, the construction of 
collective narrative and therefore contributes to understanding of leaders’ intersubjective 
accounts and creation of meaning in context.  In critique of narratives as part of sense 
making, there is doubt surrounding the accuracy and reliability of these accounts as a 
retrospective process. Leaders may be influenced by focusing on what the lessons learnt 
from the event were and this may distort the detail of what happened. Additionally, there is 
doubt as to the construction of “truly shared narratives” (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014, 
p.82). Baran & Scott (2010) and Mumford et al, (2007) emphasise that the discussion of 
processes can be enhanced in the following ways: 
• By discussing the importance of processes in the dangerous context leadership field, 
• By defining these specifically as they present themselves in context, under conditions 
classed as dangerous, 
• Showing how they integrate within a given situation, 
• By discussing the relationships/complexities surrounding processes and their influence 
based on how they unfold within an incident. 
Dangerous contexts often involve complexity, and the study of how leadership collectively 
processes and makes sense in these ill-defined contexts will be a useful area of research 
(Mumford, Zaccaro, Harding, Jacobs & Fleishman, 2000; Mumford et al, 2007; Hannah et 
al, 2009). Responding to the calls for further research into leaders adapting their response 
(Hannah et al, 2009) to highly complex and changing environments, further exploration by 
this study into the social processes of leadership will provide a richer and deeper 
understanding of leadership in dangerous contexts. 
A key potential contribution of this thesis is to leadership processes in dangerous 
contexts. Baran and Scott, (2010) stated that there are comparatively few studies in 
leadership that have focused on leadership processes employed within dangerous 
contexts, characterised by ambiguity. Leadership research has primarily focused on 
contexts that have been stable or mundane. Their research into collective leadership 
processes, and the limitations of their study, provides a basis for an extension and more 
in-depth investigation into these processes. In consideration of furthering their research, 
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this thesis will address the limitations of their study and addresses the call for this 
research directly.    
Based on a review of previous empirical studies in dangerous contexts, future empirical 
studies need to focus further on the collective processes of leaders, particularly 
highlighting the need for work in shared understanding within these ambiguous and 
uncertain contexts (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). The current status of the leadership 
process literature is that a number of specific context studies have taken place, with each 
highlighting significant gaps in this area of study:   
1. There is limited understanding of the processes of leadership enacted in dangerous 
contexts, specifically in emergency response. The study of how leadership is enacted 
within a team in dangerous contexts, will be a useful area for research (Mumford et al, 
2000 & Mumford et al, 2007). 
2. There is a lack of knowledge about how leaders think within teams and how teams 
understand dangerous contexts (Mumford et al, 2007). 
3. Focus on identifying further enabling processes that will explore how leaders reduce 
ambiguity of “multiple plausible interpretations” in an effort to adapt to the context of 
working in emergency services to minimise errors (Baran & Scott, 2010; Wolbers & 
Boersma, 2013; Colville et al, 2013). 
The retrospective nature of the fire fighters reports in the research by Baran and Scott 
(2010), also highlights a limitation to this study. Retrospective accounts of events are 
subjected to the interpretation by the individual.  Accuracy of these accounts is 
questionable.  Wolbers and Boersma (2013) conducted an ethnomethodological study 
which means that the researcher was present in the context and was able to gain unique 
insights from the narratives of leaders in context. This was limited however, as the context 
was a simulation exercise. Therefore, the responses of individuals were not investigated 
when facing actual threat to life.  A second limitation of their study is that only reports from 
firefighters were analysed. That provided a single focus in one HRO, the fire service. This 
means that the context of high reliability was under-represented. A wider and richer 
understanding of leadership would be to ensure representation of other incidents in other 
HRO, such as police and ambulance services. 
Throughout the review of the current literature, significant gaps in knowledge of 
leadership, leadership processes and constructions of danger have been highlighted. 
Constructions of leadership have been discussed and there is limited knowledge that 
addresses leadership in the context of danger, thus literature as recent as 2018 is still 
stating the requirement for further research (Burke, 2018). Leadership processes and how 
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leadership is enacted and the influence of the context of danger on leadership is 
significantly limited, and less empirical work has been conducted in emergency response 
teams working in dangerous contexts. In response to these gaps in the field, this study 
seeks to explore the following research questions: 
• How do teams working in dangerous contexts construct leadership? 
• How do teams working in dangerous contexts construct danger? 
• How does danger influence leadership processes? 
• What are the leadership processes of teams working in dangerous contexts? 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
 
This review has critically analysed contemporary leadership studies in dangerous 
contexts. This study acknowledges that there are calls for furthering leaders’ constructions 
of dangerous contexts; a better understanding of leaders in dangerous contexts will inform 
a deeper appreciation of the mechanisms and ontology of leadership processes (Hannah 
et al, 2009; Yukl & Mahsud, 2010).  It is the intention of this study to contribute to literature 
on dangerous contexts and demonstrate how team and social processes emerging in 
these contexts can enrich understanding of a leadership approach. The theoretical 
framework is to examine collective interpretive accounts of dangerous contexts with the 
purpose of identifying leadership processes thereby enabling an appropriate adaptive 
response in dangerous contexts. The next chapter addresses the methodological 
approach to the study and the researcher’s philosophical position.  
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Chapter 3 - Methodology Chapter 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the methodological framework developed to explore the central 
phenomenon of the study, is outlined: social processes of leadership. The following 
research objective is addressed: 
 
• To adopt a relevant qualitative methodological framework for data collection and 
analysis to capture the participant voices. 
 
The methodological decisions of the chosen research approach are outlined and justified, 
specifically focusing on the research design; including the sampling strategy and choice of 
data generation methods. Focus Groups are used as the primary method data generation 
method, with their practical application explored within this chapter. The ethical 
considerations of the study are detailed, before outlining the framework used to analyse 
the data as well as the potential methodological contributions of the study.   
This chapter acknowledges how I, as the researcher, bring my personal influences to the 
study with regards to my positioning on various aspects of the research design; including 
the nature of the research topic; data generation methods; and philosophical 
commitments. I therefore refer to myself in the first person at various points in the chapter, 
when discussing my research positioning and decisions made. 
It is useful to remind the reader of the central question that guides this research: How is 
leadership enacted in dangerous contexts? 
Four additional sub questions support the exploration for answering the primary qualitative 
research problem; 
1. How do teams working in dangerous contexts construct danger? 
2. How do teams working in dangerous contexts construct leadership? 
3. How does danger influence leadership processes? 
4. What are the leadership processes of teams working in dangerous contexts? 
Denzin and Lincoln (2011), suggest that it is useful to follow a structure for integrated 
philosophical and methodological discussions. A structure outlines the phases of the 
research process which, as stated by Denzin and Lincoln (2011, p.12), help to “place 
philosophy and theory into perspective in the research process”. I have chosen to follow 
the basis of Crotty’s (1998) scaffolding model below. The model provides this study with a 
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progressive methodological framework, which will allow opportunities to provide 
justification for the decisions taken. Additionally, it allows for the discussion of the 
theoretical perspectives and methodological approach of the research in a well-
recognised format. The model has been adopted to reflect the philosophical and 
methodological discussions in this study and adapted to reflect the data generation and 
analysis stage of the research process. 
Figure 3.1- Scaffolding model of research (adapted from Crotty, 1998, p.2) 
 
The next section will address the first aspect of the scaffolding model; the Ontological and 
Epistemological position.  Following that, I discuss how each aspect of the scaffolding 
model will be addressed. 
3.2 Ontological and Epistemological Commitments  
 
In this section, the ontological and epistemological commitments for this study are 
outlined. The process of establishing researcher commitments enables me to adopt 
methods that align my commitments with the aims of my research.   
When discussing epistemology, or ‘what is known’, I align with social constructionism. I 
believe that knowledge and meaning is developed through interactions between 
individuals. In other words, social interactions that determine our beliefs, our values as 
social actors in our realities; what is understood as being right, what is wrong and what we 
understand to be positive or negative social interactions. Social Constructionism, 
“is based on the idea that social reality is not separate from us as individuals, but 
that social realities and ourselves are intimately interwoven as each shape and is 
shaped by the other in everyday interactions” (Cunliffe, 2008, p.214). 
This relational perspective builds on the premise of Dilthey (1833 -1911) who asserted 
that “human social behaviour is always imbued with values” (Hughes & Sharrock, 1997, 
p.98). As discussed in the previous chapter, it is important to briefly re-iterate here that 
this study does not adopt a relational methodological approach but rather adopts a 
relational perspective or lens of meaning making. Building on this concept of human social 
values and therefore a perceived consciousness, Creswell provides the view that 
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“individuals seek understanding of the world in which they live and work…developing 
subjective meanings of their experiences” (Creswell, 2001, p.24). The term social refers to 
the “mode of meaning generation” rather than meaning creation (Crotty, 1998, p.55).   
Building on this idea of constructing knowledge and meaning through interpretation, a 
complexity view of leadership follows this reasoning through in its concept of inter-
subjectivity, stating that leadership is the “product of interaction, tension, and exchange 
rules governing changes in perceptions and understanding” (Lichtenstein et al, 2006, p.2). 
Drath (2001, p.136) proposes that “people construct reality through their interactions 
within world views, when they explain things to one another, tell each other stories, create 
models and theories…and in general when they interact through thought, word and 
action”. Further to this, the concept of social interaction takes place when these actions 
are orientated towards another. (Hughes & Sharrock, 1997). Reality in this study is 
constructed out of interaction between a person with the world (Crotty, 1998).  
When discussing ontology, or the study of ‘what is’ in terms of fundamental categories, I 
acknowledge the existence of an external reality which exists outside of my perception 
and which I interact with, and there construct my meaning. There are multiple 
constructions of reality and each is influenced through social interactions with others, and 
therefore culturally derived. As Creswell (2001, p.25) describes, the ‘social’ dimension of 
social constructionism states that constructions are influenced by cultural and historical 
‘norms’ that are formed in organisations or groups. Specific to this study, this relates to the 
norms of working in an operating environment, which involves close team working, facing 
danger on a daily basis, in emergency response organisations.  
By recognising this multiplicity of individual perceptions of reality, and how this is informed 
and influenced by socially constructed meaning (exemplified in cultural norms), this study 
explores the perceived and meaningful realities of the team members who work in 
emergency response teams in dangerous contexts.   I draw from their experiences of 
incidents within dangerous contexts; specifically how they construct danger, and how they 
construct leadership. These are important questions to consider as their understanding of 
these concepts, as well as the cultural and historical norms of their operating environment, 
influence their responses when discussing or reflecting upon each concept during the data 
collection process. 
It is useful at this point to remind the reader how leadership and leadership processes are 
defined in this thesis, as epistemological decisions have been made on the basis of how 
the terms are understood: 
• The definition of leadership that is adopted for this study is the social process of intra-
personal and intra-group interaction to achieve goals, by reducing contextual 
Page 83 of 273 
 
ambiguity and generating adaptive outcomes (A synthesis of Lichtenstein et al, 2006; 
Baran & Scott, 2010; Bardis, 1978; Eberly et al, 2013).  
• The definition of leadership processes that is adopted for this study is structured 
interactions generating outcomes adaptive to need.  These include, directive/action-
based, and inter-personal/social interactions, such as recruiting, planning, visioning, 
directing, sense-making, motivating, coordinating, monitoring and enabling (A 
synthesis of Morgeson et al, 2010; Fleishman et al, 1991; Weick, 1993; Day et al, 
2004; Lichtenstein et al, 2006; Uhl-bien, 2006; Barnett & McCormick, 2012). 
 
This study identifies all process types as highlighted in this definition. However, the 
interactive and social processes dominate as the study adopts a team level of analysis.     
3.2.1 Theoretical Perspective – Interpretative Study 
I adopt an interpretative theoretical perspective for this study. The theoretical perspective, 
meaning the “philosophical stance behind the methodology” (Crotty, 1998, p.66).  Max 
Weber’s (1969) idea of Verstehen (understanding) (Bryman, 2001, p.56; Gill & Johnson, 
2011), also referred to as the interpretive approach (Crotty, 1998), is focusing on 
meanings, in the sense that the methodological approach is “attempting to re-construct 
the subjective experience of social actors” (Hughes & Sharrock, 1997, p.101). This is in 
contrast to the concept of Erklaren (explaining) which is more attributable to the natural 
sciences, and a positivist stance in seeking to explain causal relationships. Weber (1969, 
cited in Crotty, 1998) builds on this contrast by suggesting that understanding of causation 
comes from an interpretation of social action. Weber (1969) considers that, 
“an interpretation of a sequence of events to be causally adequate, if on the basis 
of past experience it appears probable that it will always occur in the same way” 
(Weber, 1969, cited in Crotty, 1998, p.39).  
This study has a theoretical interest in understanding and interpreting “meaningfulness” 
(Hughes & Sharrock, 1997, p.101), specifically in dangerous contexts. The methods of 
this study seek to interpret individuals’ and teams’ understanding of their experiences in 
dangerous contexts and thus generate meaning from this data. I argue that it is not only 
about how participants make sense of the world or the dangerous context through their 
interactions with others, but also with the value of their meaning making, or their 
interpretation of the interaction that takes place (Crotty, 1998).  
Acknowledging that social constructionism has a relative ontology as well as realist 
(Crotty, 1998, p.65 & Denzin & Lincoln, 2013, p.27), I understand that there will be 
differing sense made of the same ‘phenomenon’ by different members of the teams. 
Participants may experience phenomenon but may interpret them differently, drawing from 
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their experience and background, thus creating multiple constructions of what is 
understood to be real. Therefore, the researcher also acknowledges a realist ontological 
view and recognises that participants may be taking part with their own views of the world 
and events, which “may be better elaborated through the interaction with others” 
(Silverman, 2020, p.207). The purpose of this research is to understand the social 
processes of leadership in teams, where there will be differing constructions of reality 
between participants.  Each team in the study will give their examples of working in a 
dangerous context, and each participant may have their own interpretation of what 
happened during an incident. The focus will remain at a team level analysis. For example, 
the nature of focus group facilitation encourages group discussions of individuals’ 
reflections. 
This study emphasises that individuals’ ways of viewing the world are based on their 
cultural values, beliefs and experience, supporting Crotty’s (1998) suggestion that an 
interpretivist “looks for culturally derived and historically situated interpretations of the 
social life-world” (Crotty, 1998, p.67).  My social constructionist positioning is clearly 
embedded in my research questions as my interest is the way in which individuals 
construct understanding of a phenomenon, in this case how leadership is understood. 
This is appropriate to the research as the study will be viewing the topic through the lens 
of the experience of individuals in a group context and their collective interpretation of 
specifically identified incidents.   
Conducting interpretative research means acknowledging the biased and subjective 
nature of human beings as research participants. These distinctions in understanding are 
important to identify, because my understanding of how the world can have an existence 
outside of the mind and the consciousness, influences the form of social research that is 
undertaken (Cunliffe, 2008). Further to this, it is only when we engage in an interactive 
way within this world that we can begin to make meaning and generate meaningful 
realities (Crotty, 1998). These meanings are explored through the social processes of 
leadership and how meaning is shaped in the group through their response to questions 
posed. 
Therefore, this study adopts a range of methods to build knowledge and understanding of 
the intersubjective meaning of knowledge in teams facing dangerous contexts.  
“Knowledge of persons could only be gained through an interpretative procedure 
grounded in the imaginative recreation of the experiences of others; to grasp the 
meaning which things in their world have for them” (Hughes & Sharrock, 1997, 
p.98).  
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In this section, my philosophical stance, epistemological and ontological understanding 
and commitments for this study have been discussed. In the following section the 
research design and method that will be used to generate empirical data and the process 
of data analysis will be outlined.  Furthermore, the potential limitations of the research 
design will be acknowledged throughout the discussions within this chapter, and due 
consideration is given to the ethical implications of conducting this research. 
3.3 The Research Design 
 
This section sets out the reasoning of relevant methodological decisions of the research 
design. I begin by outlining the method used to identify appropriate literature for review 
and consideration in this study and discussing the methodological reasoning for the 
staged process adopted. I will address each stage in turn: 
• Stage 1 - The first step of this research was to conduct an analysis of the current 
leadership literature. There is a considerable amount of research in the leadership 
field of study and therefore it was important to narrow the search to address my 
research question. In-depth searches for more recent (post 2005) general leadership 
journals revealed a gap in the literature around those operating in contexts that were 
not categorised conventional. Once this gap was established and I had narrowed my 
research study, I conducted a thorough literature search for articles meeting the 
following criteria: 
 
• Articles that discuss leadership processes or functions 
• Articles that address ‘Dangerous Contexts’ 
and 
• Articles that focus on leadership in teams. 
 
• This search was not restricted to empirical studies, context or type of leadership, the 
type of team or the focus on the leader or leadership. For example; conceptual articles 
that discussed processes or functions; teams that operate in conventional contexts 
were included as well as general articles examining leadership from the leader and 
team perspective were included.  
 
• Stage 2 - A review of all articles identified was conducted for processes that have 
previously been identified in recent articles and studies. 
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• Stage 3 - To support shared understanding and provide clarity of the processes in the 
literature, I created a process map. To achieve this, I used Morgeson et al’s (2010) 
taxonomy as a basis for the creation of a conceptual process map. In the recent 
publication by Burke at al, (2018), Morgeson’s taxonomy of team leadership functions 
was also utilised as a basis of their study. Morgeson et al (2010) is useful as they 
provide a broad set of fifteen functions that “coalesce within the dynamism present in 
team process, thereby representing the state of the art with respect to team leadership 
theory” (Burke at al, 2018, p.718). 
Mapping out processes found in Morgeson et al’s (2010) conceptual paper enabled me to 
include processes identified before 2010 and continue to map processes found in further 
and more recent articles, therefore applying the theoretical literature to existing literature 
to provide a broad encompassing picture of the processes found in the literature.  In line 
with Morgeson et al (2010), mapping the processes in this way provided a thematic tool 
and was a useful exercise, as I was able to see at a glance which studies had mentioned 
which processes. A limitation of identifying existing processes in the literature was the 
level of detail to which the process was discussed or explored (Conger, 1998). For 
instance, in some studies the process was mentioned but there was little discussion or 
definition given to how the process applied to the context or purpose of leadership in the 
paper, and therefore how it added to the theoretical knowledge base.  
I retained the model of grouped processes forming overarching themes. Processes such 
as ‘sense-making’ from one of the over-arching themes of the processes, and where 
authors identify an individual leadership process, such as ‘heedful inter-relating’ (Baran & 
Scott, 2010), these were captured within the appropriate theme or sub-theme in the map. 
Each time a process was identified in a journal article either as being described as 
important or relevant to understanding of leadership processes, an ‘x’ was placed in the 
process map.  These processes could be identified either through conceptual discussions, 
empirical findings, or theoretical definitions.   
Stage 4 - Where authors provide a definition of processes, these were captured to enable 
a synthesised discussion of the process definitions for this study.  Where prior studies are 
conceptual or empirical in nature this is clearly defined, as the empirical studies are more 
relevant to refining the theoretical contribution of my study (Lee, 2014), as discussed 
earlier. Definitions of leadership were also captured and variables such as the author’s 
philosophical positioning were considered, as well as the context in which the process 
was being discussed.  
The mapping exercise was used to gain a more complete understanding of the processes 
that are currently present in the leadership literature and to provide evidence of a 
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systematic approach to reviewing the literature. My approach was to continuously add to 
this process map with additional studies. Furthermore, by adding descriptions and 
meanings to the themes identified, I continued to collect data to exhaust the number of 
themes so that there were “no gaps in explanations” of the themes (Strauss & Corbin, 
2015, p.140). 
Stage 5 - As the process map deepened thematically and systematically, the researcher 
began to extract studies that matched the research boundaries. The studies had to meet 
all of the following criteria: 
• They addressed working in a dangerous context 
• The context was grounded in the Emergency Response Team 
• They included an empirical study of a team context 
The literature review was utilised to filter the studies in stages; nineteen empirical studies 
met the criteria for teams working in dangerous contexts, and these have been discussed 
in chapter two (page 36) Further filtering processes revealed that seven of these empirical 
studies were of teams working in dangerous contexts and in emergency response team 
contexts, three of which were recently published as part of a special issue in the Journal 
of Organisational Behaviour (2018). Chapter two has paid particular attention to these 
articles as they are the most recent studies to be conducted with relevance to emergency 
response teams in dangerous contexts.  
Stage 6 - Previous questioning strategies from empirical studies were examined prior to 
the research being carried out and relevant questions to the context and parameters of 
this research were extracted. These form the basis of the questioning strategy (Appendix 
C) for this study as well as enabling the identification of further areas in dangerous 
contexts to be explored. This strategy therefore does not include the most recent studies. 
However, the recent studies adopted differing research methods, for example: Schmutz et 
al, (2018) focused on videoed observations of team behaviour in simulated emergency 
examples at the port of Rotterdam, seeking to measure performance in relation to 
behaviours demonstrated; Uitdewilligen & Waller (2018) used the same video simulation 
to conduct a quantitative study with the purpose of sequencing information sharing 
behaviours.  
The intention of the mapping process was to inform the research with a thematic tool from 
the existing literature. The purpose was to enhance the identification of processes in the 
context being studied and to provide evidence of limited research and justification for the 
exploration of the limited research conducted in dangerous contexts, specifically 
Emergency Response Teams. The design of this study, informed by this process is 
outlined in the remainder of this chapter. 
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3.4 Research methodology 
 
When researching a particular issue, it is important to have the appropriate skills and 
techniques to employ during the research process (Hughes & Sharrock, 1997). These are 
not to be viewed purely as instruments to carry out the research, as these skills and 
techniques operate attached to a set of assumptions. Put another way, the philosophical 
issues and assumptions that are raised about the relevance of the methods used in social 
research, are pivotal to the philosophical approach of the research.  The following section 
discusses focus groups as the method for data generation. 
3.4.1 Research method: Focus Groups 
Focus groups were selected as the data generation method for this study. For the 
purposes of this research, focus groups are “characterised as a particular type of group 
interview or as a collective conversation… where the researcher asks a set of targeted 
questions designed to elicit collective views about a specific topic” (Silverman, 2020, 
p.206).  
The focus group will have a focused discussion on a topic that is introduced by the 
researcher. This is supported by Kevern and Webb (2001, p.323) who state that it is a 
“guided in-depth interview of a relatively homogeneous small group of individuals 
purposefully selected”. In contrast to most current empirical studies on leadership and in 
dangerous contexts, Morrison-Beedy, Cote-Arsenault and Fienstein, (2001, p.48) argue 
that focus groups as a method can be superior to carrying out individual interviews 
because “group interaction can assist in eliciting richer or more sensitive data”.  Further to 
this, Kevern and Webb (2001) state that this method facilitates group processes in helping 
the group explore and provide clarity in their views, which would be less easily achieved in 
individual interviews. In this instance, the focus groups will be facilitated primarily to 
generate discussion around an incident, categorised as dangerous. 
Research into the use of focus groups, shows that this technique has predominantly been 
applied in health studies (Guest et al, 2006), but also within market research, where the 
theoretical contexts and methodological assumptions have been expanded and then in 
the social sciences from 1980’s (Kevern & Webb, 2001).  In social sciences, focus groups 
have been applied in “exploratory academic research”, primarily to gain an understanding 
of meanings related to phenomenon, peoples’ opinions, beliefs, experiences and values 
(Kevern & Webb, 2001, p.325), which this study has also sought to do. 
As mentioned previously, primary empirical research with the individuals who operate in 
dangerous contexts, especially at the intra-group level, have not previously used focus 
groups as a method to explore leadership processes; most studies have post-incident 
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reviews drawn from textual sources (Hannah et al, 2010). This is a clear limitation of 
current empirical studies if leadership within teams is to be understood further. Despite 
this, there is an understanding from the literature that all participants working in dangerous 
contexts do so by operating primarily in a team environment, thereby supporting focus 
groups as the selected team based data generation method. 
Studies such as Colville et al (2013) and their investigation into the shooting of Jean 
Charles de Menezes in the London Underground in 2005, incorporated a secondary 
documentation review research method. Despite the clear communicative issues arising 
during that event fundamentally being a team-based issue, the initial primary data 
collection undertaken by government agencies did not include a team focus, but rather 
conducted one to one interviews with key ranking individuals and provided individual 
accounts and perspectives.  
Further to this, fire personnel work as clearly defined teams. Yet, Baran and Scott’s (2010) 
focus on ‘near miss’ fire incident reports, places a methodological focus on the individual, 
despite offering three leadership or social processes that mirror a sense-making lens. In 
further studies, where the team has been the unit of analysis, Kayes (2004), in his study of 
the Mount Everest disaster, analysed the team behaviours and responses to external 
cues through interviewing. Whist in some cases, this may be the only means of gathering 
information or data, team responses such as those emerging from effective questioning 
and possessing expertise in the facilitation of focus groups, can highlight the dynamics 
between the individuals at the time of the incident. Individual participants as a standalone 
source of data, whether through interviews or documented accounts, are limited in their 
ability to understand and articulate accurately what the team thought at the time and to 
explain why and how particular decisions were made during an incident. To address this 
methodological and empirical gap, focus groups were chosen as the data generation 
method for this study, with a clear level of analysis of data at team level.  This study builds 
on and therefore strengthens methods in the leadership field, by exploring within the team 
environment. 
3.4.2 Sampling Strategies 
In this case, each participant in the team possesses knowledge of working in a particular 
type of incident and within a particular context. In this study, teams have been purposively 
sourced for their role of operating within dangerous contexts. There are mixed levels of 
experience in each team and levels of knowledge in different areas of expertise. This is 
intentional to provide breadth to this exploratory study. Specific criteria for inclusion in a 
focus group for this study are: 
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• The teams are established, with a history of working together and therefore provide 
rich data opportunities to contribute to the research, or information rich participants 
(Krueger & Casey, 2015). 
• The team can identify one or two incidents (maximum number) that they all attended, 
and be prepared to discuss them together, in depth. There is a range of levels of 
command in the team, accounting for different levels of training and experience and 
therefore offering a range of perspectives in the focus group. Levels of command 
involved in an incident at both tactical (lead) and (general) operational level.  
• The participants have different areas of expertise within the team, contributing to a 
range of different perspectives possible. 
 
The focus groups will be between 90-120 minutes (Morrison-Beedy et al, 2001). This 
allows the researcher time to engage with the participants, introduce the topic and for the 
conversation and discussion to form a natural flow in the group. The next section 
discusses how I apply the methods of the research. 
3.5 Applying the research method 
 
Figure 3.2 below shows that I adopt Creswell’s (2013) view that the qualitative research 
method is best viewed as a set of interrelated activities, and approached as a cycle. This 
cycle is useful as it enables a systematic and logical progression through the process.  
Although potential limitations are briefly raised throughout this chapter, limitations that 
were then realised during the application of this methodology will be considered in chapter 
six in line with the discussion of my conclusions and contributions. 
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Figure 3.2 – Qualitative Research Method (Creswell, 2013, p.146)
               
3.5.1 Locating Site/ Teams 
The research is conducted in four emergency services that are accessed by the public 
dialling 999; the ambulance service, police force, fire service and mountain rescue. 
Focusing on emergency services narrows the scope of those teams that match the criteria 
to participate in the research. My research participants are those who work in teams that 
have the most exposure in their day to day working to hazardous situations, meaning that 
they often work with a direct risk or threat to themselves and others. The public sector has 
been purposively identified as the appropriate area for this research because further work 
in leadership in HROs and working in dangerous contexts is required (Hannah et al, 
2009).  
HROs in Great Britain operate within the public sector. Their leadership operates on 
multiple levels; Strategic, Tactical and Operational. In practice, this is the translation of 
leadership from the headquarters (Strategic) to setting up command in the field as on-site 
leadership (Tactical) and then in-situ leadership (Operational) or within the situation. The 
focus in this study is on the tactical and operational levels, or those present in the field at 
an incident. This is identified in the literature and pilot study as a real-life issue that is 
faced at these levels of command in HROs and an issue that has been identified as a gap 
in leadership literature.  
To remind the reader, incidents that all these teams can face include (but are not limited 
to): armed robbery or hostage situation, chemical and hazardous material or spills, large 
fires, rescue operations in remote locations, water rescues, off shore accidents, lost 
persons, large road traffic incidents and terrorist threats. These are incidents that all 
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emergency services can attend or work within simultaneously, being a multi-agency 
incident. This research acknowledges that there may be some overlap of discussion of 
incidents and processes that are identified as a result of cross collaboration efforts 
between services, and although a useful study for further research, this research is not 
addressing the multi-agency approach to incidents.  
The focus of the research is on the North East of England. No research has previously 
been conducted in this region on these emergency response teams, specific to leadership 
or leadership processes in dangerous contexts, nor is any research identified in the 
literature search and review.  A range of specialist teams relevant to this study exist 
geographically close, and are therefore accessible. Confining the research to North East 
teams raises some potential limitations, for example: particular ways of working (and 
therefore identified processes) in the North East may be different from other parts of the 
country, for example Northumberland has the largest rurality in England, and Teesside 
has one of the highest areas of deprivation.  This raises issues with the transferability of 
the findings to other teams in other locations. The intention of the research is to enable a 
regional picture of emergency response units to form; units that often find themselves 
attending similar incidents in the region. This is a useful practical output of the research, 
which I will facilitate post-study across regional emergency response teams. Although 
emergency response teams in other parts of the country and the world may work 
differently and experience situations specific to the antecedents of their context, these 
findings and subsequent framework will be useful for other emergency services as a basis 
for further understanding their leadership emergence and processes in dangerous 
contexts. 
3.5.2 Gaining access and establishing rapport  
Initial access was gained to the Hazardous Area Response Team (HART) within the 
Ambulance Service.  This generated further contacts of team leaders and managers in the 
Fire Service, Mountain Rescue and Police Services. In this environment, most managers 
attend the same regional strategy meetings of emergency services and conversations 
about the research had taken place. Therefore, when I contacted each of the managers to 
discuss access, the purpose of my research and what I would need from them was not 
completely new. I was told that access was influenced on the basis of the trust and 
respect managers in the other emergency services had between each other. I was ‘vetted’ 
by one through a phone call and an initial meeting as being reliable and genuine, so I was 
welcomed by the other services. 
Contacts in these organisations have introduced me to the individuals (usually in 
command) that are able to grant me access.  Rapport is essential with these individuals or 
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‘gatekeepers’ (Creswell, 2013, p.154). Due to the potentially sensitive nature of the 
incidents that would be discussed, I needed to establish trust early in the research 
relationship. This method enables the researcher to build ‘authenticity’ (Miles, Huberman 
& Saldana, 2020, p.38) with those researched, as Miles et al (2020, p.39) state 
“understanding is a more fundamental concept for qualitative research than validity”.  
3.5.3 Participant selection strategies  
The unit of analysis in this research is the team.  Each emergency service organisation 
consists of teams that work together on a daily basis, attending 999 emergency incidents. 
The possible sample across the four emergency service organisations consists of the 
following: 
Ambulance Service - Hazardous Area Response Team (HART) – 5 teams of 8 people 
and 1 team leader = 41 people in a potential sample. Teams are predominantly male and 
1 female took part in a pilot focus group. 
Fire & Rescue Service (FRS) – 5 teams of 5 people and 1 Crew Manager (team leader) 
= 26 people in a potential sample. There are further teams of 5 people located at each 
core station around the North East. Teams are predominantly male; there were no 
females in the pilot focus group. 
Police Firearms Unit (PFA) – 6 Teams of 20 people and 2 Sergeants = 122 people in a 
potential sample. The 6 teams are located around the North East of England. Teams are 
predominantly male, 1 female took part in the focus groups. 
The sample that took part in the study, consists of eight teams and a total of 61 
participants. The following table, 3.1, provides their demographic information: 
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Table 3.1 – Focus group sample – Demographic Information 
Focus 
Group 
Team 
Age Ranges Years of Service Total 
Participants in 
focus groups 
Focus 
Group 1 
HART 
8 Hazardous Area 
Response Team 
members (including 1 
Team Leaders) 
7 Male Aged 30-50 years 
1 Female Aged 30-50 
years 
1 under 1 year service 
in HART 
4 over 10 years 
2 over 20 years service 
 
8 
Focus 
Group 2 
FS 
8 Fire service officers – 
All Male  
2 aged 55-60 years   
4 aged 45-55 years 
2 aged 35-45 years  
2 over 30 years service  
2 over 20 years service 
3 over 10 years service 
1 on probation 
8 
Focus 
Group 3 
MRT 
7 team members  of 
Mountain Rescue – all 
male   
3 (55-65 years old)  
2 aged 45-55 years 
2 aged 20-30 years 
2 over 30 years service  
1 over 25 years service 
2 over 2 years service 
2 on probation 
7 
Focus 
Group 4 
PFA 
6 Police Firearms Officers 
(including 1 sergeant) – 
All male 
3 aged 30-50 years 
3 aged 50 -60 years 
2 under 1 years service 
in Firearms unit 
2 over 5 years service 
2 over 10 years service 
6 
Focus 
Group 5 
PFA 
7 Police Firearms Officers 
(including 1 sergeant & 1 
Bronze commander)  
6 Male aged 30-50 years 
1 Female Aged 30-50 
years 
4 under 1 year service 
in Firearms Unit  
1 over 15 years service  
2 over 20 years service 
 
7 
Focus 
Group 6 
FS 
8 Fire service officers – 7 
Male/1 Female   
1 aged 55-60 years   
4 aged 45-55 years 
2 aged 35-45 years  
1 Female aged 25-35 
years 
3 over 25 years service, 
2 over 20 years service,  
1 over 15 years service,  
2 over 10 years service  
 
8 
Focus 
Group 7 
FS 
8 Fire service officers – 
All Male  
2 aged 50-55 years   
4 aged 35-45 years 
2 aged 25-30 years  
2 over 20 years service  
2 over 15 years service 
2 over 5 years service 
1 over 1 year service  
8 
Focus 
Group 8 
HART 
9 Hazardous Area 
Response Team 
members (including 2 
Team Leaders) 7 Male 
Aged 30-50 years 
2 Female Aged 30-50 
years 
1 under a year service 
in HART 
4 over 10 years  
1 over 20 years service 
9 
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Teams in the emergency services (police, fire and ambulance) across organisations 
primarily work on a twenty four hour rota system. In a typical week, four or five teams on 
the rota will be on call and one team will be on ‘training’. They will be in work but carrying 
out training exercises for emergency response and checking equipment. The teams are 
predominantly males aged between thirty and sixty years old.  
Mountain Rescue Team (MRT) – 1 team of 40 people, (Team Composed of no less than 
5 per incident) including 1 Team Lead per operation = 40 people in a potential sample. 
The teams consist predominantly of male volunteers aged between 25 – 65 years old. 
There were no females in the pilot focus group. There were 5 females in the whole team 
of 40 people. This team work differently to the main emergency services as they are a 
group of volunteers that have full time job roles outside of the MRT. Not all team members 
are able to attend all events and therefore it will be a mixed number of volunteers (team 
members) at every incident. MRT face incidents such as search and rescue, often in 
treacherous conditions and with a threat to their lives such as water, flooding, heights, 
rock falls, speed of rescue causing personal injury and unpredictable weather in some of 
the remotest parts of the region. 
Non-probability types of sampling are used for the study because of the specific nature of 
the context.  The participants need to be representative of the individuals most able to 
provide meaningful data to draw analysis and findings. Purposive sampling is the 
approach taken, and is discussed below, along with a discussion of the sample size 
(Strauss & Corbin, 2015; Cresswell, 2013; Kerr, Nixon & Wild, 2010; Miles et al, 2020; 
Curtis, Gesler, Smith & Washburn, 2000).   
Guest, Bunce & Johnson, (2006, p.61) offer a useful definition of purposive sampling in 
that participants are selected according to “predetermined criteria relevant to a particular 
research objective”. Creswell, (2013, p.156) supports and builds on this criteria for 
selection, stating that participants should “purposefully inform an understanding of the 
research problem and central phenomenon in the study”. Although one of the most 
common types of sampling selection, purposive samples are participants that are placed 
with the knowledge and experience to inform the researchers understanding of the 
phenomenon under investigation. With specific regard to this study, Roberts (1997, p.80) 
states that focus groups primarily use purposive sampling methods used to “ascertain 
theoretical insights from articulate representatives of the cultural variables of the 
population”. 
The samples, although purposive, are based on their location and availability. The team 
that will be used at the time of research will be the ‘training team’ on duty in that week, 
which will avoid issues of cessation of research due to 999 emergency call outs. This 
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avoids compromising situations for staff participants and the research data reliability and 
validity. Teams will only be excluded from the possible sample at that location, if they are 
unable to meet the criteria. The criteria for inclusion were presented to the organisations 
two weeks prior to the session taking place. 
When discussing the size of the sample, which relates directly to the discussion of 
sampling strategy, there has been some debate in qualitative research about sample 
amount, sample size and therefore data credibility, or how many interviews are 
considered to be ‘enough’ (Guest, 2006).  Morse (1995, p147) suggests that saturation of 
the data is key to conducting excellent qualitative studies, however, she also advises that 
“there are no published guidelines or tests of adequacy for estimating the sample size 
required to reach saturation”. Determining non-probabilistic sample sizes in purposive 
studies have become based on the point at which saturation of the data occurs. Saturation 
in the context of thematic analysis (Silverman, 2020) is determined when no new themes 
are emerging (Strauss & Corbin, 2015). Further explanation is offered by Kerr, Nixon and 
Wild (2010) stating that a sample is indicated where saturation occurs and this point 
indicates that enough data has been generated in order for there to be credibility in 
analysis. 
Guest et al, (2006) conducted a study with sixty interviews with the purpose of providing 
guidance to researchers regarding saturation and therefore sample size estimation. Data 
saturation for the most part occurred after twelve interviews were analysed, whereby new 
themes emerging were infrequent. Creswell (1998) recommends between twenty and 
thirty participants for a ‘grounded study’, which this inductive approach resembles. 
However, Romney, Batchelder and Weller (1986) stated that small samples were 
sufficient in purposive studies providing that the participants have a good degree of 
knowledge in the subject area. This suggests that sample size is representative of the 
domain under investigation. Morse (2001) supports this stating that if the research 
question is broad in nature then saturation will take longer. As this study has been 
focused on teams facing a particular and rare type of context, the scope of the study is 
sufficiently narrow and teams were identified in the literature, as theoretically relevant to 
this context. 
With regard to the specific research method in this study, namely the number of focus 
groups to undertake to achieve data saturation, Sharts-Hopko (2001) state that three or 
four focus groups should take place, representing the phenomenon and analysis should 
take place to see if saturation has occurred. Concurring with this, Bristowe, Siassakos, 
Hambly, Angouri, Yelland, Draycott and Fox (2012), held five inter-professional focus 
groups of five to seven participants, to investigate teamwork for clinical emergencies. 
They found that saturation occurred after the five focus groups, including a pilot. 
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Silverman (2020) is specific suggesting focus groups should consist of six to eight 
participants whom all share a characteristic under investigation. Sharts-Hopko (2001) 
state that more than ten participants become harder to control and larger numbers means 
that their contributions to the discussions will be limited. The approach this study adopts 
the Sharts-Hopko approach, taking an iterative evaluation of saturation until there is 
sufficient data to respond to the research questions and aims.  Emergency response 
teams typically consist of five to eight participants, mirroring the number stated by 
Bristowe et al (2012). Initially one focus group was carried out with each of the four types 
of emergency service, and then additional focus groups were carried out until saturation of 
themes occurred.  
3.5.4 Data generation– Pilot Study 
In order to establish the methodological strategies that the study would adopt, I decided to 
conduct three pilot focus groups. This was an opportunity to: 
• Ascertain that I was conducting focus groups with the relevant people for my research 
• Assess the length of time needed for each group so that I could state this accurately to 
future groups 
• Refine and adjust my questioning approach after each pilot group. For example; it was 
necessary to encourage an open response environment, using probing questions to 
tease out a fuller answer to questions. Additionally, I had too many questions and 
based on the initial length of answers I was getting from the group, I realised that 
would not have time to ask them all. I had to reduce these to the most directly relevant 
to leadership. This assisted me in keeping the focus of the research. 
• Practice my skills in group facilitation.  In this case, it was necessary to adjust to the 
dynamic of the group. For example, if the group feels very formal and structured 
compared to another group that immediately appeared relaxed, this influenced the 
flow of answers between the members of the group. One group appeared to ‘bounce’ 
off each other but another group were formal in their responses.  I adjusted my style to 
encourage openness. Additionally, it was necessary to facilitate the group in terms of 
people talking at the same time, managing dominant members as the rest of the group 
let them speak instead and managing members who offered no responses (Cassell & 
Symon, 2006). 
• Assess if I was gathering enough data from the pilot groups to answer my research 
question. 
These field issues, alongside access issues, were recognised and addressed through 
their identification in the pilot study, which led to the refinement of the research approach.  
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3.5.5 Data Generation - Post-Pilot Refinement 
As a result of the pilot focus group, the study was refined in the following ways: 
First, the questioning strategy was the main area that required further consideration. I had 
previously decided that the focus group could discuss any amount of incidents that they 
wished. I felt that as I knew little of the context, I would not dictate the incidents discussed. 
I believed that a range of incidents would give a broad range of processes.  The 
responses and descriptions of events were spontaneous and vague. After the focus group 
pilots, I changed my approach and decided that they would need to pick one or two 
incidents to discuss as a team in depth before the focus group. This was so that I could 
analyse processes of these incidents in significant depth for PhD study and contribution to 
theory. 
Secondly, I decided to structure the questions into categories that follow the conceptual 
framework in the literature review; contextualising leadership, team leadership and 
leadership processes. This was to provide flow to the interviews and to provide a 
framework (rather than a completely open or fixed structure) for the discussions. This 
allowed me, as the researcher, to plan a series of possible probing questions to facilitate 
and encourage the discussion. 
Third, I would add a small team activity to the session to ensure the participants were 
clear what I was looking for in the focus group and to ensure that all processes in the 
incident were emerging. This means that an additional method will be added, and multiple 
method approaches increase the reliability of the data (Morrison-Beedy et al, 2001). 
Finally, it was deemed that the time period of 90-120 minutes indicated for conducting the 
focus group, was correct. There was significant discussion generated in the pilot studies 
and in the final research focus groups. Next, I focus on the development of the 
questioning strategy and justification for the inclusion of questions in the study. 
3.5.6 Focus Group Questioning Strategy 
The questioning protocol (Appendix C) consisted of five (Morrison- Beedy et al, 2001) key 
open-ended questions (who, what, why, where, when (Gustin, 2010)), based on the 
findings of the initial literature review in terms of leadership process areas, and research 
questions other authors have applied to this context.  The questioning strategy was 
supported by: the use of previously asked questions of leadership in teams (Endrissat & 
Von Arx, 2013); similar questions of leadership in dangerous situations (Campbell et al, 
2013); applying similar processes of questioning found in prior empirical studies in this 
context.  The focus group interview protocol is designed to enable the primary and probing 
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questions to “draw out rich description from the participants” (Ramthun & Matkin, 2014, 
p.247; Wengraf, 2004; Creswell, 2013; Strauss & Corbin, 2015). 
The questioning strategy begins by the researcher introducing the purpose of the focus 
group and by stating some ‘ground rules’ for interaction (Morrison-Beedy et al, 2001, 
p.49). The group will be advised that: 
▪ There are no right or wrong answers 
▪ This is a discussion in which each participant has equal voice 
▪ The interview should not be discussed with colleagues outside the group 
▪ The goal is not to reach a consensus of opinion but to explore all opinions and 
experiences. 
Initially posing questions about the leadership in the team and the way the team operates, 
will provide some insight into the dynamics of the team and how they operate. These 
questions assisted the researcher in the facilitation process of the focus group. For 
example: balancing team interaction in the focus group if a dominant voice is emergent; or 
the best way to facilitate a discussion that includes sensitive information (Morrison-Beedy 
et al, 2001). 
The strategy of this research was to ask about one or two incidents of their choosing, 
where an in-depth discussion of the whole team can take place. As the teams were 
advised several days before that this would be a primary focus for the research, they had 
to consider the incidents for discussion. The criteria for the choice of incidents was 
considered and I decided that a prescriptive approach (or placing extensive boundaries 
around the incident) to what they could choose was not appropriate for this study. If too 
many boundaries were imposed on the incident discussed, such as rank level present, 
particular type of threat or an event that was extensively planned or unplanned, there 
would be considerable bias from the participant teams.  Based on this concern, the final 
criteria of an incident to be discussed included: 
• The team needed to believe that they faced a potential threat of harm or danger 
from the incident and therefore danger was present. These were generally 
incidents that stood out as important to the teams; incidents that they remember in 
detail, which had made an impact on them and they could recall well. 
• Those present in the focus group worked together as a team on the incident. This 
meant that they could discuss the incidents during the focus group and all 
members could take part.  
To provide a structured approach to the questioning strategy of a particular incident, this 
research adopts the approach of Hannah et al (2009), who suggest discussions and 
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therefore subsequent analysis of the data around specific incidents should be structured 
in three stages: preparation, in situ and post event. This not only provides a clear structure 
for organising a focus group and its discussion of incidents but also provides a framework 
structure for the mapping of leadership processes, emerging through the analysis of the 
incident.   
3.5.7 The ‘Process card exercise’ 
Once the focus group has concluded its discussion of the incident, a short group task 
called was introduced. The process card exercise was to provide a sense checking 
exercise or a recap of the discussion, for the team to ensure they had covered in 
discussion and in their examples, all the processes that appear at each stage of an 
incident. This was a useful visual method incorporated after the pilot focus groups with the 
purpose of providing a visual representation of teams shared understanding of leadership 
through their discourse about an incident (Rose, 2001). The focus of analysis is not on the 
image itself but on the text representing their discourse. This was to support reader 
understanding of how teams understanding leadership.  The exercise comprised the 
creation of a set of pre-determined cards (see appendix D). Each card contained a 
leadership process, as identified in the literature review. These, along with blank cards for 
emergent processes and renaming of processes, were given to each of the focus groups, 
who were asked to arrange the cards showing where the particular process was 
demonstrated in relation to the incidents they discussed, as a timeline. This timeline 
approach was adopting Hannah et al’s (2009) conceptualisation that stages of action 
occur during extreme incidents. The groups were able to add or remove cards as they 
wished.  
To avoid the potential of influencing the focus groups, these cards were given out after the 
focus group discussion (so as not to contaminate the data collection process) but link 
back to the incident that was discussed in detail during the focus group. This provides the 
teams with a point of reference and focus for the task. They were required to work 
together to place the cards at each stage of the incident; preparation, in situ and post 
event (Hannah et al, 2009) with the purpose of clarifying where they believe the processes 
emerge.  How they placed the cards (format) was entirely up to the team. They were 
provided with additional blank cards to write additional processes and place them where 
appropriate in the same structure. They were also aware that if a process did not appear, 
it would not be included.  
There were some limitations to conducting this exercise. Alongside describing their 
account of an incident, this was also a retrospective task. The teams were placing the 
cards based on a combination of procedure and collective memory of the incident. 
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Memories may be compromised over time and therefore cards were placed based on their 
perception and belief at the time or recalling the incident. was not a task requiring 
consensus from the team, or a task where there was a correct place for any process but 
as teams can be procedurally focussed, there was concern that sometimes teams would 
want to place a process where it ‘should’ fall, rather than where it naturally did. 
Additionally, dominant members of the team could take over the task which would not 
provide an accurate representation of all the team members but this was mitigated by the 
researcher asking for all team member opinions. Multiple processes could be placed at 
multiple stages of the incident, as this task was to provide freedom for the team to 
construct an image of how they understood the incident and leadership in the team 
occurring. Following each focus group process card exercise, I took a photograph of the 
placed process cards to inform the final stages of data analysis. The photographs have 
been replicated as diagrams and are analysed in the process card exercise section in 
Chapter 4. Next to consider is the role of researcher in the process of conducting focus 
groups and associated tasks within it. 
3.5.8 Role of the Researcher in data generation 
Cassell and Symon (2006) address the role of the interviewer in group interviewing, 
stating that it is a facilitative role. Morrison- Beedy et al (2001) refer to the ‘moderator’ 
when conducting focus groups. For the purposes of this research, I (the researcher) am 
also the moderator or facilitator. I engaged with the group as an ‘active listener’ (Cassell 
and Symon, 2006, p.145) outlining to the group initially how the focus group would be 
conducted and ensuring the group felt at ease and safe, enhancing openness and 
creating a non-judgemental atmosphere where sensitive information can be discussed. 
(Morrison-Beedy et al, 2001). As a moderator, it is important to have the skills to facilitate 
a sensitive discussion and to recognise if a participant is in distress (Morrison-Beedy et al, 
2001). This was addressed by the researcher introducing the topic at a slow pace and 
beginning the focus group with more general discussion about the team. Additionally, it 
was important that the researcher was able to close this discussion at an appropriate time 
(Morrison-Beedy et al, 2001).   At the start of the group interview, participants were asked 
to introduce themselves to the researcher (assisting with analysis later) with the intention 
to create an open environment for discussion and to outline this facilitative role.  
I adopt a social constructionist philosophy, where the focus group is a “dynamic social 
process of collective sense making” (Silverman, 2020, p.2010).  I also hold a realist 
ontological view and therefore as previously stated, recognise that participants may be 
taking part in the focus group with their own views of the world and events. I am focused 
on the interactions between the participants themselves in generating the meaning in 
conversations (Silverman, 2020) with regard to the interpretative analysis of the focus 
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groups. Detailed notes of observations are essential to achieve integration in the 
interpretation process (Strauss & Corbin, 2015). I therefore wrote diary entries and field 
notes about the research process, thoughts and feelings. This assisted me in facilitating a 
reflexive positioning in the analysis of the study in terms of personal and professional 
values, beliefs and experiences (Nadin & Cassell, 2006), demonstrating researcher 
integration with the research process.  
3.5.9 Recording and storing information 
Ahead of data generation phases, all participants were asked if they were comfortable 
with the interviews being recorded. This process was to assist with my analysis if 
appropriate. The process of recording the focus groups was also stated on the ethical 
consent form that the participants signed. The recording equipment was tested for sound 
before the interview; however, I made written notes in case the recording equipment 
failed. 
Transcripts and incident reports were collected and were stored electronically on a 
password protected laptop to which only the researcher had access. The NVIVO software 
that was used to analyse data, was also stored securely on the laptop and password 
protected. Organisations and participants in the research were made aware of this 
through the ethical consent forms signed before the research commenced. 
3.5.10 Resolving Field Issues 
The researcher made field observation notes during the focus groups.  These notes make 
reference to the participant’s interactions with the group; highlight the participant’s 
behaviour during the research process; describe actions or mannerisms that may be 
pertinent to gaining the participants interpretation of the questions or their answers to the 
questions. For example: due to the sensitive nature of the topic these notes will be useful 
when transcribing and analysing the data, to determine if the participant was 
uncomfortable at any stage or displayed signs of distress. Field notes helped the 
researcher piece together their interpretation of the data by informing possible networks, 
thinking about possible “links, overlaps, connections, flows” (Miles et al, 2020, p.96) 
amongst the data extracts, items and sets. These notes assisted in creating the 
descriptions of the themes and assigning meaning (by the participants and as a 
researcher interpreting the data) and context. 
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3.6 Thematic Analysis of Data   
 
Thematic analysis is a common approach in qualitative research methodology (Silverman, 
2020). In my review of current literature relevant to this study, five studies in the 
leadership field adopted qualitative methods. The small number of studies demonstrated 
that there was scope for further work adopting further qualitative methods. Tuckett (2005, 
p.76) states that the aim of thematic analysis is “to develop a set of logical themes and 
associated characteristics (exemplified by sub themes which together formed a ‘story’)”.  
Social processes in this study have been understood as developing through interactions, 
the feelings, beliefs and values, in the narratives of the participants. For example, the 
qualitative design of the research enables stories or narratives from participants to be 
captured by discussing their experiences and their associated feelings about an incident. I 
considered using other methods for analysis, such as content analysis, but this research 
is not seeking to analyse the process of interaction or the “sequential” (Silverman, 2020, 
p.220) construction of meaning within the focus group, it is instead seeking to explore 
leadership processes within the incidents discussed by the focus group.  
I also considered adopting a Template analysis (Brooks, McCluskey, Turley & King, 2015; 
Cassell & Symons, 2004) approach but felt that as significantly fewer processes were 
present in the data extracted in empirical work carried out around dangerous contexts. 
This research has scope for an inductive approach without fixed a-priori assumptions and 
thus is more exploratory (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2019) and enabling of codes and 
themes to emerge. Template analysis can limit the ‘diversities of meaning’ through 
discourse in narratives (Cassell & Symons, 2004).  
Taking an inductive approach acknowledges the literature but avoids attempts to fit an 
emerging theme in the analysis into pre-existing themes. It is important to acknowledge 
however, that this study is not purely inductive. Processes also exist generally in the 
leadership literature (through the process of deduction from the literature) but may not be 
present in dangerous contexts and therefore, analysis of the data will continuously refer 
back to the literature to support inductive inferences. As the literature review chapter 
identifies, processes not appearing in dangerous contexts supports justification for further 
work on the identification and meaning of processes in this area (Lichtenstein et al, 2006; 
Hannah et al, 2009; Baran & Scott, 2010; Samuels et al, 2010). 
With reference to the potential of mixed method approaches (Saunders et al, 2019), 
adopting an ‘abductive’ approach was considered (Bryman, 2012). This is described as 
“engagement in back and forth movement between theory and data in a bid to develop or 
modify existing theory” (Awuzie & McDermott, 2017, p357). Abductive approaches have 
Page 104 of 273 
 
been criticised as they are based on ‘guessing’ meaning (Libscomb, 2012) inferred by the 
data, and to be considered credible, Bryman (2012) proposed researcher reasoning must 
be inductively and deductively evidenced.  
In this study, I have adopted a predominantly inductive approach, allowing the data to 
guide me, and ensuring authenticity of the participant voice (Ponciano, 2013). I have, 
however, used elements of abductive reasoning within my progressive focusing approach, 
in which I have moved back and forth between the data and the literature, to optimise 
understanding or verstehen (Weber, 1969), remaining true to my interpretivist roots.  As 
Sinkovics and Alfoldi (2012, p.824) state, abductive reasoning “involves using existing 
theoretical explanations to make inferences about data … accommodating surprising or 
anomalous patterns by modifying the existing theory…ultimate aim of finding the most 
plausible way to explain what is happening”. 
Most directly relevant to the research analysis method chosen, is that the step by step 
thematic analysis by Braun and Clarke (2006) provided a flexible framework; it may be 
adapted and applied iteratively across inductive research, constantly refining and 
improving understanding of the phenomenon, reinforcing the progressive focusing 
approach. This method provided greater freedom of approach to work back and forth 
through the steps of analysis, continually searching for themes in the data. It is described 
as “a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun 
& Clarke, 2006, p.79). This approach also supported the constructionist and qualitative 
stance of my research.   
In this research, the thematic analysis framework aligns well with the constructionist and 
inductive element of this (Braun & Clarke, 2006) approach, which aims to provide a “rich 
and detailed, yet complex account of data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.78). Braun and 
Clarke’s (2006) method provides analytical flexibility during the coding process; for 
example, transcription analysis will run concurrently to ongoing focus groups, enabling 
iterative data collection and analysis. The process therefore, has a cyclical approach, 
similar to progressive focusing (Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012). 
In summary, thematic areas are explored through an inductive approach to identify 
processes that emerge from the data, and then in the final stage of analysis, a cross 
reference approach using the thematic tool (process map) is taken to identify if the 
findings of prior studies emerge within the data. This involved mapping the identified 
processes in my study with those emerging in the emergency response team and 
dangerous context literature. If a theme is similar but has different characteristics, then a 
new theme or definition of the process may emerge. This systematic approach highlights 
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whether new processes emerge from the data and if similar processes emerge, provides a 
more contextualised process definition.   
The research data that was collected through focus groups was analysed using the 
following integrated coding process (Braun & Clarke, 2006) shown in table 3.2. NVIVO 
was used as the data management tool because it provided a mechanism to store the 
coded data and group codes, generating categories, themes and sub-themes. The 
demographic information for the participant sample that took part in the study is detailed in 
table 3.2 below.  Eight focus groups were conducted across four emergency service 
organisations with a total of sixty-one participants. 
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Table 3.2 – Thematic analysis process (Braun & Clarke, 2006) 
Stage 
1 
Familiarisation with 
the data 
Transcribing the focus groups and listening several times to the 
recording to be close to the data. 
Stage 
2 
Generating initial 
codes 
Working through the transcription of the focus group or whole 
data set systematically, initial codes were identified  
Stage 
3  
Searching for themes Collating codes into potential themes through collapsing of 
codes of similarity. Review of themes against the literature. 
Stage 
4  
Reviewing the 
themes 
Reviewing the themes in relation to the entire data set. To 
ensure consistency of meaning and approach. This stage 
generated a thematic template. 
Stage 
5 
Defining and naming 
themes 
Meaning was given to each theme to provide clarity and explain 
the relationship to its sub-themes. Adding meaning to themes 
builds a more in depth understanding of the theme and 
demonstrates academic rigor in a consistency of approach 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). Consideration was given to the 
integration of field notes made at the time of the focus group at 
each stage. 
Stage 
6 
Producing the 
Report- (writing the 
findings chapter) 
Final themes were identified in this stage of analysis, after all 
data collection and analysis had taken place. This referred back 
to the research question and concepts in the literature to enable 
synthesis informing the theoretical framework, which will form 
my contribution. 
 
When beginning analysis of the data set, the researcher kept a copy of the research 
question and sub-questions to hand, with the purpose of maintaining the focus of the 
study (Saldana, 2016). The researcher looked at stages 1, 2, 3 and 4 as the main analysis 
sections of the process and provides detail here of how the thematic process was 
implemented. 
Stage 1 - Thematic analysis begins with familiarisation with the data set. To enable this, 
the decision was made to personally transcribe all focus group data obtained. This 
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approach ensures researcher familiarity with the data, especially where the conversation 
is listened to several times, to investigate nuances. Focus groups have several 
participants, and it is important to recognise who said what, particularly the leader of the 
team involved.  
The researcher took field notes throughout each focus group, to provide additional 
analysis and understanding of the dynamic of each group.  These included points of 
discussion where there was emphasis, for example body language, or expressions of 
participants. This is useful as Morrison-Beedy et al (2001, p.51) state that “data needs to 
accurately reflect several important dimensions of the focus group, including the content, 
process, environment, dynamics and milieu”. A third party transcribing the focus groups 
would not be able to visualise the group and therefore distinguish one voice from another, 
nor provide an integration of group dynamics into the analysis. 
Stage 2 –Initial first cycle coding took place (Charmaz, 2006), whereby, the data was 
broken down into “discrete parts” (Saldana, 2016) or data extracts (Braun & Clarke 2006). 
A code in qualitative data can be one word, a sentence, phrase or a paragraph but is 
characterised as assigning a “summative, salient, essence-capturing and/or evocative 
attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data” (Saldana, 2016, p.3). In this 
research, the data coded are the transcripts of the in-depth focus groups. 
The researcher undertook a systematic line-by-line analysis at a team level to generate 
initial open codes. This process of open coding (Strauss & Corbin, 2015) is useful 
because it “provides the researcher with analytical leads for further exploration” (Saldana, 
2016, p.81), keeping the researcher open to the direction of the data. To enhance 
understanding and rigour it is common to use more than one initial coding process.  
This study applied two initial coding processes; process coding (Strauss & Corbin, 2015), 
where the researcher applies a conceptual label to what the participant is describing, and 
Nvivo coding, where the code includes the exact words of the participant (verbatim 
coding) where their words provide a clear description of their meaning. This ensures that 
the research “honours the participants’ voice” (Saldana, 2016, p.74). As the purpose is to 
explore processes in the data, the process description is useful when re-visiting the codes 
in stage 3 and can form the basis of themes as the analysis progresses through the 
stages. The following two codes, both within the theme of decision-making, provide 
examples of a process code and an nvivo code. 
The verbatim comment, “You sort of build up a picture so you know who to watch, 
you know who you need to guide”, was process coded within ‘Leadership as 
guidance’.  This was because a number of verbatim comments fell within the 
general sub-theme of guidance as a leadership process. 
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The verbatim comment, “each person on a watch has to be a decision maker” was 
in-vivo coded as ‘Each person needs to be a decision maker’.  This is because the 
verbatim comment provided exactly the meaning required within coding decision-
making processes. 
Table 3.3 provides a summary of the number of codes and themes generated during the 
data analysis process: 
Table 3.3– Focus group transcripts and codes generated 
 
As mentioned above, although this study was predominantly designed to be inductive and 
data-led, there are also aspects of abductive research included in the approach.  The 
rationale for this was to ensure the ability to generate meaningful themes from the coding, 
reaching saturation of the data, and ensuring a credible, rigorous approach with potential 
transferability (Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012). 
This was enacted through the sequential development of coding.  Each focus group was 
fully coded separately.  The first focus group formed the initial ‘template’ of coding against 
which each successive focus group was then applied and meaning tested in a continuous 
process of review and re-evaluation. 
Stage 3 – Identifying themes from the data is an “outcome of coding… not something that 
is, in itself coded” (Saldana, 2016, p.13). Similarities are sought to organise the data into 
initial themes. This process bears similarity to the process of ‘focused coding’ used in 
many types of qualitative studies, whereby codes are grouped together, and categories or 
Focus Group Team Transcript word 
count 
Number of 
individual codes 
generated 
Focus Group 1 HART 8550 123 
Focus Group 2 FS 8450 78 
Focus Group 3 MRT 4700 100 
Focus Group 4 PFA 11800 194 
Focus Group 5 PFA 9650 169 
Focus Group 6 FS 8750 58 
Focus Group 7 FS 8500 98 
Focus Group 8 HART 6470 121 
Total 66,870 Words 941 Codes 
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overarching themes are formed (Saldana, 2016).  This is similar to the constant 
comparative method used in grounded theory (Creswell, 2013).  
The themes generated in the first focus group were then tested and re-evaluated with the 
coding set from each successive focus group.  This was an iterative abductive approach, 
involving progressive focusing (Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012), applied to deliberately 
challenge the themes already generated.  The purpose of this was to constantly ensure 
the themes, and therefore meaning, represented the data as closely as possible.  Where 
there was disconnect, the data was prioritised and the theme either changed or removed. 
Over the course of the eight focus groups, this led to a substantial amount of revision until 
the key themes were generated with good levels of saturation. 
Stages 4 & 5 – This stage involved reviewing the themes found during the data analysis 
process.  The process map created during the review of the literature provided the basis 
for a-priori mapped processes that contained possible themes. This was not a template for 
‘fitting’ themes into prior assumptions, but instead offered cross-reference mapping. This 
informs the synthesis of the literature and the findings, which will form the contribution 
chapter of the research, specifically, emergent theory. 
The researcher confirmed meaning applied to concepts raised during the focus groups 
with participants at the time, “theming…requires comparable reflection on participant 
meanings and outcomes” (Saldana, 2016, p.140). A process of progressive focussing 
(Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012) underpinned a commitment to deepening analysis and 
meaning.  This was demonstrated by data generation in focus groups taking place 
concurrent with ongoing coding and analysis of prior focus groups. Transcripts and the 
meaning inferred were repetitively reviewed with each new data set presenting. This took 
place until saturation of the data occurred, demonstrated by new concepts emerging only 
infrequently.  The key being to exhaust the concepts occurring so there are “no gaps in 
explanations” (Creswell, 2013, p.140).  
For the presentation of the rich in-vivo data, acronyms will be used to identify each focus 
group, for example: FG1 represents Focus group 1 and HART represents Hazardous area 
response team. See table 3.4 below for full acronym list: 
Table 3.4 – Acronym list for the focus group teams 
 
FG1 HART Hazardous area response team 
FG2 MR Mountain Rescue 
FG3 FS Fire Service 
FG4 PFA Police Fire Arms 
 
Page 110 of 273 
 
3.6.1 Thematic Analysis Data Credibility & Focus Groups 
There are several methods that can be adopted, to provide academic rigour and to ensure 
robustness (Butterfield et al, 2005) of findings using thematic analysis methods and focus 
groups. This study adopts Lincoln and Guba’s (1995) evaluative framework to evaluate 
the quality of the research, because their definitions resonate closely with my social 
constructionist and interpretive ethos.  By adopting this approach, I am not seeking to 
create a positivist validity or generalisability; instead I am seeking to demonstrate a 
credible research study in the terms of a constructionist approach. The evaluative 
framework is presented and discussed in-depth in chapter six, conclusions. 
3.7 Ethical Considerations 
 
Denzin and Lincoln (2013, p.52) state that research “needs constant input from 
conscience” in order to navigate the ethical issues that are present. In other words, the 
research needs to consistently review the study to ensure that ethical issues are 
considered and revised throughout.  This study has been carried out within the guidelines 
of Northumbria University’s ethical procedures. A student ethical issues form and 
participant consent form was submitted and both were approved by the university ethics 
panel (Appendix E & F). 
Consideration of Ethics requires the researcher to consider its implications across the 
whole of the research process.  This includes addressing issues such as the relationships 
that are built; the nature of the organisations; the issues that address care for the 
participants and their roles, and how the data collected will be handled.  Lee-Treweek and 
Linkogle (2000) also argue that there are elements of danger and risk for the researcher 
when conducting social research (Lee-Treweek and Linkogle, 2000) quantifying the term 
danger in a similar way to this study as “the experience of threat or risk with serious 
negative consequences” (Lee-Treweek and Linkogle, 2000, p.1).  Creswell (2013, p.58-
59) provides a table of ethical issues that can be found in qualitative research. I use this 
as a basis for addressing these important issues. In table 3.5, I add to this and outline how 
I have addressed each issue:   
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Table 3.5 – Ethical issues in qualitative research - Sourced and adapted from 
Creswell (2013, p.58-59) 
Stage in the research 
Process 
Type of Ethical issue How this study addresses 
this issue 
Prior to conducting the 
study 
• Seek university 
approval on campus 
• Examine professional 
association standards 
• Gain local permission 
from site and 
participants 
• Select a site without a 
vested interest in the 
outcome of the study 
 
Full ethical consent for the 
research to be carried out 
has been given by the 
university ethics panel 
(Appendix E).  An 
organisational consent form 
has been signed by each 
organisation that has taken 
part in the research. All 
participants that were 
interviewed as part of the 
research completed a 
participant consent form 
(Appendix F). 
Neither the site nor the 
participants have a vested 
interest in the research. 
 
Beginning to conduct the 
Study 
• Disclose the purpose 
of the study 
• Do not pressure the 
participants to 
complete the consent 
forms 
• Be sensitive to the 
needs of vulnerable 
populations 
The researcher adopts a 
policy of honesty and 
transparency with regard to 
the purpose of the research, 
meaning that the researcher 
disclosed the reasons for the 
research to all parties and 
provided a detailed 
description of what was going 
to happen during the 
research process. 
No participants were 
pressured into signing 
consent forms. I address the 
concept of working in HROs 
separately. 
Collecting Data • Respect the site and 
disrupt as little as 
possible 
• Avoid deceiving 
participants 
• Respect potential 
power imbalances 
 I was respectful of the 
environment in which the 
research was conducted, not 
being in the way of the 
normal operations of the 
emergency services. 
I ensured that I did not 
deceive participants by 
adopting a transparent 
approach to the research. 
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Stage in the research 
Process 
Type of Ethical issue How this study addresses 
this issue 
and exploitation of 
participants 
• Do not use 
participants by 
gathering data and 
leaving site without 
giving back 
I respect all participants and 
the voluntary means by 
which they took part in this 
research. The research 
provides anonymity of the 
participants and any formal 
or informal interactions have 
been disclosed. Questions 
used during data collection 
have not led the participant 
towards a suggested 
response. Of high priority is 
the protection of the 
participants, their views and 
their relationships within the 
organisation. 
I sought to build a positive 
and reciprocal relationship 
with the organisation 
whereby I will give back 
through my area of expertise 
where this is appropriate. 
Analysing Data • Avoid siding with 
participants 
• Avoid disclosing only 
positive results 
• Respect the privacy of 
participants 
I have given appropriate 
thought to the concept of 
siding with participants in the 
research process and will 
maintain the balance of the 
researcher relationship with 
participants. This action was 
disclosed with the purpose of 
the research. 
The research analysis 
process anonymously 
reported multiple 
perspectives of participants. 
The participants will have 
alias names in the research. 
Data collected was stored 
securely in data files on a 
laptop that cannot be used by 
any other person Informal 
notes, reflexive diary entries, 
incident reports and 
transcripts were not identified 
with any one participant and 
was stored securely with the 
laptop. 
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Stage in the research 
Process 
Type of Ethical issue How this study addresses 
this issue 
Reporting Data • Avoid falsifying 
authorship, evidence, 
data, findings and 
conclusions 
• Do not plagiarise 
• Avoid disclosing 
information that would 
harm participants 
• Communicate in 
clear, straight forward, 
appropriate language 
The data was reported in an 
honest and open manner. 
The work was entirely mine 
with appropriate APA 
referencing and 
acknowledgement where 
necessary. No evidence or 
story in the research enables 
the identification of 
individuals in the research. 
The use of language is 
tailored to the requirements 
of the intended audience. 
 
It is necessary to address the nature of the organisations in this research. The 
organisations are emergency services, with a duty of care and responsibility to the 
members of the public that they service and to their upstanding credibility in society. There 
are two areas to address within this research. As a researcher, I was told experiences that 
recalled events also experienced by members of the public. I understand that I am 
responsible for my professional conduct in all situations and cases and I represent the 
professional reputation of the university and the case organisation at all times. This 
information is presented in abstract form, which means that no incident is identifiable and 
as a result, no members of the public involved in these incidents were harmed directly or 
indirectly by the analysis of this study. 
Secondly, I recognise that the contextual nature of the study means that I was asking 
participants to describe experiences that may be difficult to recall, depending on the 
severity of the event and the subsequent outcome. Participants are trained to deal with life 
and death situations but the concept of re-living the experience is an area that I need to 
consider carefully. The nature of these interviews was fully disclosed and the participants 
were debriefed before and after the interview. Their involvement was voluntary and they 
were able to withdraw from the study at any point. 
In a similar way to the participants recalling difficult experiences, I recognise that as a 
researcher in these contexts, I may be exposed to some difficult accounts of incidents 
which have a level of “emotional danger” (Lee-Treweek & Linkogle, 2000, p.4). Emotional 
danger in this instance is “danger to researchers brought on by negative feeling states 
induced by the research process” (Lee-Treweek & Linkogle, 2000, p.4).  The emergency 
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services in this instance, offered the option of counselling services to me and to 
individuals exposed to these details, if it was necessary. 
3.8 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has identified and explained the philosophical underpinnings of this research, 
outlined the research gap, potential methodological contributions and provided the 
epistemological and ontological assumptions of the research. I have outlined the research 
methodology and provided justification for the sampling and focus group approach. The 
chapter has discussed the analysis framework and credibility of the research data and has 
addressed ethical issues arising as a result of carrying out the research. The following 
chapter will present and discuss the findings and analysis of the research. 
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Chapter 4 – Findings 
4.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
The previous chapter outlined the methodological underpinnings of the research and the 
methodological position of the researcher. The design of the study was presented and the 
ethical implications discussed. This chapter focuses on the findings from the study, and in 
doing so, addresses the following research objective: 
• To conduct thematic analysis of data to generate in depth understanding of 
leadership in dangerous contexts through the lens of teams. 
 
This chapter presents the themes and analytically discusses the emergence and 
development of these themes from the data.  This chapter presents data that will support 
chapters five and six in answering the following four sub-questions of the research; 
• How do teams working in dangerous contexts construct leadership? 
• How do teams working in dangerous contexts construct danger? 
• How does danger influence leadership processes? 
• What are the leadership processes of teams working in dangerous contexts? 
The chapter begins by revisiting the analysis process discussed in chapter 3, to provide a 
description and rationale of how the themes have emerged and are presented in the 
study. The categories and themes are then presented beginning with the category 
‘Context of leadership’. The second category discusses the findings from the study’s 
exploration of teams ‘Construction of danger’. The next category analysed is team 
‘Understanding of what danger does to leadership’; the implications of danger, and how 
leadership changes in the face of danger. The final category addresses the processes of 
leadership emerging within identified stages of an incident, namely ‘Fluid leadership’.  
The final section of the chapter is a summary, discussing the main findings of the research 
and provides direction for chapter five, which is a synthesis of the findings with literature 
(chapter two) from three main theoretical areas; complexity leadership, team leadership 
and dangerous contexts. This synthesis will provide a detailed understanding of how 
leadership of teams operating in dangerous contexts has evolved and how this study has 
contributed to understanding of the phenomenon through analysis of leadership 
processes. 
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4.1.1 Review of the analysis process  
As previously described in the methodology chapter, the first stage of exploration was 
identifying leadership processes within the literature of leadership in teams in dangerous 
contexts. I reviewed the current literature and mapped leadership processes against 
Morgeson et al’s (2010) typology of leadership functions. Processes were added to this 
basis as the review progressed. An example of a process added from the literature is 
‘shared leadership’ (Bergman et al, 2012). 
I adopted Braun and Clark’s (2006) analysis template to provide a robust process of 
coding and analysis. As previously identified, the transcription process of the eight focus 
groups identified 66,870 useable words for the analysis process. Initial codes were 
generated from the transcriptions of the focus groups. As I continually shifted between the 
codes, data and the literature, categories, themes and sub-themes began to emerge.  
Appendix H provides a detailed table of the categories, themes, sub-themes and codes 
extracted from the data. This was to ensure the appropriateness of codes in the sub-
themes and themes. Following this, the themes were grouped into categories where there 
was a clear relationship between the meaning of the themes and the research sub-
question. These categories and themes are presented at the end of this chapter. 
As part of my data analysis, I continuously highlight the processes emerging, as the 
enactment of processes are the way in which leadership operates (Morgeson et al, 2010). 
Figure 4.1 below shows how I focus on social processes at various stages during an 
emergency response incident. The figure depicts how a conventional context for teams is 
before and after an incident, such as being at an operational station. The dangerous 
context is when the team attends an incident. Three stages are identifiable during the 
dangerous part of an incident. 
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Figure 4.1 – Focus on social processes of leadership during stages of an incident  
 
Following the third focus group (pilot), I developed an additional analytical tool (the 
process card exercise) as a sense-check to ascertain if the leadership processes in the 
literature were replicated in the focus groups. This was to gain a richer understanding by 
allowing the groups to shape the discussion and use their words to define leadership as 
they perceived it (Ponciano, 2013). The source of Figure 4.1 was the output of the focus 
groups and the process card exercise as applied in the focus groups. The process card 
exercise diagrams highlight where the teams identified two additional stages (pre-arrival 
and immediate aftermath) to the three identified by Hannah et al (2009). Codes that 
highlight the existence of the two additional stages are in Appendix H. The pre-arrival 
stage relates to the themes of ‘continuous risk assessment’ and sub-theme ‘planning’. The 
codes relating to the pre-arrival and immediate aftermath stages are under the theme 
‘desensitisation’, sub-themes ‘coping mechanisms’ and ‘mental dangers’.   
Figure 4.1 helps frame discussion of the social processes applied across an incident, by 
first understanding the individual stages of the incident itself.  The themes and codes 
relating to the five stages of an incident can be seen in Appendix H. 
The next section presents the thematic findings of the study. 
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4.2 Presentation of themes 
 
In this section of the chapter, I present my findings from the research focus groups. I 
adopt a staged approach to presenting data. The first stage is to present each category 
and related themes that have emerged from my analysis of the focus groups. The findings 
are presented using the research sub-questions that I seek to answer, which I use to form 
the categories. Each research sub-question has generated themes and sub-themes which 
are presented as summary tables at the beginning of the discussion of each category for 
ease of reference.   
After the discussion of the four categories, I then present my analysis and findings of a 
process card exercise, discussed in section 4.6.9. This supports my thematic analysis with 
a visual representation of how team members view leadership across stages of incidents 
they identified. This represents an important complementary data source, enriching 
understanding of the phenomenon because it directly represents the voice (Ponciano, 
2013) of the participants, as they are describing the phenomenon in their words. The 
statements made by participants include part descriptions of incidents that have taken 
place and that the teams have attended. The incidents are of a sensitive nature and in 
some cases provide potentially disturbing descriptions of situations where there has been 
threat to life or incidents that may cause mental distress. 
For clarity, this study first addresses what participant teams understand about the context 
in which they work.  To achieve this, at the start of each focus group, I asked them to 
describe how the team operate, work together and how they understand the team to 
function.  This was useful to get a sense of how the teams worked together generally on a 
daily basis, to place the focus of the study clearly on the operational structure, and team 
environment; through this I was able to more fully understand the context in which 
leadership takes place.  
As a reminder, acronyms are used to identify each focus group, for example: FG1 
represents Focus group 1 and HART represents Hazardous area response team. See 
table below for full acronym list: 
Table 4.1 – Acronym list - acronyms as displayed throughout findings chapter 
 
FG1 HART Hazardous area response team 
FG2 MR Mountain Rescue 
FG3 FS Fire Service 
FG4 PFA Police Fire Arms 
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I now present each category and the themes; these are included in summary tables at the 
start of each section. Within the themes and sub-themes, social processes of leadership 
emerged throughout the discussions and I advise which social processes emerged at the 
beginning of each section where appropriate. 
4.3 Context of leadership 
 
This section focuses on emergency response teams and the themes are presented below. 
I set out the contextual boundaries of the research and provide some useful information 
regarding the participant organisations, particularly addressing the rank and command 
structure.  
This section aims to answer the first research sub-question: 
‘How do teams working in dangerous contexts, construct leadership?’ 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the level of analysis is at team level. The data 
presented does not distinguish between individual participants, except when it is the 
designated team leader, as their differing rank offers further opportunity for understanding 
leadership. Each theme will be presented and discussed using ‘verbatim’ quotes to 
provide illustrative examples. Each quote is discussed with researcher interpretation and 
analysis, to explain how it contributes to answering the research sub-questions and 
overall research question. References to literature from chapter two will be drawn upon 
where there is direct relevance to support or provide comparison with the themed data. 
First, the teams’ responses to my question of what they understood by leadership in 
emergency response teams is described. Due to the unique antecedents of the incidents 
that the teams work in, I felt that it was necessary to understand how the teams 
conceptualised leadership in this context.  Their first responses were relating specifically 
to the structure and the hierarchy of the organisation, explaining how leadership operates 
from a command perspective.  Based on researcher observation notes at the beginning of 
the focus groups, it was primarily the designated leader of the team that began to answer 
the questions. There was some hesitancy at the start for team members to talk. Initially, I 
felt the other team members were waiting to see what type of questions would be asked. I 
also felt perhaps that they did not feel they could answer questions on leadership, if they 
were not in the designated role.  
The designated leaders’ responses began to form a picture of command and control being 
the primary way leadership was understood.  First, the theme of directional leadership is 
discussed. This type of leadership is not being addressed under the section ‘Fluid 
leadership’ because it is useful to contextualise leadership at this stage. Secondly, social 
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processes that emerged in this section, appear under the theme ‘Team culture and 
training’. The processes are training, enabling team cohesion and promoting team identity. 
Further sub-processes are also identified such as predicting actions and coping through 
cohesiveness. These are important to consider as they also set the scene for teams 
operating in emergency response. A summary (table 4.2) of the themes discussed is 
below. 
Table 4.2 – Summary table for the category ‘Context of leadership’ 
 
4.3.1 Directional Leadership through chain of command 
Directional leadership emerged as a theme across all teams and this was how all teams 
began to describe leadership in emergency response teams. This is likely due to the rank 
structure in place. Procedurally, all teams within this study have an operational hierarchy 
and designated leader who are accountable for the teams and who provide direction by 
directing activity of the team on a daily basis. An example of this is informing the team 
when they will be training and when they are having meetings.  This type of directive 
activity is largely procedural, but I argue here it is important to include to set the scene of 
leadership in their conventional working environment and therefore understand how it 
emerges in dangerous contexts. For example, to understand the emerging social 
processes of leadership, it is essential to examine the organisational structure of teams to 
contextualise this appropriately. Themes in data appeared to support this; directive 
leadership can only be fully understood as a process if the command structure and the 
procedures are clear.  
 
The teams in this study come from four different emergency service organisations, yet 
interestingly have very similar hierarchal management and command structures in place.  
At large scale incidents, a multi-agency approach is often necessary due to the skill base 
of each emergency service. Multi-agency in this case means multiple emergency services 
will be drawn upon. For example, fire, police, ambulance services will all attend one 
incident, each tasked with carrying out a specific role.  In these instances, the services 
must work together to achieve one goal. Whilst this study does not focus on multi-agency 
incidents or approaches, it is useful to establish that there are similar command structures 
Category Theme Sub-theme 
 
 
 
Context of leadership in 
Emergency Response 
Teams 
Directional Leadership Directive leadership 
through chain of command  
Multi-level leadership 
Team structure 
Team culture and training Team training 
Enabling team cohesion 
Promoting team identity 
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in place. What can be drawn from this is that all teams understand positions and levels of 
command in the same way, which has important implications for communication, 
accountability and smooth running of operational tasks.   
In the focus groups, I observed that the use of terminology across all services was very 
similar. For example, they all used the term ‘dynamic risk assessment’ and the way this is 
used and this terminology appeared across all focus groups. This is useful procedurally 
because all services should receive the same common operational picture (Wolbers & 
Boersma, 2013) through initial briefings from operational command, and operate with 
similar methods.  
Teams discussed their rank and hierarchal structure in the focus groups. This appeared to 
be an important focus point for them, and they were keen to explain how the structure 
worked and to set out the parameters in which they worked as a team. This data is 
essential to provide clear understanding of how the teams operate from a procedural and 
structural reporting perspective, and to understand the contextual boundaries of 
emergency response teams in comparison the conventional team context. Figure 4.2 
below displays a general operating structure of the units in which the teams included in 
this study operate.  
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Figure 4.2 – Operational rank structure example - HART 
 
All teams were found to operate under a formal rank structure, for the purposes of 
accountability and having clear responsibilities. Rank structures are historically from 
uniform services, where clear command decisions needed to be made. The teams 
described the reporting structure, which was like that of normal hierarchical systems in 
organisations. Typically, team members have a team leader, a crew or watch manager, a 
unit or station manager and then a regional commander.  PFA provide an example of their 
leadership structure, stating in the focus group: 
‘We work in a rank structure in the organisation, as we’re a uniformed service.  As 
a PC you take direction from the sergeant in all things.  (FG4 PFA) 
 
In terms of level of incident, there are Gold, Silver and Bronze commanders within each 
service. The higher the incident level in severity, the higher the level of command that is 
established on scene or remotely. In large multi-agency incidents, one or all levels of 
command will be present on scene.  This type of command structure is mirrored at all 
major incidents by all emergency services, which aids collaboration. The figure below 
demonstrates typical incident command at a larger scale fire. The figure depicts a two 
pump (fire engine) incident and a four pump incident. At a four pump incident, an added 
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layer of command in terms of sector is added. This is due to fire requiring more engines to 
attend, and the police and other emergency services potentially being in attendance. 
 
Figure 4.3 – Incident command structure example – Fire Service 
 
The teams referred to the way they work and their operational procedures throughout their 
responses in the focus groups. As I have established, the social processes are the focus 
of this research and in addition to discussing the structural nature of the teams, a strong 
picture of their team ethos, bond and their ways of interacting began to form from the 
teams’ discussions and their interactions in the room during the focus group. As we 
moved through the questions, all teams began to settle into the discussions.  
The following discussions turn attention to the approach to incidents with reference to their 
understanding of leadership in the team. In discussing their approach to incidents, teams 
initially indicated that often in dangerous and critical incidents, where teams and the public 
are in immediate danger, designated leaders may adopt an authoritative style, becoming 
more directive in approach if and when a situation presents with some uncertainty. ‘I think 
it makes you a bit more authoritative. So, instead of saying ‘XXX can you go and do that’, 
you say’ XXX go and do that’. It’s your tone… if it’s something out of the ordinary; you’ll be 
more authoritarian because you want someone to follow exactly what you’re saying’ (FG7 
FS). 
Participants stated that it: 
‘makes me, as someone who’s not in charge, more willing to go with decisions if 
it’s dangerous’ (FG4 PFA)  
‘Depends on the critical nature of the event as well. A normal run of the mill job, if 
it’s something out of the ordinary where it’s something risk critical where someone 
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can get hurt or killed or something, I’ll have to make a bit more authority on my 
decisions’ (FG8 FS) 
 
These quotes are representative. In this example, an authoritarian style becomes the 
default style because leaders need the team to follow instruction precisely. This is critical 
if the team has differing levels of experienced or trained team members. For example, 
there may be probationary team members that require constant instruction. Teams were 
clear to point out that this style instils confidence of competence in the leader and 
therefore compliance in the team, not because of the rank structure but because of the 
directive style of leadership. 
 
In the examples above leadership is about being confident, but it is also about having the 
ability to make decisions under difficult conditions. It is described as having strength of 
character in the face of adversity. Supporting this interpretation, considering the role of the 
leader at a house fire incident, one team states: 
‘he’s got to have the overall say at the end of the day and say “no, it’s my call and 
I’m not willing to put you in there”. He’s got to have that strength of character to be 
able to say that. When you’ve got a mother screaming that her bairns are upstairs 
and you’re wearing a BA set, you want to go in’ (FG3 FS) 
 
Despite seeking opinions from other team members, a clear and fast decision must be 
made in time critical situations (Hannah et al, 2009). Consideration must be given to the 
safety of the team, even if this means someone else (member of the public) is in critical 
danger. The team members in this case want to go in the house but the leader must make 
the final call regarding the safety of the team, based on several factors. Therefore, they 
might have a team that disagrees with the decision of the leader, as well as also needing 
to be able to cope with those involved in the incident, where members of the public are 
acting in desperation for the safety of their family.  
The verbatim quote from FG4 PFA above, suggests a ‘willingness’ to go with decisions. 
This implies that there is a choice in whether they follow the team leader. In a command 
structure this dynamic is unusual.  This was confirmed by FG8 FS focus group, whereby 
the freedom to choose whether to enter a dangerous situation is available, despite 
describing working in an authoritative command structure. This is an important insight into 
emergency response teams where, despite a structural hierarchy (similar to military 
teams), leadership shifts to individual or team choice when facing danger.  
Where leadership is viewed as directive, the opportunity for team members to make 
choices when facing danger presents implications for the leader, and the ability to 
maintain a directive and authoritative style in every circumstance.  In this case, the 
descriptions suggest that leadership emerges as a process to assert control over a 
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complex situation, where one person issues directive control measures, primarily to avoid 
confusion. Additionally, these examples indicate that an authoritarian approach is 
appreciated where previous experience of exposure to danger is low. 
The directional leadership style is similar to top-down command approaches to leadership, 
particularly in military studies (Ramthun & Matkin, 2014). The difference in the case of 
emergency response teams is that teams indicated that they can make a choice, within 
boundaries. One critical distinction is evident. They might be directed, through their 
command structure, in a similar style to military teams, but as public service workers, they 
have personal freedom to choose whether they enter a dangerous context..  
The above discussions highlight that despite possessing a certain extent of choice with 
regards to entering dangerous contexts, this choice is rarely made due to the dynamics 
found in team work in the emergency services. This suggests a prominent cultural 
influence of the emergency service working team environment, which will be explored in 
detail in the following section - Team culture and training.  
4.3.2 Team culture and training 
Issues relating to an established culture of teams working in dangerous contexts appears 
in-depth and influences several social processes of leadership. The literature addresses 
the importance of leadership forming a positive culture, influencing and creating cohesion 
within teams. However, this study addresses these areas not just as positive areas to 
develop for leadership but looks at team culture as a process as an encompassing whole; 
everything the team does is embedded in social interaction. Team cohesion is a sub-
theme incorporated within the theme of culture in this study due to the tightness of bond 
that appeared prominent between the team members.  The teams were asked to reflect 
upon how they work together. General responses centred on the working context and 
specifically addressed issues of recruitment, for example: 
 
 ‘It only attracts the certain sort of people who are willing, quite like or thrive on 
situations like that’ (FG1 HART). 
 
‘Everyone joins thinking it’s the hazardous area response team- so you know what 
you’re supposed to be, meant to be doing- what your job role is. I think you go in 
open minded, knowing these situations, there are lot of people who don’t because 
they don’t like heights, don’t like water, don’t apply for HART, so we all know the 
types of situations we’re going to be put in – we know, we’re not frightened’ (FG1 
HART) 
 
‘I think it generally attracts people who want to work in a team, doing what we do. 
It’s not a solitary role. So, if you want to work by yourself, you wouldn’t apply to 
come here. You generally attract people who are similar minded’ (FG5 PFA). 
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The issue of recruitment was raised without prompting. Teams felt this was a significant 
process that emergency services needed to consider when selecting team members. 
Teams raising this suggests that there are discrepancies in this process and that not all 
teams work together as well as they could, based on the type of person recruited. 
Supporting this, teams began to describe the type of person that would be attracted to this 
type of role. 
From the data, and as shown in the illustrative extracts above, teams believe there is a 
‘type’ of person with a specific mind-set recruited for positions in emergency response 
teams. Participants made it clear that they join these specialist teams with a clear 
understanding of the parameters of the role, cultural challenges faced and are keen to join 
a ‘team’ culture. Team members form part of a collective where focus is on the team tasks 
rather than individual responsibility.   
The researcher’s interpretation of this was checked during the focus group, with 
participants nodding in agreement, and further stating that everything they did had an 
influence on another team member’s role. Observing the interplay of these conversations 
was useful, as an absolute clarity about each other’s roles in the team was displayed.  In 
addition to this, they demonstrate acute understanding that they will face challenging 
incidents; they understand this is a team role and they know that they will face danger 
themselves. They are also not frightened to face the ‘danger’. This indicates that the team 
environment and level of collegiality perhaps encourages teams to thrive, even when they 
know the types of dangers. This data is useful leading into discussions of the sub-theme 
of promoting team identity. 
4.3.3 Promoting team identity 
A sub-theme of processes of promoting team identity emerged throughout the focus 
groups. Several teams make the clear distinction between themselves and what they 
class as ‘normal’ teams operating in emergency services. Teams felt they were different to 
other teams in the same emergency service and are called when there is a difficult and 
complex job. All teams across the focus groups suggested that they were exceptional, 
displaying pride in, and distinguishing themselves from, normal teams in the same 
emergency service. One team summarised the concept of exceptionalism, stating, ‘We’re 
different from the rest of the service in that you wouldn’t be here if you didn’t have some 
sort of leadership’ (FG4 PFA). This team and others go on to support this notion: 
‘with the threat escalation in the UK with the terror threat, we’ll be the first people 
there to deal with that so we kind of, we’re more geared up now to deal with 
dangerous stuff’ (FG4 PFA) 
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‘Because we train and train, and we train much more often than normal command’ 
(FG4 PFA) 
 
‘if you go to a normal police job and the normal police turn up and the 
commander… they don’t have a lot of current experience in dealing with 
shoplifters, criminal damage or crime, because that’s not what we do; but dealing 
with a spontaneous incident that’s quite important’. (FG5 PFA) 
 
‘I think HART differs slightly from the normal ambulance crews because we’ve got 
the mentality that the military has got, because we are such a close team, and we 
are working so closely together’(FG6 HART). 
 
They undertake larger scale incidents with higher risk factors than normal commanded 
teams and identify themselves as in line with military teams rather than public sector 
organisational teams. Based on the comments above, they want to be recognised or 
identified as specialist rescue teams that perform specialist functions and roles. For 
example, some will have more training in water-based rescue or working with heights.  
These activities demonstrate the dangerous nature of ‘rescue’. Aligning themselves with 
military teams suggests they believe that they are higher in level of ability (not rank), have 
more leadership skills, train in similar ways and more intensely than normal teams and 
they are called when it is a more complex rescue requiring focused expertise. This 
concept is supported, as this is how they operate procedurally. FG4 PFA provide an 
example showing how leadership shifts in its entirety at an incident, stating: 
 
When there’s a firearms incident though there’s a command structure which can 
then take away the rank, it supersedes the normal rank structure, you have 
bronze, silver and gold.  Bronze command can be a PC who is giving direction to a 
sergeant up to Inspector.  You can have an Inspector in a car, taking direction from 
a PC during a firearms deployment.’ (FG4 PFA). 
 
This statement appears respectful of the rank structure and command procedures. This 
differs to military teams, however, in that there is incident specific structure. The rank 
structure shifts leadership and command of the incident to teams with specific expertise. 
In most teams, a delegation of duties may be appropriate based on specialist expertise, 
but this example describes a full shift in command.  
It is useful to understand that all members of specialist teams, such as firearms and HART 
have been through basic training as normal police officers or paramedics and have 
worked in the normal contexts from which they now differentiate themselves. The 
exceptions to this are the fire service and mountain rescue who attend the same incidents, 
whether in a normal or specialist role. The concept of a team superseding ranking officers 
in command is unusual and differs from military and current studies in emergency 
response teams (Campbell et al, 2010). This has significant implications for the leadership 
capabilities of teams working in dynamic, and often dangerous, contexts, as training would 
be different to conventional teams, with an emphasis on being able to take command. 
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In contrast to this, from a voluntary sector perspective, the following comment supports 
the need for the team to ensure preparedness in the face of danger and implies the 
opposite of what might be observed in a military team. For example, ‘from the outside, it is 
a bit like oh wow, I really need to prove myself before, but it does build that confidence, it’s 
that confidence in each other more than anything’ (FG2 MR). 
Voluntary emergency service, such as the mountain rescue teams, have a different team 
understanding in comparison to police firearms, HART or fire service teams.  
Preparedness was not as prominent a concept within their responses. Although they 
undergo some scenario based training, they do not face exposure to danger as frequently 
as a full time emergency service. This provides a particularly interesting insight into 
voluntary emergency services, as there is a feeling by team members of needing to prove 
that they are able to handle dangerous and complex situations, which in turn will build 
their confidence. Confidence in this case is that they know each other can handle difficult 
situations, and that they will stay confident and able throughout an incident. Despite the 
need to be able to handle difficult situations, dangerous contexts lead to the possibility of 
accidents: 
‘It is a dangerous area we work in, so there’s always the possibility of accidents no 
matter how much training we do. Like I say, we try to minimise that’ (FG2 MR). 
 
For the team, training is portrayed as a way of reducing accidents and minimising error, 
however due to the ambiguous and complex nature of the context they acknowledge there 
is little that can be done to avoid accidents.  Scenario-based training appears useful in 
terms of increasing the perceived level of exposure to danger. Despite extensive scenario 
planning and the significant emphasis placed on training, it is arguably difficult to re-create 
such levels of danger and thus to prepare for the unexpected. This poses the question as 
to the extent to which training can influence teams’ responses within dangerous contexts.  
Team participants engage in dialogue to resolve incidents where mistakes have been 
made, referring to the personality types of those who work in the teams. They state, ‘I 
guess the emergency services, it’s not the place for shrinking violets, so if somebody has 
made a mistake, somebody will tell you, either jokingly or seriously. It very rarely gets left 
to fester. It would be identified and dealt with’ (FG5 PFA). 
Several teams turned to the issue of recruitment with regard to their discussion on 
training. The recruitment system within the services has changed over the years. 
Conversations with the participants indicated that the services have moved from intense 
training and selection courses in previous years to shortened courses. Conversations like 
this were useful as it helped to build understanding, and therefore interpretation of the 
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data. For example, for a police officer to become a firearms officer now, they must 
complete an intense ten-week course. The teams highlighted what they felt was a shift 
from previously working their way up the ladder and thus having gained knowledge and 
experience to enable leadership, to being able to take a short course to achieve the same 
status; ‘you’ve got to do more work with people now as the people you’re getting aren’t as 
well trained’ (FG3 FS). 
Team culture focuses on the need to have confidence in each other and as a result of the 
differences in training and experience levels (stemming from their recruitment processes), 
it is proving difficult, yet essential. In emergency services, those recruited to higher levels 
of command are not necessarily the most experienced firefighters, paramedics or police 
officers as in previous decades. New processes of recruitment and fast track training 
means that command can be assumed in much shorter time periods.  
During the focus groups, this was an issue raised by the teams and they discussed this in 
terms of the impact it may have upon the team. In some cases, incident commanders had 
relatively less experience, and therefore there was a lack of trust by some team members 
regarding decisions at incidents. This may be particularly challenging when operating in a 
structure where commanders can be issuing instructions from a remote location, away 
from the scene. 
Despite the teams superseding the normal rank structure, challenging the normal 
command positions is a difficult task. As FG5 PFA previously stated, culturally, it’s ‘not a 
place for shrinking violets’ and the circumstances of adopting this specialist identity as a 
team presents a challenge. This phrase indicated that speaking up is essential, and refers 
back to the teams recruiting a particular ‘type’ of personality. Teams need to have 
members that are willing and able to voice their opinions within the rank structure and 
leadership must acknowledge experience to maintain effectiveness. 
Team culture appears to be established through ‘mutual influence’ (Ramthun & Matkin, 
2014). Leadership is not exclusively derived from position in the hierarchical structure. 
Leadership develops through reciprocal influence such as experience, ability to step up, 
capability and knowledge, and the perception of honesty. For example, one team leader 
stated, ‘I wouldn’t expect any of the team to do something I wouldn’t do. I wouldn’t want to 
put myself into that position, so why would I put any of these into that?’ (FG6 HART). 
In this statement, the leader of the team is showing respect for his team members and 
displaying that they would not exploit team members to do anything dangerous that they 
themselves would not undertake. The team nodded and made agreeing noises during the 
focus groups which the researcher interpreted as the team demonstrating their respect for 
the team leader and suggesting that what was being said was an accurate assessment of 
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the leader’s way of working. This comment demonstrates a level of high experience and 
judgement regarding incidents and, consequently, an understanding of the challenges 
faced by team members. Equally, honesty in leadership within teams gains respect in this 
type of culture. One group stated, ‘I think because of the type of people we are, we are 
quite open and honest with each other.  There’s not mud-slinging behind each other’s 
backs’ (FG4 PFA). 
It would be naïve to suggest that there is never anything said behind people’s backs, but 
generally, Emergency Response Teams strive for the job to be done correctly, safely and 
effectively.   Emergency Response Teams appear acutely aware of their actions and 
decisions based on the “open and honest” interactions within the team. As the teams 
describe incidents, they were continuously describing how they justify their decisions as 
they work through the incident. This is particularly important when considering how the 
team often apply self-directed processes. This also implies that past leaders have put 
team members into difficult situations and respect has not always been reciprocal. The 
team were nodding in appreciation in response to this comment. Team culture also shows 
a respect for team member safety, for example, ‘Personal safety first I always say, 
second, your teammates and third, the casualty. I think that’s one of the main things I’ve 
picked up on when I’ve been out in some more dangerous areas’ (FG2 MR). 
 
Viewing emergency service teams as a collective is useful to understand to how teams 
perceive themselves and dangerous working contexts. The next theme discusses the 
leadership process of enabling team cohesion, to further understand how teams interact in 
dangerous contexts in comparison to conventional contexts. 
4.3.4 Enabling team cohesion  
Through observations of the teams during the focus groups and the analysis of the data, 
there was confirmation of teams being cohesive as being a firm resolute state between 
team members. This was especially apparent in teams that have worked together for an 
extended duration, and who knew each other, and, in some cases, each other’s families 
well, through social interactions beyond the working context. Teams stated that their 
cohesiveness is achieved over time, and is thus not immediate with new members. 
Responding to this emergent process of developing cohesiveness, team cohesion is 
identified as a sub-theme in the findings. It is conceptualised as an enabling process of 
leadership, rather than a resultant absolute state of cohesion, and it emerged in all focus 
group discussions. 
The following data presented addresses several aspects of cohesiveness: how cohesion 
is built in the teams; the ways in which cohesion emerges within dangerous contexts; and, 
how the teams operate as a result of cohesion as a leadership process. As themes are 
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progressively presented, this chapter will attempt to capture emerging cohesiveness 
between the team members. 
Discussing team cohesion provides the opportunity to identify strong bonds between 
members across all teams in the focus groups.  Cohesion was observed in all the focus 
groups through their use of humour, general ‘mickey-taking’ and banter.  The designated 
team leaders were often the instigators of this, and this is deemed significant because it is 
a process of encouraging team members to speak up. Teams tended to immediately 
relax. This was observed by the researcher in the physical body language and verbal 
interaction of the participants. For example, where the leader display relaxed behaviour 
and opened-up, the team visibly relaxed, smiled, and shoulders lowered. The interaction 
between team members became more frequent, with greater freedom to comment being 
observed. It was through this that insights to the workings of the team emerged. The 
teams felt they were family, stating ‘With the threat we deal with, our team is like a family’ 
(FG5 PFA). In support of this, other teams stated: 
 
It’s like family, it’s a work family. We’re all quite close you know. That does help us 
a lot you know’ (FG1 HART) 
 
‘More than a team. It’s not just a team at work, we socialise as well, which is an 
important factor. This is where you get your trust’ (FG1 HART) 
 
‘It sounds corny but you can rely on people at the extremes with your life. People 
do work well as a team because they’ve got to’ (FG5 PFA).  
 
Based on the nature of the role, and continuous social and work interactions of these 
team members, the bond in the focus groups felt profound, perhaps in comparison to 
‘conventional’ teams. These teams feel like they are ‘family’, as referred to by several 
participants.  The comment of being more than a team and the reference to family also 
serves to promote the feeling of care that has formed between the team members. They 
live with each other on long shifts, often for several days.  
Across the focus groups, only one team (FG3 FS) did not appear to have this profound 
bond, and this was interpreted as them having relatively new team members, as well as 
some team members on probation (see figure 3.1, chapter three). One participant, who 
was on probation within this team, commented that it was time that enabled you to be an 
effective team member. ‘I wouldn’t say it was possible to become an effective member of 
the team in less than a year, and probably 2 year station observation was chosen for a 
reason’ (FG3 FS). This may be because new members are not confident in their 
knowledge and need to gain more experience, or maybe experienced members are not 
confident in the new member. 
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Team cohesion appears in discussions of military teams (Yammarino et al, 2010).  
However, as previously established, the contexts that military teams face are different in 
nature to emergency response teams and there are also significant cultural differences. In 
comparison, this sub-theme captures literature sub-themes such as social climate and 
team wellbeing (Morgeson et al, 2010), whilst extending understanding by exploring these 
sub-themes in dangerous contexts.  Teams indicated that the nature of danger at 
incidents strengthens the bond of the team, which is perhaps why the teams feel 
profoundly reliant on each other. Dangerous incidents bring the team together as the 
nature of the context prompts working as a tightly bonded unit. They need to trust each 
other implicitly and rely on each other to make the right decisions. This can mean life or 
death in some cases, which helps to explain why there is such closeness. As a result, a 
sub-theme that emerged was ‘predicting actions’, which will now be presented.  
 
4.3.5 Predicting team member actions 
This is a sub-theme that was in the findings and has emerged because of the nature of 
the context. The bond the teams form and the inherent communicative processes within 
the team enable ability for members to predict each other’s actions, stating ‘the jobs been 
done and almost nothing has been said’ (FG3 FS). Further instances of participants 
referring to being able to predict others actions were apparent across the data: 
 
‘When the times get harder and the job gets difficult, everyone’s so in tune with 
each other, like I’ve witnessed on this watch. The jobs just been done and there’s 
almost nothing been said, it’s they know what they’re doing and you trust him…you 
know? It’s a complex thing and it takes some time to build up’ (FG3 FS) 
 
“although we hadn’t used verbal communication, literally by the direction of our 
vehicles going in, we managed to resolve the job correctly by going toward each 
other. Everyone did exactly what they wanted to do and that’s because we work so 
well as a team’ (FG5 PFA) 
 
‘If I worked with another team, I couldn’t say that they’d do the exact same thing as 
what we did. We might do a slight variation. But our team work together all the 
time, did exactly what we’d planned on doing anyway, without even speaking to 
each other’ (FG5 PFA). 
 
The team nodded in agreement with the statement from FG5 PFA, and re-iterated the 
nature of danger as a catalyst for bonding in the team. The closeness of the team 
develops into the team knowing and being so attuned with each other, that they have 
reduced their reliance on communication and interactions on jobs. Teams are often able 
to predict each other’s actions, based on previous experience of their team mates’ 
actions.  As a result of knowing the team well, one team describes how even body 
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language can give enough information to form a prediction of action. Prediction also has 
importance in assessing risks and making decisions regarding an unfolding incident.  
However, it is easier to predict an incident if you are dealing with the ‘expected’ in an 
unfolding incident; the expected being the predictability of the way an incident will unfold 
from experience in a similar context previously.  The process of communication is seen as 
essential to effective leadership, but a finding of this research is the concept of not having 
to discuss actions pre-incident. In the absence of direct communication techniques being 
available as described in the final quote, the result of capturing a criminal has been 
achieved through the ability to predict the actions of another team member in a time 
critical and dynamically unfolding situation.   
 
The last comment states (FG5) that teams will do as they planned, without speaking, 
suggesting that this is team specific and due to the nature of the particular team and 
relationship between the team members. If members were to swap teams, this could be 
an unlikely occurrence. This concept of an enhanced team capability emerging over time 
has implications for leadership as it enhances the concept of retaining current members. 
Leadership in this case might be to encourage cohesiveness, but the implications are that 
this may not be achieved across all teams and may not be through training alone. There 
may also be issues with relying on the ability to predict the actions of others, such as 
complacency. This as a concept has not received discussion previously in dangerous 
contexts but is indicated in the shared sense making literature.  
This section has addressed the organisational context in which leadership takes place. 
The organisational command and emergency response team structures, the composition 
of those teams, their understanding of leadership within organisational and team 
parameters, has been examined.  In the next section, the exploration of the construct of 
danger has resulted in several emergent themes and sub-themes. The following section 
will discuss the construct of danger, dangerous contexts, tangible and mental danger and 
desensitisation to danger. These themes are related to emerging leadership processes 
enabling working in this context. Discussion of how these integrate with further emerging 
leadership process themes will be made later in the chapter, when findings of what danger 
does to leadership are presented. 
4.4 Construction of Danger 
 
This section discusses the types of danger faced by teams, their understanding of what 
makes an incident dangerous, their conceptualisation of danger and the complexities of 
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working in danger environments. This section aims to address the second research sub-
question 
 ‘How do teams working in dangerous contexts construct danger?’ 
Few studies have attempted to define dangerous contexts (Campbell & Hannah, 2010). 
Definitions are challenging based on the particular contingencies, constraints and social 
dynamics (Osborn et al, 2002) present in a dangerous context, in comparison to normal 
and routine contexts (Hannah, 2009). As a result, this research sub-question focused on 
exploring team construction of danger, and how danger appears in the contexts faced by 
emergency response teams. This is critical to establish, as danger is the lens through 
which the team are responding and viewing their context of leadership. Therefore, it is 
necessary to gain a full understanding of how they construct danger. Analysis of this data 
resulted in themes and sub-themes presented in summary table 4.3 below. 
Table 4.3 – Summary table for the category ‘Construction of danger’ 
 
Emergency response teams predominantly deal with members of the public, and face 
dangers whilst also being in a civilian capacity in their role.  A fundamental difference to 
military studies is the mind-set that emergency response team members have whilst 
working in their capacity.  As a uniformed service, all teams stated that they have control 
and authority in the situation, but as civilians (public servants), they have the choice to 
refuse to face the danger. As teams and individuals, they cannot be forced into a 
potentially dangerous situation, whereas this is not the case with the military.  
It is the team that makes the decision to go forward into a potentially dangerous 
circumstance. This is less relevant if the team faces an unexpected situation as they can 
find themselves in a dangerous situation without a choice. The following section will 
discuss how teams construct danger, and the sub-themes; tangible danger, mental 
danger and desensitisation to danger. 
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4.4.1 Tangible Dangers 
Each focus group was asked to describe their understanding of a dangerous context. In 
order to answer this, the teams initially talked about what they consider to be dangerous 
incidents. The teams initially found naming dangerous types of incidents difficult.  All 
teams in the focus groups looked around the room at each other with expressions of 
uncertainty whilst they were thinking. This was unexpected given that their day to day role 
is to face incidents that ‘conventional’ (FG5 PFA) teams in the emergency services would 
not. The types of dangerous incidents described are not common to all the teams, and the 
type of danger is dependent on the type of rescue service provider. The responses have 
been distinguished between the focus groups for this reason: 
“chemical, suicide, gas leaks, anything like that can go wrong but we have that 
much PPE and things and equipment to detect things when they’re about to go 
wrong” (FG1 HART) 
 
“another big area of physical danger that creeps up on you is the water stuff” (FG2 
MR) 
 
“someone armed with a shotgun, numerous other weapons, knives, hammers….” 
(FG4 PFA) 
 
“Knife threat; Guns; Crossbows; Machete; Terrorist; Suicide vests; Medical 
Trauma; Hit by cars; Mental health and an incident that might affect one of your 
colleagues, that can be quite dangerous” (FG5 PFA) 
 
“Erratic patients, especially if there’s been assaults with weapons and things like 
that. Environmental as well.” (FG6 HART) 
“There’s a potential of greater risk because of the reduced staffing, which creates 
a greater level of stress and anxiety in everybody, and it’s quite tangible. You can 
see it and sense it yourself” (FG7 FS). 
 
Using the language of the participants, the types of incidents above describe mostly 
‘tangible dangers’ that can be faced by the teams. The term tangible from one team refers 
to the ability to place some boundaries around the incident; the ability to ‘see and sense it’ 
(FG7 FS) and therefore be able to assess the level of threat and plan a measured 
response. Tangible dangers faced by emergency response teams affords the team the 
ability to prepare strategies for the possibility of danger; pre-incident, in-situ and post-
incident (Hannah, 2009).  For example, there are set procedural models on how to 
manage the circumstances on scene when dealing with a person with a sawn-off shot gun 
or where there is a hazardous chemical spillage.  
Teams place much focus on the amount of procedural training that takes place to provide 
the skills to mitigate circumstances in the event of the team facing these particular 
situations. From the examples given, there is also heavy reliance on the personal 
protective equipment that is used in these circumstances. However, when dealing with an 
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‘erratic patient’ (FG6 HART), events cannot be easily anticipated. The use of the term 
erratic suggests that responses cannot always be predicted, therefore aligning with 
Hannah’s (2009) unique intensifiers in dangerous situations. 
The identified types of danger have some similarities and differences with those operating 
in military contexts (Yammarino, F; Mumford, M; Connelly, M & Dionne, S. 2010). 
Similarities include the threat of physical dangers; guns and knives as well as some 
environmental dangers; operating in or near water or chemical exposure. These dangers 
are often anticipated in a military and an emergency response context, due to the 
information the teams receive on route to scene. As discussed in chapter two and 
referring to the context, responses to incidents are driven by whether the danger is 
anticipated or unanticipated and this can be complicated by multiple interpretations of the 
environment (Scott & Trethewey, 2008). Multiple interpretations can present a challenging 
aspect to facing danger, in that the information regarding the incident parameters that are 
relayed to teams on route may not be accurate, and therefore negate planned response.  
After thinking about particular dangers, some focus group teams became broad in their 
interpretation of what they consider to be dangerous incidents, viewing potentially 
“everything and anything” (FG3 FS)’ that they attend as dangerous. This judgement is 
based on the potential that every situation they go into may have dangers, explicit or 
implicit. Further investigation of what is understood by danger moved away from tangible 
types of incident, towards threat to life: 
“everything and anything” (FG3 FS) 
“Something that is a threat to life, either to the public or any responders” (FG7 FS) 
 
“There’s a perceived threat or a possible threat. Either it’s a potential or it’s going 
to happen, that’s what you’re working against, the threat” (FG7 FS) 
 
“Where we can’t guarantee safety” (FG6 HART). 
 
FG6 HART refer to the aspect of not being able to ‘guarantee safety’, suggesting that 
danger is perhaps not a deterrent in the context that they work in. They attend an incident 
with full knowledge that it may be dangerous to themselves and/or members of the team. 
Based on the quote above, the initial mood of all the groups was that the possibility of 
injury or death is in the background of their normal working context but that this is 
extremely unlikely. As the focus groups moved on, with further discussion of danger, I felt 
it was as if a lightbulb switched on with every group, where they suddenly realised what 
they actually faced. This was indicated by the teams suddenly looking around the room at 
each other, disputing who did what and pointing out that what other team members did, 
had been quite dangerous upon reflection.  
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This was most prominent when telling stories of incidents.  They were also reflecting, 
asking ‘what if?’ regarding previous incidents and consequently drawing attention to the 
danger. The discussions were unprompted and, sitting in the room, I felt that it was as if 
they had only seen the danger for the first time. During the focus groups, teams 
acknowledged types of danger and understood they can be in danger.  However, teams 
appear to view the context as inherently dangerous and therefore relate to danger as 
embedded. There appears to be an acceptance that they may be at risk during an incident 
but attention is placed on preservation of public lives and the job they have to do, rather 
than their own in the moment. A further interesting insight from discussions regarding 
constructions of danger, was related to the teams perceiving themselves as potentially 
being dangerous to others; this will now be discussed.  
4.4.2 Dangerous team 
Impromptu discussions in the teams, around different individuals’ perceptions of danger 
emerged in the focus groups. Team members began to question each other during the 
descriptions of incidents, to challenge the decision making of the team member at that 
time.  This was useful as they were de-briefing themselves about the incident and data 
emerged through this. 
A surprising finding was that several teams perceived the team itself as dangerous. This 
implies that, in part, the context becomes dangerous because of the team’s presence. For 
example, Police Firearms have the capability to kill with the weapons they carry, either 
deliberately on instruction from an invoked reaction or by accident. Teams are dangerous 
to one another for this reason, and dangerous to the public and other emergency service 
personnel on scene. HART stated this based on the equipment they have during rescue 
operations and echoed by PFA’s stating: 
‘In relation to what we do, we are carrying live firearms amongst other things, so 
we’ve the ability to kill.  So, from our position we are quite dangerous’.  
 
‘You are dealing with threat to life, our lives, our colleagues lives, the public, the 
subject, because if they invoke a reaction from us we are going to shoot’ (FG6 
PFA). 
 
This is a particularly interesting finding and one that perhaps inherently applies across the 
emergency services due to the equipment that they all use. For example, FS stated that 
they would not like to find themselves at the other end of a hosepipe because of the 
dangerous pressure. All services are therefore not only carrying out a risk assessment on 
the incident, they must also include themselves as a potential risk to the incident and 
public. In this example, I also felt that they described the physical equipment such as 
ballistic equipment and guns, as shielding them from danger but I also felt it assisted in 
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their mental preparation for dealing with danger, thus also emerging as a metaphorical 
shield. 
The way in which the teams describe danger closely aligns with Campbell & Hannah’s 
(2010) definition of danger in that the teams face situations that are unpredictable and 
dynamic, where there is a threat to life or the possibility of severe harm to person/persons 
in the team and perhaps where there are limited resources.  Hannah (2009) and Campbell 
& Hannah (2010), however, discuss danger only in terms of the risk to the response team 
and the responding organisation.  The data from the focus groups goes beyond this, 
demonstrating instead a considerable focus on patient and civilian risk in each incident.  
This suggests that the team definition of danger extends beyond their organisational 
environment and is instead encompassing of all the people involved. The next section 
addresses the concept of mental danger. 
4.4.3 Mental Danger 
FG6 HART not only include the physical or tangible element of danger, they also make 
reference to the psychological nature of facing danger, or having to attend and deal with 
what might be considered a deeply distressing situation. Teams talked about travelling en-
route to incidents and described how their adrenaline is high if they know it is a serious 
incident; if they know there have been fatalities, and their preparation and communication 
is happening ‘in the wagon’ (FG1 FS) before they arrive on scene. Teams reflected on 
previous anxiety en-route, particularly where there has been a lack of information 
regarding the nature of the incident (this can be lack of information on the exact location of 
the incident), which sometimes impacts their preparation or readiness pre-arrival. Again, 
this supports Hannah et al (2009).  FG2 MR concurs with this, stating: 
‘I think its split into 2 types really, maybe….one is physical danger to you and the 
other is mental/emotional danger to yourself. I suppose if you think about the 
emotional, mental danger to yourself, then dealing with some of the fatalities. 
Yeah, we’ve started to look at that a bit more carefully now in terms of effect on 
team members’ 
 
‘A lot of it can be dealing with people who have committed suicide. It can be 
getting their bodies out of gullies after they’ve jumped off bridges or hanging out of 
trees in woods and that’s not a usual thing that people might do. Those are some 
examples of where what you see and what you experience is quite out of the 
ordinary’ (FG2 MR). 
 
FG2 MR in the second quote, provide an example of the mental danger that the team can 
face. Attending dangerous incidents where the team face a psychological threat provides 
challenges for leadership.  For example; mental danger is a serious threat to the teams 
that work in this area and is acknowledged by most team leaders present in the focus 
groups throughout the study. The concern is primarily of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
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(PTSD), where the symptoms and influence of seeing and responding to these distressing 
situations is not tangible at that time. The influence of these incidents may manifest weeks 
or years later. For example, two team members from FG2 MR described a slightly 
different situations which were not considered ‘dangerous’ at the time.  In the first 
statement, the mental repercussions of his not being able to fulfil his role during the 
incident, albeit not his fault, resulted in years of reliving the repercussion of what he 
perceived as a failure. 
 
‘It’s something that’s affected me most in my 30 years and that was a person who 
had been dead for several weeks. We knew he’d been dead for several weeks, but 
it was our task to find them. We pretty much knew where they were but we missed 
them on 2 occasions and they were subsequently found several weeks later and 
that affected me psychologically more than ever, it still does’ (FG2 MR). 
 
‘I’ve seen dead people before, family members, but they’ve all died of natural 
causes but to see someone semi mutilated was… I was quite….you feel full of 
adrenaline for so many hours and then I remember I was driving home and I asked 
my girlfriend at the time to drive and she wouldn’t….and there was this big lorry 
screaming down the A1 and I absolutely s**t a brick and we had to pull over and sit 
there for 10 minutes’  (FG2 MR). 
 
They were both able to recount the events with intricate detail because it had made such 
a psychological impact on them. The stress from incidents is not only felt post incident (at 
debrief stage the next day or years later), it can be felt en-route to a known dangerous 
incident, whist still on scene and in the immediate aftermath of the incident. The example 
from FG2 MR suggests that this was a stress reaction immediately after the incident. The 
team reactions to the stories in the focus group provided evidence that this is an element 
of the role that resonated strongly across the whole team.  They were all nodding in a way 
that appeared empathic; indicating that they understood the psychological stress in the 
immediate aftermath of his situation.  
In this instance, leadership is being able to ‘see’ the implicit nature of situations and the 
effect on the team members at the time, but also to understand how these situations can 
contribute to post traumatic stress responses later. Further to this, their role as those that 
save others features strongly in their mind-set, and a conflict arises in terms of their self-
definition, in which several teams refer to themselves as ‘superheroes’, whilst also 
acknowledging they are not ‘superheroes’. 
 
‘If you’ve got something that’s been going on for 24 hours and because we’re 
volunteers, we’re superheroes, we try to keep going and then suddenly you think 
this is not good’ (FG2 MR) 
 
‘It’s not that we think we’re super human, we just know’  
 
‘Can’t be super human, we can’t be in two places at the same time’ (FG6 HART) 
 
Page 140 of 273 
 
‘Whilst everyone else is running away from the incident, we’re the ones running 
towards it’ (FG8 FS). 
 
All teams demonstrated a determination to resolve each situation they face.  The quote 
above suggests that this is how they feel during lengthy jobs. Teams described how they 
can attend multiple incidents in one day. Immediately following one job, they may be 
called to another and teams commented how they have to mentally prepare for the next 
incident in the immediate aftermath of the previous incident. FG1 HART stated “ It’s a 
case of drawing a line”. This implies notions of endurance and is discussed in the next 
secion In the statement from FG8 FS, the team view themselves in comparison to 
conventional teams in the emergency services. Their perception of danger is collectively 
risk adverse, yet they display a ‘proud of facing danger’ mind-set linking to a ‘superhero’ 
aspect of the role. This is visible in all the teams in the focus groups.  Every superhero 
has the fact that they rescue people as an identifier of self. Hannah, Campbell & Matthews 
(2010, p.S158) refer to this as the ‘heroic ideal’, but in the case of individual leaders rather 
than a team. In further focus groups, teams instinctively mentioned that they did not see 
themselves as super human but just highly trained individuals undertaking a role. This 
suggests that they perceive that others may think or feel that what they do is a bit 
superhuman. 
 
These quotes referred to the fact that they knew the situation and knew what they were 
doing to resolve it. The comments above suggest that the situation sometimes dictates 
how they feel. This may be down to a reduction in resources (mentioned as a potential 
threat earlier), that leads them to not be able to deal with every incident at the same time.  
If a few jobs come in at once then this would be challenging, creating stress within and on 
the team en-route to the incident, and/or immediately after the incident. The comments 
also indicate that they feel superhuman effort is expected from them in their role and they 
find this hard to live up to.  
 
They have the expertise and it is expected that leaders and their teams know what to do 
and how to do it (White & Shullman, 2010), but there is conflict in the reality of what is 
expected and what is feasible. Despite being able to refuse to face danger, the 
expectation from the public and often the command structure creates additional pressure 
on the teams, as they feel responsible. This theme highlighted the implications that 
danger can have on the teams, but desensitisation to danger was also present within 
discussions. The next theme will now consider this.  
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4.4.4 Desensitisation to danger 
Danger is inherent in the role of the teams and the teams establish that they face 
dangerous incidents, sometimes on a daily basis. Although the teams acknowledge that 
there are tangible physical and mental dangers, there is also a surprising confliction in the 
way that ‘danger’ is perceived by the teams. 
‘Well, what you think is nasty, we could probably sit and have our bait and not 
leave scene….that’s just what we’ve done for the last 20 years or whatever….not 
saying it’s right or wrong and not saying it won’t affect us in years to come but it 
doesn’t affect us because…we’re there to help’ (FG1 HART). 
 
It’s how it’s reported. The first few pub fights you go to seem horrendous but by the 
time you’re 5 years in, it’s just another pub fight, piece of cake’ (FG4 PFA) 
 
“It’s how you perceive it isn’t it. I think we think going to a knife job is dangerous 
but on our pecking order it doesn’t really; you’re not going there worried or scared 
at all because it doesn’t – when you first join the police you probably do” 
 
‘We come up against knives, people threatening to harm people every day and it’s 
just exposure’ (FG5 PFA). 
 
These examples refer to the understanding of the team member based on their level of 
experience in the PFA’s section. Teams also indicated that length of service, and 
exposure are factors contributing to the de-sensitisation to distressing incidents. Based on 
the amount of experience and therefore exposure they have over many years, they no 
longer worry about the potential danger of the situation. This is also due to their belief that 
their personal protective equipment will keep them safe. The first comment above is 
inferred through the phrase ‘on our pecking order…’ that in comparison to other types of 
threat or incident attended, this is not one to be concerned about. In essence, there 
appears to be a different understanding of the level of danger a person with a knife poses, 
based on the level of exposure to that type of threat.  
Insights in to how they achieved de-sensitisation emerged when describing having to deal 
with several incidents in a day:  
‘We’ve gone from siege, bus crash on the way to the axe thing, over to the shot 
gun incident, all in one day’ 
‘It is one job at a time and once ones finished; I think we’re quite good at 
compartmentalising it’  
  
‘. Whatever happened 20 minutes earlier has no bearing, is no longer relevant’ 
(FG1 HART). 
 
 
Although this team raised the concept of attending multiple incidents (more than two) in 
one day, attending multiple incidents one after the next is not a common occurrence for 
the teams, and that attending a couple of incidents in one day is more common. Multiple 
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incidents for those that are not de-sensitised would be extremely difficult to cope with 
emotionally, particularly if they were distressing. The teams have adapted to this way of 
working by compartmentalising under incidents, using this as a technique for coping with 
undue pressure. HART in this instance are not saying that what happened in the incident 
is not relevant but that the result of that job can not impact the quality of work from the 
team on the next job. The teams make reference to drawing lines. These metaphorical 
lines symbolise the finality of that incident and fuel their mental ability to move on to the 
next job. Further to the teams being ‘used’ to difficult and dangerous incidents, there is a 
distinction for some teams about being in danger at all. In this study, there was initially 
reluctance from two teams to see that they might ever put themselves in dangerous 
situations. FG1 HART and FG2 MR indicate that you are ‘doing something wrong if you’re 
putting yourself in danger’. Additional supporting quotes include: 
 
‘To some extent, you’re doing something wrong if you’re putting yourself in a 
massive amount of danger’.  
 
‘you’re probably doing something wrong if you’re literally in a situation where one 
slip is going to cause you to injure yourself as a team member’ (FG2 MR) 
 
 
‘It should never happen. It might happen one day, but in theory, if you put these 
things in place (the process), that should never happen. Plus, you’re relying on 
your pals as well so one will say, ‘what about that’ and we’ll say ok, we’ll do that 
first or xxx will say. We’re relying on our own experience to keep ourselves safe’  
 
‘I think because of the systems we put in place, that we very rarely find ourselves 
in the situation where we think we’re in danger and we’re not able to cope because 
we wouldn’t get there’  
 
‘we’re classed as hazardous area response team, so the nature of our jobs is to 
put ourselves in hazardous areas, but because of this, we are really risk adverse 
and know the situations we’re going in, so we don’t’ (FG1 HART). 
 
 
The above extracts make an assumption that the danger is visible and tangible. There is a 
primary focus on the procedural element, where there is belief that if the processes that 
are in place are followed, then being in danger should never happen.  If danger is visible 
and apparent, then they are doing something wrong by putting themselves in that 
situation. The way this was said implied that if the team are in danger then it is their fault 
for not following procedure. There is also a reliance on experience and knowledge from 
previous exposure to inform when there is danger. Although the procedural processes are 
in place to mitigate the exposure to danger, the discussions in the teams also highlighted 
some contradictions. The next section addresses team coping processes in dangerous 
contexts. 
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4.4.5 Team coping processes 
The level of trust and absolute commitment to the team safety is paramount to the 
cohesion of the team in terms of leadership. The team display leadership throughout with 
comments such as, ‘you become protective over who you work with, you get close to 
them’ (FG5 PFA).  Another bonding process is found in training. One team described that 
when they trained, if one person did something wrong, the whole team was punished. This 
would be a long time ago now (old school training) but the mind-set of those individuals 
will be ensuring that they get it right. During incidents, there is pressure to get it right as 
their decisions may affect everyone else. No-one is truly a standalone entity, particularly 
by the end of the incident. 
 
Cohesion in a team was raised when facing danger and being able to cope with this 
dynamic. This translates through the teams because team members were concerned 
about being the ones that made a mistake when facing a dangerous context. 
Interestingly, in a culture of formalised debriefs, the main method of discussing incidents 
is informal. It is no less valuable, in fact it appears to be a form of drawing out concerns, 
getting team members to question themselves in a safe environment and being able to 
constructively criticise decisions made by other members of the team. This is where a lot 
of tea helps; interestingly, from the moment the focus group began, it was observed as a 
comfort and also reflects in the post-incident discussions in most of the teams. 
 
‘I think that’s where we have a strong team and it helps us immensely with that 
because, we have our own therapy, we do you know- whether that’s adequate or 
not, I have no idea but it helps us talk through things and we have a cup of tea’ 
(FG1 HART) 
 
‘We go through it and as long as you talk about it, it can get rid of it because 
you’ve talked about it.  If you don’t talk about it and you bottle it up’ (FG2 MR) 
 
‘I think drinking a cup of tea round the table is as good as anything. Personally, I 
think it’s as good as anything because you’re dealing with your crew’ (FG3 FS) 
 
‘For me, when you go to a job like that, you don’t want to be the one that drops the 
ball’ (FG4 PFA). 
 
 
Talking as a coping mechanism is a method described by all teams. This refers to talking 
with the team immediately following an incident and in the hours and days post incident. 
This also appears to be a way in which the team bond. As suggested earlier, there is 
some concern from leaders about PTSD in teams and this is an informal method adopted 
to help deal with the aftermath. 
 
Teams also appear extremely supportive of each other. Team members display 
leadership, particularly in the form of experienced professionals when it comes to team 
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members coping with the circumstances. To do this, there is a heavy reliance on the 
social aspect of the teams, such as ‘indulging in black humour’ (FG5 PFA). There is also a 
reliance on gallows humour. All teams pointed out that this is found in the majority of the 
teams in emergency services. Humour allows team members to discuss incidents and 
perhaps voice their concerns and inner worries to the team. 
 
‘we’ve always talked amongst ourselves, gone for a pint afterwards…indulged in 
the black humour which I think all of the emergency services do’ (FG2 MR) 
 
‘Black humour. So, if somebody goes for instance, didn’t bother wearing his 
ballistic helmet and went to go to a firearms job, everyone would take the mickey 
out of them’ (FG5 PFA). 
 
In the final extract above, black humour is also used to tackle issues where things have 
not gone to plan. Black humour only appears to work if the team is cohesive and this was 
demonstrated in the focus groups. The same humour was used in the interactions 
between team members when they described incidents during the focus groups.  This 
example shows that they use humour not only to cope but to ensure that their valid point 
is remembered by the team member, if something wasn’t right, they would joke about it 
with each other as a mechanism for ensuring the mistake didn’t happen again. Therefore, 
even through the use of humour, there still exists a challenge culture. 
Several types of danger have emerged in this study. Viewing the potential of danger in 
these different ways means that that danger can potentially be anything, anyone, at any 
time.  If danger is conceptualised in this way, there are implications for leadership and 
processes employed to mitigate such circumstances. In an incident where danger is not 
perceived then, then a different response again will emerge that perhaps does not seek to 
mitigate the unexpected. Some incidents may include all perceptions of danger to different 
team members and therefore leadership processes, and resultant enabling responses 
become more complex and challenged. 
Additionally, in contexts where dangers are tangible, teams view the concept of being in 
danger almost as a team failure; that it is a result of failing to follow procedure. Leadership 
in this case must be aware of these potential processes of assessment, to maintain a 
balanced view of the overall situation and to keep motivation high on scene during difficult 
incidents.   
There is conflict in how danger becomes apparent. If danger is understood as being an 
unexpected outcome of a perpetrator or an external environmental issue, there is some 
acceptance in teams that this is unavoidable. In cases where they recognise they are in 
danger but the circumstance is familiar or expected, this led to teams questioning 
processes and questioning the role of leadership. In some instances, the teams were so 
used to being in the dangerous circumstance, they had become desensitised to it and 
Page 145 of 273 
 
they did not see how they were in danger (until reflecting, as observed within the focus 
groups). In this case, the concept of danger is only what is not under control.  
Understanding that an incident that usually consists of an expected series of events can 
quickly become an unexpected series of events, might lead teams to not see the danger 
present until it is too late, and this potentially has implications for leadership. Seemingly, 
there is perhaps an over reliance on being able to predict situations (discussed in the 
previous section) based on previous experience. 
There are several areas of consideration for leadership in this instance focusing on the 
team. Based on the type of danger in the incident, teams may choose to take risks and to 
put themselves in harm’s way deliberately, if they feel ultimately responsible for saving 
someone.  In contexts where there are victims of a fire, there may be relatives nearby 
putting extreme emotional pressure on the team to save their son, daughter, mum, dad or 
sibling from burning. Team members have described situations where they would run 
towards the danger to save someone. By implication, if one is running, it appears a 
reaction rather than a considered response. 
This section has focused on the detailed perceptions and constructions of danger by the 
teams participating in the research. The next section addresses the influence of danger on 
leadership. This is essential to explore next as it provides findings for the implication of 
danger on the emergence of leadership processes and subsequent responses. 
4.5 The influence of danger on leadership 
 
This section presents the expectations of leadership by teams in dangerous contexts and 
discusses the complexities of working under dangerous conditions. This section aims to 
address the third research sub-question, 
‘How does danger influence leadership processes?’ 
There are limited discussions about the concept of leadership in dynamic contexts and the 
processes employed in leadership in comparison to normal working environments 
(Hannah et al, 2009).  Military studies have addressed leadership in this demanding 
dynamic context (Yammarino et al, 2010), however, there is limited analysis of studies into 
their understanding of the types of danger present in these contexts, their perspectives of 
danger or what danger is to the team members and subsequently how to respond to it 
(Burke et al, 2018).  In the previous section, team conceptualisation of danger was 
explored to better understand the findings of this category: what being in danger does to 
leadership.  
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The sub-themes that emerged were not purely from the answers to this question in the 
focus group; they are a synthesis of data emerging during the discussion of specific 
incidents and grouped where they met the criteria for that theme.  In this category, 
accountability and enabling trust have emerged as sub-themes and social processes of 
leadership alongside dealing with uncertainty and reliance. 
Table 4.4 – Summary table for the category ‘influence of danger on leadership’ 
Category Theme Sub-theme 
 
 
Influence of 
danger on 
leadership 
Expectations of leadership Enabling trust 
Accountability of leadership 
Challenges to leadership 
in dangerous contexts 
Dealing with uncertainty 
 
4.5.1 Expectations of leadership 
A theme that emerged was around what all teams expected a leader to be.  Focus groups 
were keen to discuss what they expected from the designated leader in the discussions of 
leadership, and therefore, I have presented this first. Leader traits are not an area of focus 
of this study but as these came out prominently in the discussions, I have included these. 
It is important to understand traits of leaders; different leaders display different traits and 
this has an influence on the type and quality of leadership enacted. Focus lies in the 
dynamic between the perceptions of what good leadership is, the operational role of the 
team and the dangerous context. For example, in the following extracts, teams described 
a leader as being rational, calm and collected under pressures of danger: 
‘Predominately, you’ll get someone who’s quite cool and calm and if XXX calm, 
and we’re all calm natured anyway, that’s how it runs’ (FG3 FS) 
 
‘in terms of what leadership is, it is calmness. That calm, rational approach which 
is needed’. (FG4 PFA) 
 
‘Clear, concise, where the team knows exactly what situation we are in, where 
everyone knows exactly what they are doing, so there’s no mistakes, there’s no 
ambiguity’ (FG4 PFA) 
 
‘I think it’s being that little bit more calm, confident being your own and teams’ 
abilities and being able to rationalise really, calm under pressure’ (FG5 PFA). 
 
 
There was consensus from the teams in the focus groups but FG4’s statement echo’s 
other respondents for leadership in dangerous contexts. The process of removing 
ambiguity emerges here (Yukl, 2008), discussed in literature focusing on normal teams. In 
the above verbatim comment, the team are referring to communication as a pivotal 
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leadership process with the purpose of providing concise instruction across the team. In 
danger, there is consensus and there is no room for error or confusion. This is perhaps an 
idealistic statement when we consider the dynamics of working in dangerous contexts as 
the anticipatory nature of these provides significant challenge for leadership. Conversely, 
it is useful to understand how teams continue to strive for this ideal when working in these 
contexts and the expectation that leadership will evolve when facing dynamic situations.  
One team suggested that leadership changes from incident to incident: ‘I think it’s incident 
based…. the kind of leadership you get’ (FG5 PFA).  This team recognise that the type of 
incident is an influential factor in the leadership presented. Unexpected and unanticipated 
events can create a surprise reaction in any team member and this is potentially where 
the danger may emerge without warning. As presented previously, there are different 
leaders for each team in each organisation, all of whom will all have different leadership 
traits and therefore differing styles and approaches to leadership. Despite this, all the 
teams stated that the characteristics of calmness, rationality and displaying confidence in 
the team’s abilities were key factors to leading in dangerous contexts. 
In dynamic dangerous situations, if the team sense that the leader is panicked, this will in 
turn filter to the team as described in the example below. After one team had received an 
urgent call regarding an immediate threat to a person’s life, the leader “...started shouting 
at us “Get your kit now, get straight to scene”.  Everyone felt the hairs on the back of their 
neck.  His panic went through all of us.  Everyone started rushing to get their kit together, 
we all rushed on the scene’ (FG4 PFA). FG5 further emphasised the first response where 
threat is perceived: 
‘Your first response is either fight or flight which is built into all of us, and then after 
that, you’ve got your experiences built in so when you deal with it more and more, 
it helps your leadership in these jobs because you’ve got that experience and 
knowledge to help you deal with the next set’ (FG5 PFA). 
 
Teams acknowledged that with regard to leadership there is a ‘fight or flight’ mechanism in 
all human response to danger.  However, despite all teams being trained to remain calm, 
teams in this research believe that the leader’s response to the incident has a prominent 
influence on the team. This is a similar finding to the study of military teams in dangerous 
contexts (Ramthun & Matkin, 2014), wherein that particular context, their argument for 
adopting a shared approach to leadership was enhanced by the concept that another 
team member was able to step up in the leader’s place in the event of a problem. If 
leaders adopt a calm and rational approach to the emergency response incidents, then 
this filters through the team, thus not triggering the necessity for shared approaches as 
described by Ramthun and Matkin (2014).  
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The example by FG4 PFA demonstrates how in real situations, unexpected behaviours 
can influence the way of operating in this context. The response to panic in a leader is 
prominent because it is unexpected in a command structure. This is a surprising finding 
emerging from this study and has implications for leadership in dangerous contexts. The 
finding indicates that despite the extent of the scenario training, leadership is not 
straightforward and not always appropriately ‘directive’. In this example, although they 
likely knew that this was a panicked response, the urgency implied in the direct command 
means that this response was not questioned until later.  
Training in different scenarios is frequent for all emergency response teams and therefore 
this reaction was not anticipated from a designated command position. Training in this 
case may not have a significant focus on, or include the loss of the leader (through panic, 
loss of communication or even injury) in the incident, as suggested of military training 
(Ramthun & Matkin, 2014). As stated earlier, teams would expect leaders to be confident 
and competent in their role, give the appearance of it or revert to the trained responses of 
a scenario that was nearest in nature to the incident. The response described places 
doubt on the experience level and exposure, or lack of, of the leader to the pressure of 
incidents requiring immediate action.  
The previous verbatim quote suggests that this working environment is in a top-down 
leadership structure, which has influence on the levels of responsibility felt by the team 
members and is a potential barrier to speaking up. Leading on from this point is the feeling 
from the team when communication from the leader is deemed incorrect. The reaction of 
the team seems to be based on firstly the level of the leader’s reaction (panic) and 
secondly, the respect and trust that the team have currently for that person in that role. As 
previously mentioned, the experience of some team members of working at incidents and 
their level of exposure to danger is considerably higher than the designated leader or the 
command in overall charge. The more experienced team members in the focus groups 
found this a challenge in terms of trust and respect for the leader and this has the 
potential to influence the necessity for a voice culture, where their experience in some 
instances could inform decision making during incidents.  
 
Ramthun and Matkin (2014) describe how military teams experience issues where the 
leader makes a mistake, describing some incidents of flight crews when things have gone 
wrong. They acknowledge that the military rely heavily on contingency planning before 
engaging but also acknowledge that this is not possible for every incident. In this case, the 
leader appears to panic, as there is no pause for planning and contingency, throwing the 
team into reciprocal panic.   
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What is interesting is the finding that experienced team members who had significant 
exposure to these types of incidents, responded to the panic of the leader with reciprocal 
panic by just doing as they were told. In a culture of accepted directional leadership, such 
as the military, this is perhaps anticipated, but there appears to be a dichotomy between 
the conditioning of being part of a rank structure (doing as you are told) and working in a 
team where you might need to step in or up and display leadership (even if it’s not their 
designated role).  
The next sub-theme in this section is the process of ‘enabling trust’. This is discussed 
under the theme of expectations of leadership as an essential process of leadership in 
dangerous contexts. Trust is discussed in literature as important in teams, however, there 
are differing elements emerging from this study based on the constantly changing 
dynamic of threats present in the working environment for emergency response teams. 
4.5.2 Enabling Trust 
Further discussions around leader traits, included the need for leaders to be credible role 
models for the team. Trust, conceptualised here as a leadership process, has been briefly 
referred to in several other themes so far. Often linked to discussions regarding cohesion, 
trust has been reviewed in literature in teams, but primarily from the perspective of the 
leader and the necessity to enact behaviours that instil trust in team members.  
Discussion regarding trust in this study, however, appears from several different 
perspectives in team working: trust in the leader, trust in self, intra-team trust and trust 
from the leader.  I refer to these dynamics as team trust. Trust as a theme warrants its 
own discussion as an important element of understanding how danger can influence 
leadership.  
During discussions of trust, one team states how trust is developed between their team 
members, stating, ‘because we depended on each other, and looked out for each other, 
that builds trust and cohesion’ (FG4 PFA). In dangerous contexts, the team state that 
there is a dependence on each other. Dependence in this instance relates to the trust in 
each other in their application of knowledge to a situation and looking out for each other, 
meaning that they make decisions that will not put each other in harm’s way.  
When working in danger, team members learn that they can rely on their team-mates to 
do this, thereby building trust and a cohesive bond. In relation to attending incidents, 
leaders of teams assert that trust between the team is critical in dangerous situations, 
stating: 
 ‘you have to have trust in each other, otherwise you’ll have a big problem’ (FG4 
PFA).  
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‘I think we’re good in that we are open and we do have trust between each other.  
You can’t dictate the situation in the house from outside the house.  You can’t 
micro-manage every situation.  You have to be able to say “I need that house 
cleared” and trust the team you are sending in’ (FG4 PFA) 
 
‘It helps with trust doesn’t it? and it helps to make sure you’re doing it right and 
safely, because you’re not just worried about getting yourself hurt, you’re worried 
about the repercussions on your team’ (FG5 PFA) 
 
‘You’ve then got trust in the fact that they considered all those things. It then 
breaks down the trust if you were in the same sort of situation again. How can you 
take for granted all those things that you did take for granted?’ (FG6 HART) 
 
‘Decisions trust. You want to know that you can ask a question to whoever it might 
be, a team leader, and want to know that they’re going to make the right decisions 
quickly and communicate those to you’ (FG6 HART) 
 
‘you should be able to give people who are working the trust that me or XXX is 
looking after safety, so they don’t have to worry about their safety’ (FG6 HART). 
 
All teams indicated that trust was an essential component in dangerous contexts. One of 
the most prominent issues around trusting the team to do their job was about the safety of 
team members and ensuring that all team members were aware of potential 
repercussions of their actions. FG4 PFA described how there can be a sudden loss of 
control in leadership, and highlight that this is where the concept of team trust is essential. 
Similarly, the fire service discussed house fires and how there is a sudden loss of 
leadership control when their team enters a building. Once they are through the door, 
there is nothing more the designated leader can do. If the team have not been properly 
briefed or given the correct information then this can create a big problem for them from a 
safety perspective. For example, if they were told there was no-one in the building, they 
would make a different plan of entry on that basis. When they are in the building, if they 
then hear a shout from someone, instinct is to go to that person. Therefore, the plan 
changes in-situ, rapidly, and communicating is challenged.  
In this example, the implications for leadership is that team members must be able to take 
this control in-situ, to step in. The findings from this study suggest that despite working in 
a hierarchical structure of leadership, incident dynamics mean that it cannot be purely 
directive in approach. In this example, leadership responsibility for the team and the 
processes employed under the conditions of that incident is delegated to the team 
members going into the burning building. This is the case for all emergency teams, where 
all had examples of ‘leaving’ the leader to complete the rescue.  Examining trust in this 
instance; if something happens at an incident to create distrust within the team, it is 
difficult to regain this. 
Teams acknowledge that in-situ, if a mistake is made, there is little opportunity to re-
assess or change your mind. The time frame between decisions and actions can be 
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seconds and therefore the consequence of the action made is the one the team must deal 
with. Post- incident, there is an opportunity to debrief and this is the time to question 
decisions and to challenge the sequence of events. The teams are keen to learn from any 
mistakes made or simply recognise where they could have performed better.  
Reference to honesty is made several times by teams. As mentioned previously, issues of 
trust are raised if the team do not believe that the leader, command or other team 
members are being honest. If this happens it is possible that teams will not take 
opportunities to challenge decisions, as their understanding of the individual is that they 
will not be truthful about events. These comments imply there must be a level of openness 
and honesty fostered by the style of leadership in the teams, to achieve this dynamic. 
In FG6 HART, the concept of trusting other team members is raised. Teams need to trust 
the leader but they also need to feel capable themselves. There is a need to feel like they 
are trusted to do the job; that the leader has confidence in their abilities. It is trust from the 
leader to the team. The leader must be able to trust and depend on the team’s ability to do 
the job. Conversely, in the case of clearing a house from a firearms perspective, the team 
must have an inherent trust in their leader. They must believe that the leader would not 
knowingly send them into an incident or scene that they knew was dangerous, or that they 
were not equipped to deal with. 
If trust is lost during an incident as in the example described, it creates further issues for 
leadership and decision making during the remainder of the incident; it disturbs the 
equilibrium of team dynamics.  As stated in the previous quote by FG4 and its subsequent 
analysis about building trust and cohesion, it will be unlikely that the leader would 
delegate responsibility to team members in the future or until further training is received. 
In the case of all incidents, whoever is leader, team members feel that trust in the 
decision-making ability of the person in control is essential. 
These comments clarify that they identify as a team and therefore mistakes affect the 
whole team and the teams’ professional image. The term ‘trust’ emerges in this statement 
implying that the team are under threat of making mistakes. Similar to the leader not 
putting them in the situation again, team members are concerned that the other team 
members will think they cannot make the right call and will not put them in the position of 
making a decision of that type again.  Several teams described how they felt more 
confident in their leadership if mistakes were admitted and learned. Trust was developed 
between team members by teams having the ability to do this, learn from the 
consequences and move forward.  
The designated command leadership role is often in a ‘removed’ position from the 
incident. All team leaders in the focus groups described how their role was primarily to 
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have an overarching view of the team members, what they were doing, how they were 
doing it and to gather incident intelligence to disseminate where appropriate.  Trust is 
often placed on the designated leadership position to keep communication and 
intelligence flowing. Depending on the type of incident, this can sometimes mean putting 
their lives in the leader’s hands.  
For example, identifying the location of an armed suspect whilst searching an area. There 
is often air support, information from the public and ground command support. The 
information may be relayed by helicopter to the team leader on the ground, who then 
relays the information to the team members. The information containing the location and 
situation of the armed suspect must be as accurate as possible to avoid team members 
walking into an extremely dangerous situation with no contingency, opportunity to plan 
how to apprehend, or find a method of escape. 
If communication to the teams suddenly halted during the incident because the leader was 
unsure of the next moves, this would be a problem. The expectation of the leader would 
be to relay this issue so the teams would know to stand still or back. Schmutz et al (2018) 
describe the difficulties of reflection in the heat of the moment in healthcare emergency 
teams. There is the potential for leaders to freeze or panic because they are unsure what 
to do and therefore communication stops, or, communication may stop because they are 
reflecting and thinking of a solution.  
Both scenarios’ mean that the team is vulnerable to threat. Ramthun and Matkin (2014) 
acknowledge that this is when a ‘speak up’ culture is important. Their concept of ‘mutual 
influence’ (Ramthun and Matkin, 2014), is pivotal in averting disaster, where a team 
member may step in at that moment and take the lead. The next section examines the 
concept of accountability and how this emerges as a leadership process in dangerous 
contexts. 
4.5.3 Leadership Accountability  
Assuming responsibility emerged as a leadership process, also described as ‘being 
accountable’ and as a result, looking after the wellbeing of the team. The teams 
understand leadership as being expected to take responsibility for the team. ‘One of the 
major challenges is if something goes wrong, It’s massive. It comes back to whoever is in 
charge’ (FG5 PFA). This is an expected finding as ‘setting direction’ is an identified 
leadership process (Morgeson et al, 2010), associated with defining objectives and 
establishing goals. 
Teams are looking for someone to take charge of a situation and take responsibility for the 
decision made in difficult circumstances. Leaders are viewed as requiring strength of 
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character as they need to withstand scrutiny of their decisions from a range of 
stakeholders, including the public and media. If the leader is unable to make decisions, 
due to a fear of getting it wrong, this was viewed as a significant challenge to operational 
performance: 
‘Someone had fallen badly over a waterfall onto the rocks...the inherent danger in 
that task was enormous. You’ve got helicopters overhead, you’ve got slippery 
rocks, you’ve got water, you’ve got injured people and the pressure to get that 
person out starts to take over’ (FG2 MR) 
 
XXX said one of the biggest things we are looking for from a leader is 
decisiveness, but another thing is responsibility for decision making’ (FG4 PFA) 
 
‘It comes back to them officially because they’re the ones that said this is what 
we’re going to do. It’s a big thing on their shoulders to get things right and to make 
sure that they’ve thought of everything’ (FG5 PFA) 
 
‘I think in that way there’s probably pressure on if you’re working to someone 
who’s a lot more senior to you; there’s pressure on them’ (FG5 PFA) 
 
‘It comes back to the leadership.  If you have the responsibility overseeing, and 
you really believe this is a replica firearm, why have you got fully armed cops on 
the scene?  And a full siege model’ (FG4 PFA) 
 
‘There’s public pressure as well on top of you. So, if you get a job like that, where 
there’s hundreds of people standing round and you’re thinking ‘it’s too dangerous 
to go in there’, there’s that moral pressure, public pressure to go in, take a risk. 
Probably like the twin towers, they probably knew they were going to their deaths, 
but they had to get in there and be seen to be doing it’ (FG7 FS). 
 
 
There is a conflict present between taking responsibility for the team, their safety and the 
pressure that is ‘on top’ of the team at a dangerous incident. Teams want to be effective 
and resolve the situation, but in dangerous contexts, there is often a moral conflict 
between what is the correct course of action (not going in a burning building if it is too 
dangerous), and the expected course of action (feeling of having to go in because the 
public are expecting teams to take the risk to save others). Pressure is an added 
complexity for leadership and does not only emerge from the command structure or 
professional codes of conduct; it can be from multiple additional sources such as the 
public at an incident. This resonated with many of the teams. Public pressure can also 
intensify threat levels at an incident, with many people comes additional complexity and 
unpredictability.  
From the previous example, pressure on team members emerged from multiple sources 
within an incident, either to be perceived to be doing the ‘right thing’, which is itself highly 
subjective, or just to be seen to be doing something.  This action could go against better 
judgement; as there are many perceptions of what outcomes are ‘possible’. Responses 
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may be a reaction to a combination of these stimuli, which has significant implications for 
leadership, as these external influences are dynamic and largely uncontrollable.  
The above examples help to explain how the level of pressure on team members may 
invoke a ‘superhero’ response, as discussed earlier in the presentation of data around 
danger.  There is an overwhelming pressure to extract another human being from harm, 
as they know no-one else can or will.  There is, however, an inherent fragility and 
internalised conflict to this, as the team members are not, as they acknowledge, 
impervious to physical or mental harm. 
Although challenges to leadership have been addressed throughout the chapter so far, 
the next section specifically focuses on key challenges to leadership, caused by danger. 
4.5.4 Challenges to leadership in dangerous contexts 
This section presents detailed findings of how leadership operates in teams in dangerous 
contexts. This is grounded in teams’ construction of danger, perceptions of leadership, 
and what constitutes effective leadership in emergency service teams. Continuing the 
conversation around danger, and its influence on danger, one team stated: 
‘It challenges it, to see whether that person can cope or can’t cope. In that sort of 
situation, its sink or swim or maybe just float around in the middle. A good leader 
will swim quite easily and someone who’s not so good will sink’ (FG5 FS). 
 
Danger challenges leadership; all teams stated this.  The above extract demonstrates the 
expectation from the team that leaders must personally cope with danger, with the 
concept that ‘good’ leaders are able to cope. This relating of mental strength and effective 
leadership relates back to the concept of a ‘type’ of individual being appropriate for these 
teams. It is important to remind the reader why there is focus placed on these specialist 
teams. These teams adopt a unique identity distinguishing them from other areas of the 
emergency services. They have a belief that they are the elite, stating: 
‘All of these have much more experience than the normal cop on the street. So 
you find that if these turn up, the normal cop on the street will generally step back 
at let us lead because we have more experience in first aid or dealing with people 
who are mentally ill – we’ve got more experience than them - these would lead in 
that kind of situation’ (FG5 PFA). 
 
The issue with this concept of being elite is the potential for over-confidence.  One of the 
biggest challenges to leadership in dangerous contexts is uncertainty, created by 
ambiguity in dynamically unfolding situations (Good & Sharma, 2010). The challenge for 
leadership is to employ processes that seek to remove ambiguous elements of a context 
as uncertainty disrupts the normal enactment of operational procedures. When teams are 
working in danger, unexpected events can suddenly occur, presenting issues for the 
normal provision of leadership. The next section explores this. 
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4.5.5 Dealing with uncertainty  
The discussions in the focus groups suggest that the teams ‘expect’ particular types of 
incident, such as knife attacks or people brandishing a gun, stating, ‘you just get 
conditioned to it. Maybe you shouldn’t, maybe take it a different way but it’s just you’re 
expecting to go to it’ (FG3 FS). Described earlier as tangible incidents; the danger is 
measurable. For example, PFA described that once the perpetrator has been contained, 
the team has procedural options for capturing and detaining them; and is trained 
extensively for such incidents. In many cases, the perpetrator will do exactly what the 
team has anticipated.  
The teams are conditioned to respond to certain likely responses from perpetrators. The 
benefit to this is that ‘expected’ behaviours enable the team able to pre-plan responses 
en-route to the scene, enhancing cohesive action. The issue with this, which the teams in 
the study are aware of, is danger from unanticipated and unexpected circumstances 
rather than those they are trained for.  
In FG2 MR, the term ‘out of the ordinary’ was used, meaning that this type of incident was 
not something that they would expect or anticipate. The clear implication being that teams 
are not able to pre-plan or train for all these types of circumstances.  FG6 provide an 
example of how, despite having numerous procedures to counteract danger, danger can 
manifest unexpectedly in a real-life situation: 
‘For me it’s something that’s not necessarily controllable by procedures that we’ve 
got. So, you go to a car accident on a busy main road or a motorway, you know 
the sort of things you need to do to keep yourself out of danger, moving traffic and 
things like that; but a say a house fire, it could change in an instant. Where you 
have no control over it. To me, that’s what constitutes a dangerous situation. 
Where the variables are not necessarily controllable’. 
 
‘Possibly something that goes way beyond your procedures which you may have 
to rely on experience to deal with, the experience of the crew, operational 
discretion again’ (FG6 FS) 
 
‘It’s unknown as well isn’t it? You are going into an unknown, so you have to try 
and mitigate that every time. You do not know what you are up against. I think that 
is the thing. You don’t know what’s going to happen or what could happen’ (FG7 
FS). 
 
 
There appears to be an inherent conflict between the team self-belief in their training and 
preparedness, and their awareness that they will still be subject to the unexpected.  
Significant focus is placed by teams on the unknown and what they can’t predict; namely 
those incidents that fall outside of procedure. The implication for leadership is the 
unexpected creates additional ambiguity and uncertainty in the team members, in 
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response to a perceived lack of control.  This perception appears well founded as 
dangerous contexts are prone to uncontrollable events with many changeable variables to 
be considered and are usually accompanied with no prior information. FG7 FS states this, 
indicating that they often don’t know what they are going to face and therefore are unable 
to pre-plan tactics, often needing to try to mitigate (or adapt to the circumstance) on 
scene. 
As a working principle, teams working in dangerous contexts believe that they need to 
establish control of the situation to resolve the incident quickly and safely. FG7 FS 
provided an example of when they consider a context to be dangerous, stating, ‘where 
you have no control over it. To me, that’s what constitutes a dangerous situation. Where 
the variables are not necessarily controllable’ (FG7 FS). Dealing with the unknown puts 
team members under additional pressure, with concerns expressed of not being able to 
assure good outcomes, due to lack of control and clarity. Supporting this assertion, FG2 
MR describes circumstances where they were placed in danger without warning and 
without upfront information to enable them to prepare: 
 
‘One occasion when we were searching around XXX in XXX, we’d been out 
looking for this chap who’d slipped out of there, and we’d been searching for quite 
a while in dark fields sort of just shining a torch round. Then a message comes 
over the radio to get everyone in as quickly as you can because it was suddenly 
brought to the controller’s attention that the person was actually dangerous and 
wouldn’t want to be found and we shouldn’t be out there looking for them. That’s 
the unexpected.’ 
 
‘Nothing happens on the town moor’…until cows start running at you. Nothing 
prepares you for that. I was working with an ex-dog handler… he said he’d never 
been so terrified because all you could hear was the thundering of them and you’re 
spinning round to see where they’re coming from. There’s no amount of 
preparation you’ve ever done before.’ 
 
‘We had a missing person, thought possibly to be in the Tyne. This was shortly 
after storm Desmond. We had teams out, dog teams on the river for about 8-10 
hours, it had got dark. The guys wanted to go and do a last stretch. They’d started 
to do that and basically, they were losing control… this is starting to get 
dangerous. So we pulled them out’ (FG2 MR). 
 
 
The first example here states ‘nothing prepares you for that’. Throughout this findings 
chapter, incidents provided as examples of danger are predominantly where something 
unanticipated during the incident has occurred or there has been ‘A dynamic change. You 
never know what you’re going to’ (FG7 FS).  
The findings here however, indicate that danger is not a deterrent to action. Team 
members will often find themselves in dangerous and unexpected circumstances. A 
particularly interesting finding, however, is that despite not always being prepared, teams 
will put themselves in dangerous situations with the purpose of mitigating a sudden 
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unknown change in the incident. This is often to prevent harm to others, and supports the 
finding of teams referring to themselves as ‘superheroes’; ‘the situation could expand to 
involve other people or things and you’ve got to take mitigating action to stop that, which 
may or may not mean putting yourself in danger to stop that’ (FG7 FS). 
 
In this instance, the fire services call a sudden or evolving changing situation, ‘dynamic’. 
This is a term that is also used procedurally, as all emergency services conduct ‘dynamic 
risk assessments’. This is a formalised procedure which takes place pre-incident.  It is a 
form of scenario planning where all perceived potential risks are assessed. Teams will 
draw from their experience and personal knowledge of situations to make judgements 
about the risks involved in these scenarios and ‘we’ll very quickly come up with some 
contingencies and some options’ (FG5 PFA). 
However, the intrinsic nature of a ‘dynamic change’ means that dangers may not be 
foreseen and therefore there is the need for ongoing and continuous dynamic risk 
assessment throughout the incident to mitigate risk.  
The exploration of how emergency response teams understand leadership in dangerous 
contexts has generated emergent findings regarding dealing with the unexpected, and the 
unique pressures placed on the teams to respond to uncertainty in dynamically unfolding 
situations. This informs the teams’ expectations of leadership.  
Although specific focus on leadership ‘traits’ and ‘behaviours’, such as being calm, 
rational, clear and concise are not in the scope of the study, it has been essential to make 
reference to these and their relationship between leadership expectations and leadership 
processes, to honour the participant voice (Ponciano, 2013), because teams use these 
terms to construct what they mean by leadership and how by employing these traits, 
enables leadership to operate in dangerous contexts.  Next, the final theme presented in 
this chapter focuses on the process of fluid leadership, discussing how leadership 
emerges in response to danger. 
4.6 Fluid Leadership  
 
The teams’ construction of danger in the previous section informs the following analysis of 
leadership across the teams when facing danger. Themes emerging from discussions 
around incidents in the focus groups are integrated with processes identified in the 
subsequent process card exercise.  Specifically, diagrams replicated from the 
photographs taken of the outcome of each process card exercise are integrated to support 
the findings of the focus group transcripts. Supporting narratives are provided to enhance 
the reader’s understanding of how leadership in teams in dangerous contexts is enacted.  
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This section aims to answer the fourth and final research sub-question 
‘What are the leadership processes of teams working in dangerous contexts?’  
Previous sections in this chapter have presented team’s construction of danger and the 
influence of danger on leadership. This section presents themes addressing how 
leadership has emerged in response to the influence of danger, its “unique causes and 
contingencies” (Hannah et al, 2009, p.898) and the context in which teams operate. It is 
useful to briefly remind the reader how the data was collected, as my method of collection 
and analysis supports my justification for the presentation of ‘fluid leadership’.   
Each focus group engaged in the team discussing a dangerous incident that they had 
worked in. Themes emerged through an inductive analysis of the transcripts of the 
incident discussion. Justification for this approach is embedded in the literature.  Although 
focus is on identifying what processes emerge during incidents (Baran & Scott, 2010), it is 
also on how leadership emerges in dangerous contexts, the types of leadership, and 
processes wherein leadership is ‘enacted’. 
Klein et al (2006) presented four different types of leadership as emerging in their study of 
emergency trauma teams as a framework to explain how leadership and leadership 
processes appeared in those teams. Similarly, I have represented leadership as three 
emergent types to address the complex interplay of styles, types and non-linear social 
processes of leadership that emerged as part of the data analysis process.   
The themes emerging in this section are: self-directed leadership, where the concepts of 
autonomy and responsibility for self are discussed; adaptive leadership, where focus is 
placed on social processes of risk assessing, sense making, and dynamic decision 
making; and the process of shared leadership, where changing leadership style, leader 
rotation, and the process of leadership through knowledge and experience is examined in 
detail.  
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Table 4.5 – Summary table for the category ‘Fluid leadership’ 
Category Theme Sub-theme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fluid Leadership  
 
Self-directed leadership 
Autonomy in team 
Responsibility for self in incidents 
 
Adaptive leadership 
Continuous risk assessment and 
evaluation 
Sense Making for adaptive 
response 
Dynamic decision making 
 
Shared leadership 
Leader and leadership rotation 
Leadership through knowledge and 
experience  
 
Previous and recent studies in teams in dangerous contexts have described leadership as 
shared (Burke et al, 2018), distributed (Gronn, 2002), or adaptive (Marion & Uhl-bien, 
2010) and each is discussed in isolation. In this study, fluid leadership is conceptualised 
as a series of dynamic interchanges; consisting of types of leadership and leadership as a 
set of dynamic inter-related processes. Hence fluid leadership is presented as a category 
containing these leadership styles, and sub-themes.  
These emergent types of leadership are in addition to the concept of directional 
leadership, in recognition of an existing hierarchical structure in every emergency service 
and the identification of a designated leader. The first emergent type of leadership 
discussed is self-directed leadership. 
4.6.1 Self-Directed Leadership 
The necessity for teams to lead themselves became a prominent theme emerging from 
the data and was one of the most densely coded areas of the analysis. Despite the nature 
of working closely as a team, complexity is added when they acknowledge that team 
members as individuals are also ‘autonomous practitioner[s]’ (FG6 HART). HART team 
members are viewed and view themselves this way because they are all trained as 
paramedics and are used to working independently.   
They gained this medical expertise separately from working in their current team, and as 
an operational paramedic, they were trained to work independently as well as part of a 
crew (usually a two-person crew).  Teams working in dangerous contexts have been 
established as tightly bonded. This concept of autonomous operation, however, suggests 
that even in a highly cohesive team, members retain significant independence. In addition 
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to this independence, teams believe in some part that because of this and the fact they 
work as a specialist team, and have more exposure to dangerous incidents, they need 
less formal leadership. One team stated, ‘we don’t need that much leadership’ (FG6 
HART). In this example, the team indicated that they understand leadership as coming 
from a designated leader. I interpret this statement as meaning that the team does not 
believe they require much leadership from the command structure.   
There is a conflict in this understanding when they face danger; in that teams originally 
stated that directive leadership is present throughout.  It is possible that in dangerous 
contexts this is largely self-directed leadership, whereby the team is making authoritative 
decisions based on their experience.  
Team members across all the teams may be tasked to do different roles on scene at an 
incident. Teams cross-train in doing a range of different roles in order to be able to take 
over from other team members.  In this regard, they take charge of that role and the 
responsibilities that fall within that role, and therefore they essentially retain their 
independence on a task-by-task basis.  This is useful as during an incident, they may be 
required to rotate roles and responsibilities due to circumstances.  If one team member 
becomes incapacitated due to equipment or communication failure, another team member 
can swiftly assume the task. Previous findings stated have already established that this 
can often happen seamlessly, through team interaction and without necessarily relying on 
verbal communication, thus recognising that as a social process, communication goes 
beyond verbal interaction. 
Retaining independence in-situ leads to the potential issue of multiplicity of voices being 
present on scene, with differing opinions. FG6 HART state that due to the nature of 
working in teams with designated leaders and rank structures, their suggestions as a team 
may lack weight in decision making. Their view is ‘that can make it very difficult because 
everyone has got an opinion…and a valid opinion but at the end of the day, it has to be 
one voice sometimes’ (FG6 HART).  Multiple voices can lead to conflict and confusion on 
scene. The role of the leader is to organise the path for the right voices to be heard at the 
right time, and to help remove conflict and provide clarity on the decisions made. 
Reducing confusion and creating clarity is dependent on the leadership style of the 
designated leader. If their leadership style is directional and top-down throughout an 
incident, this is perceived as being unlikely to be achieved. Clarity in dangerous contexts 
is paramount to making decisions and achieved by ensuring the team all know and 
understand the situation. Clarity is essential, but so is the availability and knowledge of 
alternative options for action. It is established that teams defer to the more experienced 
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team members for situational input. Where this does not take place, optimal options can 
be missed. 
 
Self-directive leadership emerges strongly in the team discussions particularly when 
discussing larger scale incidents. This appears to be a process embedded in every 
incident that the teams attend.  Based on the size and complexity of some incidents, such 
as a larger fire in different sections of a building, the team may be spread out or split away 
from the rest of the team. For the team to operate and conclude the job successfully, there 
must be room for individual team members to retain their independent thinking, whilst 
working alone, with the ability to make their own decisions. Often this is due to time critical 
situations and difficulty in communicating at incidents if the team is spread out.  In many 
cases the teams agree that: 
 
‘Yes, just do it. We don’t stand at the back of the vehicle and wait to be tasked, we 
task ourselves’ (FG1 HART) 
 
‘What we’ve got is a lot of experience, so you don’t really need that level of a 
person acting up as they all know their individual jobs that they have to do’ (FG5 
PFA) 
 
‘We get like a basic sort of direction from whoever’s in charge that day but once 
we’ve been told ‘this is going to happen’ we tend to be like get on and not 
micromanaged’ (FG6 FS) 
 
‘If you are first on scene, you have to perform that leadership, make those dynamic 
risk assessments, on yourself’ (FG6 HART). 
 
 
Based on training and experience, teams point out that they generally know their jobs at 
an incident.  In this case, inexperience does not mean that there is no self-leadership. 
Each team member is capable of leadership, working without directional command and 
will be accountable for their actions. The next section addresses the concept of adaptive 
leadership and the sub-themes that relate to this theme. 
4.6.2 Adaptive Leadership 
In order to navigate complex systems, leaders must stay ahead of the complex demands. 
Hannah et al, (2013, p.393) state that as a result, leaders must possess “a requisite level 
of complexity that allows them to perceive and assess these complex and changing 
dynamics”.  This study recognises that as the complexities of work environments expand, 
so to must the capabilities of leaders to adapt and challenge the existing processes and 
seek to utilise those that enable and support leadership in these contexts. Yukl and 
Mahsud (2010) focus firmly on the behavioural flexibilities of leaders in context but also 
discuss the importance of disruptive events as being influential to the adaptive 
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development of leaders. This approach has been found to be limited in the current 
literature, and therefore this study has sought to explore this adaptability. 
The following processes were identified as sub-themes that support the capacity of 
leadership in dangerous contexts, emerging from data; Sense making, dynamic decision 
making and risk assessment and evaluation. The themes contain several sub-processes 
which are also discussed. The first for discussion is sense making as a process of 
leadership. 
4.6.3 Sense making 
Individual sense making is a process which receives some attention in the literature 
discussing leadership in dangerous contexts (Baran & Scott, 2010). Conversely, social 
components of sense making emerged from this study. Concepts which prompted 
discussion were primarily groupthink and the process of collective sense making in teams, 
which have received little attention in the literature. This section begins by presenting the 
understanding that teams need to understand what is required of them; ‘if you’re tasking a 
team, they’ve got to understand what they’ve got to achieve’ (FG1 HART). 
 
Teams facing dangerous contexts need to collectively make sense of what is happening 
(Uhl-Bien, 2010). This process is to ensure that all the team are working together to a 
clearly stated goal. An interesting sub-theme of this study is the concept of Groupthink 
(Kayes, 1996). An example of this was discussed in one focus group but the concept of 
‘things haven’t gone quite as they should have done’ resonated across all the teams: 
‘Thinking about specific incidents, I can think of two in the last year where things 
haven’t gone quite as they should have done. So whilst I agree we have all these 
processes and procedures in place, we tackle them very professionally, there is 
this …it might be described as ‘group think’ you get in to when doing this. As a 
group, we’re all going with that, and we don’t necessarily challenge’ (FG2 MR). 
 
Groupthink can be a positive phenomenon as it means that the team are thinking 
coherently as a collective. This is useful for teams facing danger, as this chapter has 
established, based on the cohesiveness of teams where sometimes communication is not 
even needed.  When a team are so in tune with each other, this presents some really 
useful opportunities for leadership as the job will be done without question and every 
member of the team knows and understands where they need to be, and what is expected 
from them.  
In the example provided, this can also present some challenges. If Groupthink is 
conceptualised as a process of enabling leadership in dangerous contexts, this process 
can lead to a lack of challenge to leadership. In previous studies of disasters, this lack of 
challenge has proved fatal.  On scene, the emergency services do not challenge decision 
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making unless there is an obvious threat associated with that decision. Challenge may be 
reserved until post-incident, with the implication that adaptive processes may not be 
enabled.  
The problem with groupthink is that threats may not be challenged, nor recognised. 
Groupthink as a process challenges the team’s ability to see beyond their goal and look 
further than the immediate decisions.  This is exacerbated where experience is perceived 
as leadership and decisions are instinctively trusted. Scenario planning may become 
overly narrow if the team have no concept that an incident can go another way. In this 
case, groupthink is a potential problem.  
Another example of how this phenomenon manifests in teams is where teams internalise 
information sharing, excluding outside influence. 
‘You’ve been bombarded with information up to that point, but on the ground it’s 
that discussion with your partner as to how you deal with the situation.  It’s our 
world.  When another car comes into our world, it’s then how the four of you deal 
with the situation’ (FG4 PFA) 
 
‘if we go to any incident, we’ll always talk to the sergeant first, and he’ll give us 
directions on this is what I want you to do and this is what’s going to happen’ (FG5 
PFA) 
 
‘It’s actively encouraged for people to voice their opinions and sometimes those 
opinions are taken and sometimes they’re not, which is what advice is all about, 
ultimately’ (FG7 FS). 
 
A key concept is ‘our world’. If the team believe that what is happening is within their 
world, then their thoughts and opinions and decisions will be the ones that count. This can 
exclude the seeking of external sources of information which could prove vital. Prediction 
based on experience in this case could lead to potential complacency of teams and a lack 
of adaptive capacity when attending incidents where they believe the ‘expected’ will occur. 
Sense making literature refers to the process of helping teams to remove ambiguity. White 
and Shullman (2010) focus on the leader’s effectiveness and ability to deal with differing 
degrees of ambiguity. In this study, it has become apparent that leadership is viewed as 
being about removing ambiguity rather than helping to make sense of it. Leadership is 
therefore situated in the team rather than within an individual.  
There is, however, acknowledgement by the teams that in adapting to dynamic change, 
there is the need to seek to break with preconceptions and conditioning.   
‘Every incident is different. You try and put the skills that you’ve learnt or gained 
into other incidents, but there could be something at one incident that’s just a little 
bit different, you can’t use the tool that you wanted to, and then you have to adapt, 
improvise and overcome’ (FG3 FS). 
Page 164 of 273 
 
 
Sense making is therefore a dynamic process which is essential to responding to change, 
adapting and leading the team towards an effective and positive result. The next sub-
theme discusses this as dynamic decision making. 
4.6.4 Dynamic Decision Making 
Decision Making is a theme that emerged as an adaptive process, supporting the 
literature in this area (Good and Sharma, 2010). Decision making is addressed by the 
teams as a key leadership process, ‘for me the definition of leadership in that critical 
situation is that ability to make the decision’ (FG4 PFA). This section addresses decision 
making both as a collective, and in terms of there being levels of decision making within 
an incident.  
A finding of this study is that decision making is not a linear process, made at identifiable 
points within an incident by the leader. The process of decision making appears to be far 
more fluid, moving from one person to another depending upon the incident and the 
expertise of the team.  A unique complexity is that decision making is often made within 
limited time constraints in dangerous incidents; ‘it’s over in 30 seconds.  But in that 30 
seconds there’ll be a million and one decisions by the team’ (FG4 PFA). Based on this 
comment, time is a key factor influencing leadership in emergency response teams. This 
study conceptualises decision making as a dynamic process of leadership. In dangerous 
incidents, the pressure to make decisions becomes paramount. In a normal general team 
working context, the repercussions of a failure to make the right decision is not life or 
death.  
 
‘within the team the people who rise to the top when the decision needs to be 
made, and there’s not someone there to make that decision for the group of 
people’  
 
‘That’s the ethos we strive for.  We want everyone in the team to feel they have the 
power to make those decisions ‘(FG4 PFA). 
 
Some people are better at making decisions and some people are more risk 
adverse’ (FG5 PFA) 
 
There’s a lot of levels to work through when you are decision making in a time 
critical situation, that might be quite challenging’ (FG6 HART) 
 
 ‘Each person on a watch has to be a decision maker as well. The way we train is 
sometimes very sterile, black and white. When you go to an incident that dissolves 
into various shades of grey’ (FG7 FS). 
 
 
These examples describe how all team members need to be able to carry out the process 
of decision making throughout an incident. FG4 implies a difference in thinking to what 
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was expected from teams facing danger; that risk aversion can be difficult to overcome, 
particularly in incidents which are often time and resource critical. The person who is risk 
averse may in fact create more risk to the team through delaying decision making. A 
situation may rapidly become worse necessitating mitigating action.  
Further to this, where decisions are coming from a person off-site (remotely) this may 
mean that team members may need to adjust these decisions as the incident unfolds. 
What is different about this process is that it is described as something that even training 
cannot teach, indicating that ‘it’s something you learn from an incident when you’re 
surrounded by people screaming, my kids are in there’ (FG3 FS).  Teams suggest that 
learning to make sense of a situation quickly is through the process of experience. This is 
the only way it can be contextualised.  
The pressures of this situation cannot be substituted in training for the real emotions of a 
mother whose children are trapped in a house fire. The decisions that are made could 
result in their death. All the teams find it difficult to detach from the decisions that need to 
be made. They believe their purpose is to be there to help and it is difficult when this isn’t 
possible. They face a great deal of emotion from those around them as they are not just 
drawing from each other to cope and understand the situation. However, the teams assert 
that leadership within the team is a part of dealing with this:  
One thing that can be difficult for XXX in particular, is that you’ve got to make 
those decisions in quite contentious environments. You can be drawn in, you can 
be sucked in so easily by patients. People are there, they’re screaming help, they 
need treatment, you’re there to provide that treatment but sometimes that’s not the 
right thing to do’ (FG1 HART) 
 
‘When you are in a dangerous situation, it’s when someone has the ability to make 
quick-time decisions, because a lot of the time you’ll have a long period of 
intelligence gathering’ (FG4 PFA) 
 
‘A split-second decision you take on the ground will be pulled to bits and that is 
where the real leaders step forward, and clearly state what they want to happen’ 
(FG4 PFA) 
‘danger just makes it incredibly difficult to make the decisions sometimes, without 
all the information that could be available. You don’t have it to hand at that one 
given point so decision making is really difficult in dangerous situations’ (FG6 
HART) 
 
‘As the complexity or size of the incident increases we try and limit spans of control 
of the Incident commander to 5 to ensure he/she does not get information overload 
when making possible important life critical decisions’ (FG7 FS). 
 
It has been established that in large incidents a delegated leadership style is adopted, to 
manage the scope of control. Leadership decisions are made at varying levels of rank, 
expertise and experience, potentially all at one incident. Danger complicates decision 
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making at all these levels because of the unique challenges it presents. These comments 
show that danger invokes pressures on leadership decision making, such as time, lack of 
information and the level of complexity, proposing that leadership is the ability to make 
sense and adapt within this context.  Interestingly, one team stated that up until a decision 
was made regarding the action they would take, their feelings were heightened: 
‘That decision, it was at that point during the incident where I was in a car with 
three other guys, it was strange that with just that one decision, an element of calm 
descended on the whole situation’ (FG4 PFA). 
 
In this case, the commander had provided the options that they had and laid out what 
action should be taken in each eventuality. This resulted in the team knowing exactly what 
they needed to do in each scenario and there was a resultant calmness. In the case of a 
firearms incident, this decision removes the concern that the team will find themselves in a 
situation where they need to make the decision to shoot. Of course, there are times where 
that decision may not be made until the last minute. Concerns around this issue are valid 
as it is already acknowledged that procedurally, post incident, there are challenges made 
to decision making.  The leader is essentially a problem solver for the team.  
4.6.5 Problem Solving 
‘Solving problems’ in the literature is a recognised leadership process in teams. These 
findings show that solving a problem influences the immediate danger the team faces.  
Decisions taken to resolve a situation are perceived as having a clear result in reducing 
the level of threat to teams. 
‘you need to rely on them. You look to them to say am I doing this right and they’re 
hopefully helpful in saying yes you are’ (FG5 PFA). 
Continuous dynamic risk assessments, discussed above, are key to solving problems. 
Although this is procedural, it is also a social process. Risk assessments are based on 
knowledge of previous exposure to incidents. This knowledge enables leaders to ‘see’ 
unanticipated issues, often before they become an issue of endangerment.  This can 
provide solutions to problems and reassurance to team members with less experience. 
 
‘because if you’ve never been to a real incident before, this is your first time there 
– you just want that little bit of guidance, bit of reassurance to say yes that’s 
right’(FG5 PFA) 
 
‘We don’t want our guys coming in worried about doing their job.  Any concerns or 
hang-ups we need to help remove’ (FG4 PFA). 
 
Resolving problems that occur on scene is rarely done by one individual. Resolving issues 
is a collective process where the team have a voice and there is significant emphasis 
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placed on the team voicing their thoughts and opinions. The repercussions of this are 
stated: 
‘you may have to take someone’s life so for you, you have to know that everything 
is clear, so that when you make the decision, you are backed and doing what is 
asked of you, with no ambiguity’ (FG4 PFA) 
 
‘If you use the analogy, it’s very rare that parents make decisions that benefit only 
them and not the family.  Using that, if XXX and me are the parents, our decisions 
must be in the best interests of these guys’ (FG4 PFA). 
 
The process of thinking through problems and potential obstacles informs decision 
making, reducing uncertainty of action: 
 
‘Everyone knows what they are facing, everyone know what outcomes can come 
of it.  If he comes out with a gun, or he doesn’t come out with a gun, or he’s got it 
against someone’s head.  It’s knowing exactly what to do’ (FG4 PFA). 
 
This process is also useful if the team find themselves in an unanticipated dangerous 
circumstance: 
 
‘You just try and make sure that every step you take, you’re thinking ‘ok if I now 
slip, what’s going to happen and if what’s going to happen is I’m going to end up in 
the water, you don’t take that step…but that’s not a perfect situation, at night in the 
rain with a flood, with trees suddenly coming round the corner or whatever’ (FG2 
MR). 
 
Problem solving is an intrapersonal process, but as identified in this example, is also self-
directing. Team members continually risk assess and scenario plan to anticipate danger. 
This example demonstrates the potential dangers that sometimes occur when trying to 
help someone else. Awareness of the potential problems is essential, so scenario 
planning continues alongside making decisions to limit the danger. This may be based on 
knowledge, scene awareness, risk types, and available skills or equipment. 
When incidents don’t go according to plan or there has been a large incident, the 
debriefing process is where problems can be identified and resolved before the next 
incident. As previously discussed, the debrief is a procedural process that helps teams to 
identify problems and promote discussion to deconstruct and resolve them. 
4.6.6 Continuous risk assessment and evaluation 
A social process and theme to emerge, as discussed above, was assessment and 
evaluation. This has elements of ‘challenging the team’ (Morgeson et al, 2010), but is a 
more specific form of situational assessment to respond to danger. The main form of 
evaluation has been from risk assessments continuously performed during incidents. As a 
result, there has been continuous evaluation of the situation made at each stage. One 
team leader states: 
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‘Because we accomplish our goals, and in general we do it safely.  I think if you 
look across our deployments, our overarching goal is to do our job safely.  We 
understand there is a level of risk to what we do but if we are doing things safely, 
and we are getting the results, then we are effective’ (FG4 PFA). 
 
As this example demonstrates, evaluation is the team perception of whether they were 
effective, based specifically on whether they achieved the job safely. Teams referred often 
to following procedure, such as post-incident debriefing. Most teams acknowledged that a 
formal debrief was not always necessary after smaller scale or run-of-the-mill incidents.  
If the team had experienced a difficult job, they generally talk about it informally. However, 
after a large-scale incident or where there was a threat to life or firearm discharged, there 
would be a full formal debrief. These are viewed as challenging but are used as learning 
opportunities for future incidents. Debriefs offer the chance for procedures, actions and 
operational decisions to be scrutinised and updated. For example; 
‘You’ll be looked at under a microscope.  This is hard because it’s not something 
that you do often.  For that incident for some of the lads it was their first.  After your 
first post-incident your head is spinning’ (FG4 PFA).  
 
The teams acknowledge the purpose of the debrief is not to assign blame, although this 
could be an outcome if unjustified actions are taken but are to understand incidents and 
generate learning. All teams discussed reflection as a team process:  
‘Generally, if we have anything clinical which has involved a lot of the team, I’ll 
write a reflection on it. That’s just something I do for my own….like CPD almost. 
That’s shared amongst the group if anyone wants to read it. If you read their 
reflection, it’s probably different as they had a different job in that team. So I keep 
hold of things like that’ (FG1 HART) 
‘It wasn’t until about half an hour to forty five minutes later, after everything was 
finished, you’re thinking “actually, that was pretty close that like’ (FG4 PFA) 
 
‘We reflect after every job, we critically analyse ourselves. We’re really harsh on 
ourselves. We do it without even knowing we’re doing it. Have a job, we come 
back and we’re reiterating a job, or the whole teams there and we’re talking about 
a job and reflecting on it, looking at different sides’  
 
‘The culture of this department that you’re always critiquing what going on…..if you 
think in the back of your mind that you weren’t happy with where I was there then 
next time, you won’t do that. Self-critique as you go’ (FG5 PFA) 
 
‘Look at the failures there; you’ve got to reflect on the whole process’ (FG6 HART). 
 
This is not a formalised process, but one which they decided to do for the purposes of 
learning from incidents. FG4 show that reflecting is particularly important where there 
have been near misses or failures in order to learn and inform future decision-making 
processes.   
FG6 focus on viewing each incident as a whole. This is possibly so that the sequence of 
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how the incident unfolded and how decisions were made are transparent and potentially 
replicable. As a result, teams can seem harsh with their critical reflection of their own 
actions. Self-critiquing is viewed as being an essential element for personal growth in the 
team. Teams are quick to point out that this is now part of the culture of their team.  
Continuous learning, individually and as teams is an emergent social process. To self-
critique, team members seek peer feedback to analyse their thought processes that led to 
decisions made. Evaluating if there was something that could have been done differently 
is common across the teams. 
‘I don’t think there would be anything I would have done differently last time but 
you know, it was just, the knife that he pulled there, he could have come down and 
stabbed anyone. I don’t think you think about it until maybe after’  
 
‘To be honest at the time I don’t always know what I’m doing, in the moment.  
That’s how we learn, by challenging our mistakes.  We need to share that learning.  
It comes down to honesty.  It’s in the statement of values.  The process needs to 
be described accurately’ (FG4 PFA) 
 
 
‘They all give their bits about what they did and then me and XXX would say “yes 
that is great, yes that’s great, but maybes we could do this next time?’ (FG5 PFA) 
 
‘You’ve got to learn from past mistakes; you’ve got to be the type of person I think 
that’s willing to take on that learning’ (FG6 HART). 
 
Ensuring this learning process is continuous means they will retain this knowledge and 
experience moving forward which is essential for growth in the team. The process 
appears to be successful for the teams. Of relevance to this study is that they feel that 
evaluating all aspects of the incident, including themselves, is key to their effectiveness.  
 
Every team conducts a dynamic risk assessment of the incident as procedure. Gathering 
information about what is happening, how it has happened and establishing the risks 
based on a range of potential scenarios. If a team member arrives at an incident, they can 
find themselves in unanticipated difficult circumstances, and they may be the least 
experienced team member.  
Decision-making is a theme that has been addressed already in the chapter but in this 
case, there is significance raising it here because it’s an essential process to team 
members enacting self-directed leadership based on their own risk assessment and 
evaluation. The word ‘freedom’ used in the example below is unexpected due to the rank 
structure and heavy procedural parameters surrounding what these teams do. They also 
refer to ‘operational discretion’ which means that team members or the team can make 
decisions based on their own assessment of the situation. There is emphasis on their 
being able to provide explanation for these decisions and justification for choices made, 
they do not go unchallenged, but this is a post-incident process: 
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‘You have to be able to take some criticism without a doubt and you have to be 
strong enough to put your point across as well, but in the right manner’ (FG3 FS) 
 
 ‘Historically as a service we are quite unique.  We do have a rank structure, but 
the amount of freedom to use discretion and make your own decisions’  
 
‘if you are sent into the area, and the authority hasn’t been given, we are in as 
much danger as anyone else, as we aren’t armed at that point.  You might have to 
self-authorise that and make your own decision’ (FG5 PFA) 
 
‘Sometimes you’ve got to go against procedure to get the job done. If that means 
someone lives or dies, that’s sometime when you have to break that procedure. 
But then again, if you think someone’s going to get killed doing that, you think…’ 
(FG7 FS). 
 
There is consideration in the focus groups to the breaking of procedure. However, due to 
the critical nature and dynamics in this context, this would be expected if it was life or 
death of the public. However, there is more consideration for the safety of the team 
members, many teams stating that their work safety is priority. This makes sense given 
that if they are injured, then there are more casualties to deal with on scene, and less 
responding resources.  
In some instances, there is significant risk involved in self-directing based on personal 
evaluation. In the PFA example above, the team are talking about the risk of needing to 
self-authorise shooting someone. This is an unlikely circumstance, but they live with the 
knowledge that this is what they may have to do one day. However, if they are in danger 
yourself, they have the right to protect themselves.  
This comes with significant risk of danger physically and psychologically. One of the key 
areas raised in terms of self-directed leadership was the ability to take constructive 
criticism based on the actions taken and be able to defend your actions.  Extensive 
scrutiny may be a damaging process to the team and individuals. For example, the level 
of extremity of the repercussions are severe to teams, ‘If he slashed her throat whilst you 
are on scene, it’s you that has the questions to answer’ (FG4 PFA).   
The next section for discussion is Shared leadership, which addresses how leadership 
operates in the team as a shared process and presents how this influences the enactment 
of other leadership processes. 
4.6.7 Shared Leadership 
Shared leadership appears in the team literature described as a process (Bergman et al, 
2012) and it also appears in this study as a theme comprising several component parts 
such as knowledge and experience, leader rotation and leadership as a distributed 
process.  In this study, shared leadership appears as an important aspect.  To start this 
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discussion, a finding of this study is that despite the rank and a command structure, 
leadership is not purely found in the designated leader.  As focus groups pointed out: 
‘leadership doesn’t always have to come from the top’ (FG3 FS) 
 
‘I think as a crew, we’ve all got leadership skills in our own right and everybody 
has got a voice’ (FG7 FS) 
 
“When there’s a firearms incident though there’s a command structure which can 
then take away the rank, it supersedes the normal rank structure, you have 
bronze, silver and gold.  Bronze command can be a PC who is giving direction to a 
sergeant up to Inspector.  You can have an Inspector in a car, taking direction from 
a PC during a firearms deployment.  Then you’ve got silver command and gold 
commander” (FG4 PFA). 
 
This statement is supportive of the rank structure way of working but is different in that it 
appears that leadership is situational, and incident specific. The rank structure does not 
automatically marry up to the command of the incident. As there is a clearly defined 
structure in terms of command and therefore accountability, this is a deviation to deal with 
danger. The adoption of a fluidly shared leadership where the incident criteria 
‘supersedes’ rank structure, was an unexpected finding of the study.  
It appears there can be accountability regarding the outcome of the incident which is 
potentially in conflict with rank and position. For example, if a lower in rank team member 
assumes a leadership role, full accountability is also shifted to this position. All teams 
discussed this shifting of leadership based on the necessities of an incident. Based on the 
above discussion about the skills required the implication for leadership is that all team 
members need to have requisite leadership abilities. 
Teams also concur that there are challenges for leadership in teams because it is not 
simply roles and responsibilities that rotate. There is a rotation the role of the leader and 
therefore the responsibilities of that role: 
 
‘There are challenges of having a rotating leader in that a lot of people on the unit 
think that they know what they are doing……and you do get that rub and conflict 
because you haven’t got one leader.  It switches around, and you do get people 
thinking they know better’ (FG4 PFA). 
 
This example clearly establishes that leadership ‘switches around’.  This finding presents 
a complex dynamic for examining leadership in teams. If leadership is viewed as 
comprising of differing types, which is suggested in these findings, then the leader 
switching could create different dynamics each time it switches from one team member to 
another. This means that different processes of leadership may be drawn upon by 
different types of leadership. 
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 If there is any rotation of leadership role responsibility, this is often but not always, 
established at the beginning. In situations where there is uncertainty, this is where the 
process becomes more complex: 
‘The first car that gets there could be the two newest cops on their first shift, and 
they might find that they can’t deal with the situation.  They might then 
communicate this back and make the decision to move the RVP to a more secure 
area.  That’s not the bronze commander or area command, that’s the newest guy 
on the shift stepping up, which is necessary’ (FG5 PFA). 
 
If leadership is viewed as not merely being the person in command, this means that any 
person in the team can step into a leadership role, without possessing the rank structure 
or designated title of ‘leader’. This step up is what would be expected to happen 
procedurally, however, if the leadership changes then the processes employed with this 
new leader may also differ.  
Specific situations, as described here, also prompt the necessity for all team members to 
be capable leaders of a situation, to assume control, to make assessment of a situation 
and to make further decisions of next actions, in the absence of a formal leaders’ 
presence.  However, in the example above, the team member does not have the access 
to draw on more experienced team members. As a result, further discussion in the focus 
groups demonstrated the nature of leadership as a natural emerging process within 
individuals in the team:  
‘When there’s decisions to be made, with the complexities of the job, the bronze 
commander is not able to make every decision which needs to be made, 
sometimes you’ve all got to be leaders, cause you all have to make those 
decisions for yourselves.  The leaders of the group are those that naturally rise to 
the top to make those decisions, the ones that are motivated continually, the ones 
who volunteer, who step forward’ (FG4 PFA). 
 
This statement clearly recognises that leadership is shown by those who have the ability 
to take charge of decision-making, are willing to put themselves forward and are 
motivated to do this.  Also, some jobs are too big for one commander to be making every 
decision and micro-managing the process and therefore leadership must be distributed to 
the team (Gronn, 2002). In this example, leadership is distributed to team members 
because they are first on scene.  A clear example of distributed leadership follows; 
‘I think everyone needs an element of leadership. I think in this role as well 
because part of our role is to respond to major incidents… so a car could arrive on 
scene first of all and you would have to take charge of that scene so you have to 
lead…you know, show your leadership skills, deal with public on scene. You have 
to take control until which time you can pass that on to the leader or officers or 
whatever. There has to be leadership within you, to take on the response to that 
role’ (FG6 HART). 
 
In this section, it is important to consider the emerging sub-theme and process of 
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leadership emerging through the application of knowledge and previous experience of 
team members. This concept is discussed in detail in the following sub-theme. 
4.6.8 Leadership through knowledge and experience of team members 
The concept of leadership processes encouraging team members to relay on the 
knowledge and experience of other, longer serving team members is not a new one in 
conventional contexts, however, in dangerous contexts (Baran & Scott, 2010) there is little 
research to support that this is a process occurring. One exception is Baran and Scott 
(2010) who found that more experienced firefighters played a vital role in the sense 
making processes of less experienced firefighters.  
Therefore, leadership through experience is a prominent emerging leadership process. In 
the focus groups, less experienced team members were quieter than more experienced 
team members. The transcripts demonstrated this as more experienced members 
dominated the discussion. This dynamic resonated with the following sub-themes in this 
section; confidence emerging from experience; looking to others with experience; 
experiential learning; strength of team through knowledge and safety from experience. 
One focus group focused on leadership in dangerous contexts and stated: 
‘leadership in dangerous contexts is one of the  things that makes you feel safer, 
because you have that underpinning capability, underpinning knowledge and you 
have confidence in the people around you’ (FG2 MR). 
 
The comment implies that the belief comes from trusting the judgement of the leader.  
Leading through experience is an important process working in these teams. Experience 
appears to be a currency that instils confidence and respect from those around you. In this 
case, the person with the most experience is rarely the designated leader of the team. 
This may create an interesting power play but teams are clear to say that the hierarchal 
rank structure will defer to those that have the knowledge: 
 
‘It’s that accumulative effect you get over time basically, that gives you the 
confidence to then lead. It’s the experience, which you only really get from time 
served and jobs done, and from that you build confidence that enables you then I 
suppose to lead and to assume those roles’ (FG3 FS) 
 
‘people would maybe gravitate towards the person with the most experience, 
which is the aspect of respect really as you’ve earned your way to that position 
because then, you’ve been there and done that and you’ve dealt with it a lot of 
times and  everyone knows that. They’ve got there, not by accident, but they’ve 
come in and they’ve worked their way through and that’s why that is so massively 
important I suppose.. If you’ve got that strong leadership and respect there then 
that is massive’ (FG3 FS) 
 
‘It’s not hierarchical; it’s just that experience level’ (FG4 PFA) 
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‘Getting direction from someone more experience and has knowledge of the way 
he wants the job to unfold’ (FG5 PFA). 
 
There is a clear emphasis on exposure to incidents, complexities of these and time 
served. However, this does not always correlate with the levels of experience in the 
hierarchal positions whereby not all those in command have extensive experience. Skill 
base is essential to the team working effectively, regardless of position. For example; 
teams understand that newer members bring with them their own skills and training, which 
often serves the team well. Newer members are more in touch with new technology and 
will help others on the team if needed, just as the newer members will look to the more 
experienced members of the team for jobs that have unexpected turns of events. One 
team described how new team members influence the dynamics of the team and it is 
necessary: 
 
‘Over the years that some of us have been in, you’ve felt that its best when you 
have a new cohort, generally younger people (laughing) but people are keen and 
the dynamic of the team changes quite significantly at that point’ (FG2 MR) 
 
‘When you’ve got new blood on the shift, by teaching the new starter you refresh 
yourself as well… and it forms a healthy squad then’ (FG3 FS) 
 
‘XXX (our probationer) couldn’t lead a team into a building but he can go in as a 
number two, with a senior firefighter or a crew manager, so he’ll always be 
learning off someone with more experience’ (FG3 FS) 
 
‘You’ve got individual people on each shift with their own particular strengths, 
which comes to the forefront depending on the incident’ (FG7 FS). 
 
FG3 concurred with the other statements as they felt new members provide the team with 
a healthy balance of different personalities and skills. Leadership in this instance requires 
the ability to recognise these different strengths and apply them appropriately within an 
incident. Change in the teams does not appear to be received with resistance. Where 
change becomes problematic is where the team keeps changing and team members keep 
getting moved. The problem is then in the bonding processes, where they are unable to 
form that level of trust in the new individuals. Data has established that this is a longer 
process and takes considerable time to achieve.  
A further interesting finding about these teams is that experienced team members will also 
give way to let the less experienced gain the experience. If someone has not led before, 
they will give them the opportunity to lead and develop their skills.  
 
‘There’ll be someone who’ll say “you need the experience, do you want to go 
number 1 and I’ll stand right behind you and keep you right”. So we don’t always 
have to wait and think “XXX is always number 1” but he might be 20 miles away 
and you would have to wait until he got there.  It’s good to spread the roles around’ 
(FG4 PFA) 
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‘I’m quite happy to look at anyone in this room and have them mentor those with 
less experience rather than continually looking at me and XXX leading from the top 
down’ (FG5 PFA) 
 
‘Leading that way rather than saying ‘you need to get that bit of equipment and do 
it like that’ they’re doing it and showing that way’ (FG7 FS). 
 
As the findings have already established, spreading the roles around is primarily achieved 
through training processes until they gain confidence.  In contrast to training for 
experience, in FG7, more experienced team members state that they develop the team 
through leading by example. There is some evidence here that teams respect an earned 
position on the team and see that as strong leadership. The context of the dangerous 
working environment has the potential to be disastrous if decisions are wrong. All teams 
were able to talk about how despite this potential issue, there was (in most cases) a 
strong level of respect for the knowledge and experience of the team members, many who 
had been in the services for over twenty years. 
‘A person calls the police; it comes through the control room. The control room 
then advise the boss to say there’s a firearms incident ongoing. I sit up there with 
the boss and the boss says, this is the information we’ve got so far, there’s a man 
in the house with a gun, he’s threatened someone, we need to arrest him and we 
need to safeguard the people. So, he asked my advice on how to deal with it’ (FG5 
PFA). 
 
Teams felt a potential disconnect between levels of command fully understanding the role 
of the teams and what they may face. Structurally, they potentially face the situation 
where the experience of senior management is far less than the teams on the ground. 
However, from a rank structure and therefore procedural position, this means that 
decisions can be made without the expected expert level of knowledge. Respect for 
experience and knowledge is clear, particularly when teams face dangerous situations.  
From the above example, there is a shift from the leader towards the team member with 
the expertise to provide the leadership in this instance. Based on the nature of the 
incident, this would happen very quickly and expertise, experience and knowledge of the 
circumstance in this instance become critical for leadership, rather than only a hierarchal 
approach. 
Experienced team members may also need to feel supported.  In this case, the 
designated leader role is in the background. If self-directed activity requires further 
support, there is the option to gain a second opinion from the leader of the team. Despite 
the fact they have more experience, during an incident, it is difficult not to get caught up in 
the job they are doing and not to get involved emotionally. The role of the leader becomes 
greatly important in this instance as they are generally more detached, having a holistic 
view. This enables them to give a clearer opinion: 
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‘I think the differentiation for us is that in a big job, we can work by ourselves as 
you’ve said but if things go pear shaped or there’s things we’re not sure about, we 
can always get in touch with the team leader and say ‘what do you think’? 
Someone else who’s taken a step back, and we can ask them and they’re not as 
emotionally involved as we are’ (FG6 HART). 
 
Experience and knowledge of incidents is a vital component of leadership in emergency 
response teams. Those that lead are often in leadership positions, but this is not always 
the case. This then falls to the dynamics of the team and the ability to look beyond rank 
and command to achieve the goal. The teams are clear to distinguish themselves as 
having the strength of experience as a team, of dealing with specialist incidents and 
because of their exposure and training feel that the ability to resolve difficult incidents lies 
within their teams. They stated, ‘you’ve got people shouting and there are only certain 
people that can take charge of the situation and assess it correctly and you generally find 
those people work here’ (FG5 PFA). The next section addressed the fluidity of the 
identified leadership processes. 
 
4.6.9 Fluidity of leadership processes 
Some of the processes identified in this research are not static entities that appear in one 
stage; pre- incident, in-situ or post-incident. The figures below show that processes can 
appear in more than once stage, being employed dynamically as the incident unfolds. 
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Figure 4.4 – Visual representation of cyclical movement of leadership processes 
 
The literature of leadership in teams displays processes in a linear way, particularly in 
normal teams (Morgeson et al, 2010), focusing primarily on the functional approach of 
leaders and categorising them as transition based or action processes.  If leadership 
within a dangerous incident rotates then the natural assumption is that the processes of 
leadership will also rotate.  
This is a finding demonstrated in this process card exercise diagram, which shows how 
within an incident, processes are cyclical in nature. In addition to being cyclical, the results 
of this game also demonstrate that transition and action processes do not fall into one 
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prescribed state or stage of incident. Action processes emerged throughout all stages of 
an incident.  Transition processes, although primarily described as processes that would 
be expected pre-incident, appear across all stages of incidents, including post-incident. 
This was unanticipated. 
In this example, the team accept that some of these processes are present but the team 
wanted to demonstrate how these processes did not happen in isolation or fit into an exact 
structure of pre, in-situ or post incident categories and that the nature of the context drives 
the fluidity of movement of these processes. In the case of a change within the incident, 
the team show that they will review objectives, look at resources and in one focus group, 
they added a new process around sector management. This relates to the immediate 
incident which has been cordoned off to public, where there is a need to re-assess the 
area for safety and manageability. This re-assessment could mean repeating all the 
processes placed in-situ. This is a continuous cycle until the incident ends. The fluid 
nature of processes corresponded to the fluid nature of leadership. 
As is seen in both diagrams the aspect of fluidity is visible. Figure 4.5 depicts fluidity using 
arrows to demonstrate how the processes move in a cyclical way. The focus group called 
the movement of processes across the stages of an incident ‘fluid leadership’. Therefore, 
this study has adopted this terminology to be aligned with the emerging themes. 
 
Figure 4.5 – Visual representation of processes fluidly moving across incident 
stages 
 
 
 
‘It’s the fluid leadership of being flexible to each person’s experience and skill-set. 
Bowing to each other’s experience and knowledge.  That’s really important in our 
team’ (FG4 PFA). 
 
As can be seen, the processes of leadership stretch across all stages of an incident and 
the teams described that these move around as the incident unfolds.  In support of this, 
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teams provide numerous examples of how leadership is passed from one team member 
to another, based on several factors that may emerge before or during the incident. The 
word ‘bowing’ implies a respect level of the experience in the team. This may not just be 
because of the length of time someone has been in the service; it may also be because 
they have other interests outside the job role. For example; if someone is qualified in 
electronics, they would be deferred to: 
‘Although we all have a good working knowledge of procedures and things, some 
specialists within the team who can advise on different situations, such as working 
at height. XXX knows about working at height, if she got a job which was working 
aloft, she can advise, take an active leadership role in the team and setting up 
equipment in that area’ (FG6 FS). 
 
In this example, leadership is delegated based on the size and complexity of the factors to 
consider: 
‘I’m in charge of an incident, I can’t deal with every aspect of the incident. So, that 
could be communications, it could be tactical, it could be rescue procedures, it 
could be health and safety… so I’ll appoint people. So I’ll take one of those things 
out…XXX might be dealing with 2 or 3 and XXX might be dealing with 1. I can’t 
deal with all those spans of control effectively so I’ll delegate’ (FG7 FS). 
 
This shows how all team members need to have leadership capabilities. To manage the 
span of control at incidents, leadership is not just delegated but it is shared in the sense 
that the team must be working as a collective. One team member action may influence the 
decisions of another team member leading in a different area.  The statements below 
reinforce this concept that all team members must have leadership capability to be able to 
work effectively in these teams: 
‘Every person in this room could be an operational commander at a major incident 
of any size’ (FG6 HART) 
 
‘when you get a number that’s not fixed for the whole of the day.  The number’s 
rotate constantly so that each member will take charge.  This rotates a lot in each 
job.  So that everyone has a fair experience as leader’ (FG4 PFA). 
 
These examples demonstrate several types of leadership style, fluidly interacting and 
integrating; shared, directional, self-directed and adaptive leadership. These styles are not 
new to the literature. However, the dynamic rotating, interactive and integrative nature of 
leadership within a dangerous incident provides a unique perspective on leadership. The 
fluidity of the way the four types of the loci of leadership merge into an integrative flow is 
an unexpected finding. FG5 provide an example of this: 
‘It can quickly change going from one room to another where the number 4 
becomes the number 1 and he becomes the leader for that particular area’ (FG5 
PFA). 
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Upon searching a house (directive and delegation), the rotation (sharing) of leadership is 
made clear. First person in the building leads, flipping to first person out of the building 
leads. If the team come across something during the search that promotes uncertainty in 
the next action, leadership may then be taken (distributed) by the person with previous 
experience of the situation and thus will be looked to as the leader at that point. In this 
case, there is devolution to experience from team members: 
‘Sometimes for the benefit of the search, the leader can step back from their own 
idea and allow another to lead just to get the team moving again’ (FG5 PFA). 
 
This form of leading appears across all teams in the emergency services. Adding to the 
complexity of this, there is still the command and rank structure present between the team 
members.  Leadership is presented here as fluid; it is shifting during the incident to 
different team members, often in a matter of seconds, as the situation unfolds. This relies 
heavily on the understanding of the team that they will need to be skilled in this way.  
This section has presented the findings for the category of ‘Fluid leadership’.  The 
examples and analysis introduce fluid leadership in the context of danger and attempt to 
explain the uniqueness of teams and leadership working in this context. The next section 
addresses the analysis of the process card exercise conducted in the focus groups. 
4.7 Process card exercise analysis 
 
In this section, I present the findings from the analysis of the process card exercise.  As a 
reminder of the reasoning for the process card exercise, it presented findings that are 
separate from the main themes and sub-themes emerging from the focus groups. After 
conducting three focus groups (one in each emergency service), themes and sub-themes 
were forming which were rich in detail, capturing the voice of the teams but I still felt 
further detail could be captured from the teams regarding processes of leadership and 
how these emerged during incidents. Essentially, I wanted to ensure that the teams had 
the opportunity to show me where they employed leadership processes within incidents, in 
their teams.   
After discussion with my former supervision team, I decided to create a card exercise 
whereby the remaining five focus group teams would be provided with process cards 
depicting leadership processes identified in the literature. The card exercise was 
conducted before data analysis took place. The process card exercise in this research 
served as a useful analytical tool to enrich knowledge of the processes appearing in the 
literature. Teams were able to place the process cards where they wished in order to 
show (in their own way) how processes appeared during different stages of an incident. 
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This answered Burke et al (2018) who called for insights into which processes are 
employed over the stages of an incident. 
The processes were placed by the teams based on the stages of incident, mapped out on 
paper, and the focus group placing the process was identified. Figure 4.6 below shows a 
compilation of the five focus groups, in terms of the stages of the incident they identified, 
and the leadership processes applied in each.  
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Figure 4.6 – Results from the process card exercise-processes from literature at 
different stages of incidents 
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The processes are texture coded to represent where the literature distinguished between 
types of process; for example, dotted boxes represent transition phase processes and 
grey-shaded represent action phase processes (Morgeson et al, 2010). The lined boxes 
contain leadership processes compiled from seminal studies of dangerous contexts, such 
as Weick (1995) and Baran and Scott (2010). The white boxes show where new 
processes have emerged in the focus groups which were not found in the review of the 
literature. 
A finding of this study related to the stages of an incident. The focus group teams felt the 
three stages identified by Hannah et al (2009), namely pre-incident, incident and post-
incident, to be prescriptive and not representative of the complexity of dangerous 
contexts. Therefore, another two stages of incident were added to the three stages by the 
teams, specifically identifying a pre-arrival stage, when teams are en-route driving toward 
the incident, and an immediate aftermath stage. This five-stage approach identified is 
represented above in Figure 4.6.  
Leadership is described as fluid in these contexts, and using the concept of fluidity and 
liquid, I felt it was appropriate to talk about levels of danger metaphorically using the 
temperature of liquid.  For example, pre-incident is blue or cool, representing cold 
environment in terms of low levels of threat. Moving through the stages, they turn to 
amber and then at the critical point in the incident, I talk about the stage being red, 
representing significant ‘heat’ or the boiling point and high levels of threat.   
The critical point is where teams are in-situ and assuming their roles and responsibilities 
on scene, at the point of danger. The aftermath stage has been identified because teams 
immediately begin to deal with the stress responses from the incident and de-briefing and 
discussion sometimes takes place in the dangerous environment. Continuous de-briefing 
can take place in the form of continuous risk assessing between team members in dealing 
with the immediate aftermath of an incident. This is demonstrated in the Figure 4.6 as 
‘sector management’. For example, a fire might be out, but the building can still not be 
entered by anyone due to structural complications. This stage is essential to a proper 
understanding of leadership processes in this context, as processes in this stage might be 
to protect the public, other emergency services, as well as themselves. 
Figure 4.7 below is useful, as it shows how the team have placed the process cards into 
stages of an incident; pre-incident, In-situ and post-incident. 
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Figure 4.7 – Visual representation of process cards placed at multiple stages of an 
incident 
 
Figure 4.7 also shows an added process to the In-situ stage; resilience.  Integrating a 
verbatim comment from one focus group, an example of when this is paramount is: 
‘The worst rescue is probably an ice rescue, where someone’s fallen through the 
ice in the middle of the river. You’ve got a crowd of people watching, and there’s a 
child in the water. And we haven’t got the gear on the appliance to deal with that. 
The public pressure, child at risk, it goes wrong in seconds’ (FG2 MR). 
 
This example demonstrates the distressing nature of some incidents which teams deal 
with. Although only one team discussed this example, it is apparent that all team members 
working in danger have a level of resilience to external pressures and internal scrutiny, 
and the ability to keep going to overcome these issues. The wellbeing of the team 
becomes a primary responsibility for leadership. The process card exercise was useful for 
the teams to provide a visual representation of the incidents they discussed and an 
opportunity to add new insights. 
Figure 4.6 shows the finding that transition and action process phases as identified by 
Morgeson et al (2010) appear across all numerous stages of an incident. Transition phase 
processes did not appear in the fourth (immediate aftermath) stage, however. 
Categorising leadership as transition or action processes does not therefore demonstrate 
the more cyclical nature of leadership in a dangerous context. For example, as shown in 
the compiled process diagram (figure 4.6) teams do not only structure and plan at the 
beginning of an incident. The process of planning occurs continuously throughout the 
stages as the incident changes dynamically and is therefore fluidly responding to that 
change. 
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Figure 4.8 – Example of providing resources process cards placed across multiple 
incident stages 
 
Supporting this concept, the diagram above highlights the process of solving problems 
and it shows that this team view solving problems as a process that happens during 
different stages of an incident. The diagram highlights two additional columns of 
processes which have been identified as the pre-arrival and immediate aftermath stages 
of an incident. As previously emerged in the thematic discussion, decision-making is 
understood by teams as a dynamic process, with continuous review of outcomes and 
redefining the criteria upon which to base decisions. The next section summarises the 
main findings of this chapter and presents the overarching themes and sub-themes. 
4.8 Summary of the main findings in this chapter 
 
The categories and emerging themes have been presented and discussed in this chapter. 
In the next chapter, I will discuss synthesis of the literature and my findings and therefore 
the contribution of this research. It is important to highlight why my findings are important 
to the leadership theory and acknowledge how they contribute to answering the research 
question. In order to develop a synthesised discussion, I now summarise the key findings 
of the study. 
• Leadership is multi-level in emergency response teams, where the normal rank and 
command structures do not always apply. The context of leadership was essential to 
discuss first as the data provided insights into the structure of emergency response 
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teams, which was helpful to understand what participants consider to be their 
‘conventional’ way of operating. These teams face the potential of danger in their daily 
operations, and therefore the threat of facing danger could be considered as their 
conventional working environment. The norm however is the expectation that they 
may face dangers, rather than the danger itself being normal. In this respect, there are 
similar features in emergency response teams to military teams in terms of structure 
and expectation of potential dangers. However, there are significant cultural 
differences. This is most apparent in the process of shared leadership, where rank 
structures can be ‘superseded’ by emergency response team members during a 
dangerous incident. Emergency services shift the normal rank structure to specialist 
teams in specific contexts. Team members in the normal rank structure become 
leaders in specific contexts.  
 
• Team cohesiveness and trust: team interactions developing cohesiveness and trust 
between members, supports that of military studies (Yammarino et al, 2010). 
However, the ability of emergency response teams to fluidly adopt leadership roles in 
response to danger is a finding which differentiates from the military context. Team 
cohesion and the level of cohesiveness described, is unique to the context of working 
in dangerous contexts, where there was less focus on communication and interactions 
of team members as a result of this bond. A leadership process called ‘predicting 
actions’ was identified as extending current understanding, with the interest of this 
aspect emerging in emergency response teams highlighted. 
 
• This study’s conceptualisation of danger extends current theory. Conflicting constructs 
of danger poses some challenges for leadership and how leadership is 
conceptualised. Danger influences leadership processes of decision-making, risk 
assessment, evaluation and sense making within incidents (Hannah et al, 2009), 
based on a range of complex causes and requiring contingencies to be fluidly 
developed by emergency response teams. Danger in the context creates an additional 
cohesion dynamic where team member’s lives are each other’s responsibility. This 
study has highlighted that danger prompts the necessity for varying adaptive 
responses. Whilst this aligns with the literature (Uhl-bien, 2010), a new finding 
emerging from this research is that there is an inherent conflict in the teams’ 
construction of danger. Although the focus groups were able to list what represents 
danger, and teams face these situations regularly, they often struggled to see the 
danger that is inherent in their role. Emergency response teams have an intriguing, 
conflicting constructions of danger as a duality. They understand that they operate 
facing physical and mental danger but find it difficult to reconcile this with their own 
personal experience, due to what appears to be natural coping mechanisms of 
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detachment and desensitisation. The role of leadership therefore appears to be a 
balance of ensuring team members can perform their roles in these contexts whilst 
mitigating against potential complacency. This has important implications for future 
research, which will be outlined in chapter six. 
 
• Leadership is conceptualised as moving fluidly between these different types of 
leadership dependent on the changing situation. This study presents leadership as 
different emergent types in dangerous contexts, extending understanding of 
leadership in dangerous contexts. A key finding is that processes do not appear in a 
linear fashion in dangerous incidents but are instead ‘fluid’. Focus groups themselves 
used this term as they understand leadership, processes of leadership and in turn 
leadership responses to danger, to be cyclical in nature; continuously moving (fluidly) 
between the different stages of an incident, continuously assessing and evaluating as 
the incident develops.  
 
• This study identifies leadership types in emergency teams as being directional, self-
directed, adaptive and shared. Considering leadership in one incident, it has been 
described as potentially moving from person to person within the incident, often 
rotating this responsibility within seconds in the presence of danger. In the same 
incident at the same time, leadership types will also change to adapt to the dynamic of 
an unfolding situation. The fluidity of leadership emerging in this study is 
contextualised in emergency response teams and extends current knowledge of how 
social processes of leadership are enacted within teams in dangerous situations. 
 
• The results of the process card exerciseprovide emergent findings. In addition to 
identifying additional processes, teams also identified new stages in incidents which 
presents an extension to current literature in teams facing danger (Hannah et al, 2009; 
Morgeson, 2010). In summary, the process card exercise actively engages teams in 
defining how leadership works in dangerous contexts. Demonstrating leadership 
processes by this visual method, based on the discourse (Rose 2001) of emergency 
response teams, is novel to this context..  
Following the discussion of the emergent findings of the research, I present the 
overarching themes and sub-themes of this chapter, with their meanings in the summary 
table 4.6 below. 
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Table 4.6 – Thematic template of overall themes  
Category Theme Meaning of the Theme 
Context of leadership 
 
This theme considers 
the nature of the 
context in which teams 
operate. 
Directional and 
Command Leadership 
The way in which command and 
directional approach to leadership 
in service organisations influences 
their expectations and actions 
when responding to incident types. 
 
Team Culture and 
Training 
The way in which the culture of 
emergency response teams, their 
structure and training, influences 
their expectations when responding 
to incident types. 
 
How participants 
construct danger 
 
This theme provides 
insights into the way 
that danger is 
constructed and 
recognised by teams 
Tangible Dangers 
 
This refers to the team 
understanding that danger can 
present a tangible physical threat 
to lives of individuals, their team, 
patients and/or public. Such threats 
include stabbing, gunshots and 
other types of incidents that could 
result in physical harm. 
 
Mental Dangers 
This refers to the team 
understanding that danger can 
present a mental threat by affecting 
the psychological wellbeing of 
individuals, their team, patients 
and/or public 
 
De-sensitisation to 
Danger 
The way in which the team 
becomes used to danger and 
unconsciously employ a range of 
coping mechanisms. 
 
 
The influence of 
Danger on leadership 
 
This theme identifies 
how danger affects the 
way in which leadership 
operates within the 
team. 
Expectations of 
Leadership 
The ways in which the team 
describe leadership as a set of 
their expectations in dangerous 
contexts. 
Challenges to 
Leadership 
This refers to the ambiguous or 
uncertain way in which an incident 
can unfold and the ways in which 
this affects team leadership 
processes within an incident, whilst 
the team is under considerable 
pressure and scrutiny 
Fluid Leadership and 
processes 
 
This theme provides 
insights into how 
leadership is 
understood in the team 
Self-Leadership 
The ways in which individuals must 
take responsibility and 
accountability for their own actions. 
Furthermore, making autonomous 
decisions, and the influence of 
these on the team. 
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Category Theme Meaning of the Theme 
context; identifies and 
describes the nature of 
how leadership 
operates within the 
team when they are 
working in a dangerous 
context. It identifies the 
emergent styles of 
leadership, identifies 
social processes and 
details the fluid nature 
of leadership processes 
and responses to the 
inherent contextual 
complexities. 
 
Adaptive Leadership 
The way in which the team adapts 
to the fluid and dynamic nature of 
dangerous contexts. 
 
Shared Leadership 
The ways in which leadership is 
shared amongst the team based on 
role, experience, training and 
specific situational needs and 
knowledge. 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the findings of the research in four overarching categories; 
context of leadership; construct of danger, how danger influences leadership and fluid 
leadership. I then presented the results of the process card exercise. Situational 
complexities and the challenges to leadership embedded in the context of dangerous 
working have also been addressed throughout the chapter as narrative has emerged. 
Chapter five, discussion and contributions, will synthesise the findings from the process 
card exercise, the themed focus group transcripts, and the review of the literature. This 
process will further extend current literature and enrich current knowledge of processes of 
leadership in dangerous incidents. I will also discuss my contributions to leadership 
literature, and research methodology. 
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Chapter 5 – Discussion and contributions 
5.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
This chapter comprises a synthesis of the current leadership literature, analysed in 
chapter two with the research findings presented in chapter four. The chapter also 
addresses the fifth and the final research objectives: 
• To add to the existing theoretical area of leadership in dangerous contexts by 
identifying leadership processes. 
 
• To develop a theoretical framework with the intent of contributing to theoretical 
and practical bases for enacting leadership in dangerous contexts. 
 
Throughout this chapter, I have highlighted in bold where there is a contribution to the 
current theory arising from this synthesis. The chapter presents the contributions of the 
research, demonstrating where it extends, builds on and challenges current literature in 
the leadership field. The chapter addresses the key themes that emerged within the study, 
including: the contextual nature of working in emergency response teams; the team’s 
construction of danger and the emergence of fluid leadership within those teams. The 
chapter also addresses the inherent challenges to leadership, discusses the challenges 
danger poses to leadership and the influence of these challenges on emergent processes 
of leadership. The chapter draws from extracts of the data set for illustrative purposes and 
includes summary tables throughout to highlight specific contributions to theory.  
5.2 Recap of study aim and research questions 
 
It is useful at this point to remind the reader of the aim of this study, to provide clarity for 
the contextualisation of contributions set out in this chapter. The aim was to examine how 
leadership is ‘enacted’ in emergency response teams. To achieve this, it is also useful to 
remind the reader of the following four research sub-questions, which were used to 
structure the following discussions and in answering the overall research question: 
• How do teams working in dangerous contexts construct leadership? 
• How do teams working in dangerous contexts construct danger? 
• How does danger influence leadership processes? 
• What are the leadership processes of teams working in dangerous contexts? 
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Literature discusses the changing world for leadership, with increased threat levels and 
the necessity to respond to increasingly complex contexts (Hannah et al, 2009; Yukl, 
2010; Morgeson & DeRue, 2006). Emergency services teams in this study highlight the 
increasing number of threats in current society, from cyber-attacks to physical forms of 
threat such as bombs, knife attacks, and biological weapons or in more recent attacks, the 
use of vehicles to injure. To set the scene of danger, one focus group provided a 
perspective of danger in the current climate: 
“The risk has changed now, the threats are different now. I think from what they 
were, in terms of dangerous situation that you’re likely to stumble across” (FG1 
HART). 
 
Types of threats and forms of danger are not always anticipated, immediately obvious, nor 
expected. Chapter one highlighted the recent pressures to understand new threats, to find 
new and adaptive ways of responding as teams face a new world with intensification of 
danger, and of what can be considered ‘dangerous’ (Hannah et al, 2010; Yukl and 
Mahsud, 2010; Norton, 2010). This changing environment brings with it the concept of a 
new ‘conventional’ way of working, with many implications for leadership in emergency 
response teams.  
Enhancing understanding of what is ‘conventional’ to teams operating as emergency 
responders through conducting primary research with teams operating in environments 
characterised by uncertainty, is a necessary endeavour to further understanding of the 
context specific leadership, and how this may have implications for leadership theory as a 
whole. 
Most studies of leadership have focused on hierarchical structures of teams operating in 
conventional environments, such as traditional business organisational settings; 
specifically where there is no form of anticipated threat to the operational context on a day 
to day basis. There have been limited empirical studies focusing on emergency response 
teams, the nature of their working in danger and their leadership processes. There is, 
however, an expanding interest in researching teams working in extreme environments 
(Burke et al, 2018). Recent literature and current studies that have addressed team 
working in dangerous contexts (Burke et al, 2018; Golden et al, 2018) has primarily been 
focused on the military or teams operating in extreme environments such as polar 
expedition, climbing or sailing teams. Leadership of these teams has warranted particular 
attention due to the lack of previous research studies and understanding (Burke et al, 
2018) of how, in practice, leadership operates in these contexts. As mentioned in chapter 
two, contemporary literature has not explored the processes of leadership in these 
contexts, particularly during dangerous incidents. This is important to understand if 
leadership in emergency response teams is to respond adaptively and effectively to 
dangerous contexts.   
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5.3 Methodological process and contributions 
 
In order to answer the question how leadership is ‘enacted’, posed at the beginning of this 
study, initial research focus was placed on identifying the ‘processes’ of leadership 
emerging in the literature (in other words, what do teams ‘do’ in dangerous contexts). 
These were mapped as a matrix of leadership processes against the articles as a process 
map. Using Morgesen et al’s (2010) functions of leadership as a basis for the mapping 
was useful, as a picture began to form across the leadership and team leadership 
literature regarding the present landscape of discussion and research into processes of 
leadership in dangerous contexts.  
Following this, studies were narrowed down to those focusing on teams and leadership 
contextualised by danger. Few studies have been published, but for those which were 
identified (see table 2.2), analysis was undertaken to investigate how team’s construct 
leadership, danger, what danger does to leadership, and the leadership processes that 
appear in dangerous contexts. The answers to these sub-questions were intended to 
provide insight into how leadership is ‘enacted’ in these contexts.  
To remind the reader, the unit of analysis in this research is the team and therefore the 
focus is on the social processes of leadership rather than a single leader. The process of 
mapping the literature (outlined in chapter two, section 2.3.3) showed the limited amount 
of study of leadership in dangerous contexts, and therefore demonstrates a gap in the 
literature. A number of authors (Burke et al, 2018; Lichtenstein et al, 2006; Hannah et al, 
2009; Baran & Scott, 2010; Samuels et al, 2010) called for future studies to address this 
gap, highlighting the comparatively little research on leadership in teams operating in 
dangerous contexts. This is necessary to address so that leadership is able to respond to 
different forms of threat effectively.  
Primary research with the individuals who operate in dangerous contexts, especially at the 
intra-group level such as a focus group, have not been used as a method to explore 
leadership processes; most of the studies are post-incident reviews drawn from textual 
sources (Hannah et al, 2010).  To address this methodological and empirical gap, focus 
groups were chosen as the data collection method for this study.  The visual method used 
to represent teams discourse (Rose, 2001) of incidents for the process card exercise 
discussed in chapter 4 are novel to research in this context. The method of involving the 
emergency response teams in identifying leadership processes in a visual way, enabled 
the opportunity to guide data through their opinions and experiences and support reader 
understanding of the way in which leadership is understood. This is novel to research in 
this context.  
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Data from the transcriptions of eight focus groups was analysed through the process of 
abduction and this resulted in interesting findings. Firstly, structuring the study using one 
overarching leadership theory and conceptual framework was found not to be appropriate. 
For example, if the focus was on extending knowledge in shared leadership, if a purely 
deductive approach had been adopted, processes emerging through the focus groups 
could be aligned with the three leadership types identified in complexity leadership; 
administrative, enabling and adaptive leadership (Uhl-bien, 2010). This would be too 
constrictive, however, and not reveal the true complexity of the phenomenon. Due to the 
lack of research conducted in this theoretical area, context and level of analysis, it was 
important to adopt a study that was exploratory in nature but which resulted in a critical 
examination of the phenomenon. 
In contrast, adopting a social constructionist and inductive approach reveals that 
leadership in dangerous contexts is not a linear process that fits neatly into an existing 
conceptual framework. Undertaking an inductive approach has resulted in understanding 
leadership in dangerous contexts as a far more complex dynamic interplay of leadership 
processes. 
The following discussions are structured by the emergence of themes from the focus 
groups and process card exercise discussions. Reference to the literature is made 
throughout. Themes are also discussed based on my philosophical positioning and 
underpinning assumptions laid out in chapter three. Adopting an inductive approach is 
appropriate because the study intends to offer its own conceptual framework specific to 
emergency response teams, focusing on emergent areas that have not been captured in 
the current literature. In order to interpret data from focus groups and provide an 
integrated discussion of meaning making, it is important to address the team 
demographics and the dynamics within the teams and highlight potential influences from 
team members. 
5.4 Group Complexity 
Eight focus groups were conducted from four different emergency services. It is important 
to discuss similarities and differences between the teams, particularly demographics in the 
teams, as these demonstrate the group complexities (Hannah et al, 2010) present and if 
this had any influence on team cohesion. They are also relevant when discussing the co-
construction of knowledge from data in the study; forming contributions to theory and 
addressing data credibility. 
Despite being located in different emergency services, all teams were structured in similar 
ways. The teams were structured and operated on a daily basis by hierarchical levels of 
rank and associated levels of responsibility. All teams were ‘on call’ and worked in shifts, 
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generally retaining the same team members for long periods of time. Teams across all 
organisations described their way of working and incidents with a similar use of language. 
There appears to be common ‘argot’ across the emergency services, with similar phrases 
and procedures from training. This would be expected as they train for incidents with 
similar protocols and standardisation. For example, attention was drawn to their Joint 
Emergency Service Inter-operating Procedure documentation (JESIP), in which 
procedures for cross service operation are clearly laid out in terms of structure and 
command. 
The team members were predominantly male, with only five females included in the focus 
groups in total, out of sixty-one participants. No females were present in the voluntary 
organisation focus group. Gender was not in the scope of this study and therefore this 
was not explored in the data analysis stages. However, this is key to note and will inform 
proposed areas for future research in the final chapter. Ages of team members ranged 
between twenty-five and sixty years old. In the focus groups where there were females 
and particular gaps in ages present, I was keen to observe any differences in dynamics in 
the team. There were no distinguishable differences between male and female 
interactions in the team, but there were differences in the engagement of older team 
members and younger team members. Older team members (forty+) had more stories or 
examples to share in the focus groups, and I found that this was largely due to them being 
more experienced. 
In some instances, older team members provided more challenge over the discussion of 
particular decisions that were made during incidents or they provided more contextual 
information to enable sense to be made from the incident description. One explanation for 
this is that because they were more used to scrutiny and more experienced in telling the 
story of the incident in a way that covered all probable future questions about the incident 
outcome and their decisions. The older team members’ however, were not always the 
team leaders. In some focus groups there appeared an element of resentment from the 
much older members, towards those in hierarchy of the organisation, rather than towards 
the team leaders. For example, there was some side discussion around examples of the 
hierarchy not demonstrating understanding of how the teams operated because they were 
not as experienced.  Despite male and female team members, differing age ranges and 
experience levels, there appeared to be no difference in the cohesive nature of the team 
as all team members were engaging in similar bonding techniques, such as humour, 
‘mickey-taking’ and team or personal ‘in jokes’. 
The following discussion of key themes will take each thematic area in turn. A small 
summary table will be presented at the end of each theme to demonstrate the areas of 
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leadership I am contributing to. Table 5.1 below, for instance, summarises my contribution 
to methodology. The first theme for discussion is the context of leadership. 
Table 5.1 – Methodological contributions to current literature 
 
 
5.5 Context of leadership 
A debate in the current leadership literature is how the context changes leadership, how 
leadership is enacted in teams facing danger, or outside what is considered a ‘normal’ 
working environment (Hannah et al, 2009). Questions such as what danger does to 
leadership and what is effective leadership in dangerous contexts were posed in a special 
issue of Leadership in military contexts (Campbell et al, 2010). Ramthun and Matkin 
(2014, p.251) offer a suggestion that dangerous dynamism has a negative impact on team 
processes and leadership. The concept of facing danger is acknowledged as placing 
unique pressures on the enactment of leadership.  
This study found that there is limited empirical research to explore how leadership 
manifests in teams working in dangerous contexts.  Current studies addressing leadership 
and danger have focused primarily on military contexts (Yammarino et al, 2010; Ramthun 
& Matkin, 2014; Samuels et al, 2010; Sweeny, 2010; Fisher et al, 2010; Veestragenter et 
al, 2014). Other studies have focused on extreme teams and extreme contexts. These 
studies focus on extreme sports such as mountaineering, sailing or polar expeditions 
(Kayes, 2006; Burke et al, 2018). 
Studies are beginning to address emergency teams working in potentially dangerous 
environments, and those operating in a post-danger environment, for example, leadership 
of teams in hospitals (Klein et al, 2006).  Hannah et al (2009) provide a useful conceptual 
typology to show the unique antecedents of danger to leadership, in comparison with 
normal environments. As stated previously, much of this current knowledge appears to be 
conceptual, or based on post-incident reports. This study extends the current 
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knowledge of leadership in dangerous contexts, how teams perceive and 
conceptualise danger and therefore develop adaptive responses, as a result of 
inductive research capturing the participant voice. 
There are several problems with comparing studies of leadership in danger, with 
‘conventional’ working environments, also differentiated as dangerous and non-dangerous 
(Hannah et al, 2010, p.159). The first issue is that it is difficult to define a normal non-
dangerous working environment.  A comparison of leadership enacted whilst working in 
an office environment would not seem appropriate to this study, despite the findings 
potentially building on current literature. This research can, however, provide some 
transferability of insight to inform leadership in conventional working contexts, as although 
still rare occurrences, those operating in conventional contexts are facing dangerous 
incidents with increasing frequency (Hannah et al, 2010), for example, terrorist attacks. 
Another issue is that when researching teams working in dangerous contexts, their 
concept of what is conventional is understood differently. Military studies are the most 
prominent studies tackling the concept of working in danger, with little focus being on 
other types of teams or individuals that may face a threat to life. Therefore, discussions of 
the dangerous context in literature appear to group teams working in danger together. For 
example, studies state that the focus is military or crisis management but that the 
discussions could also apply to emergency teams or extreme action teams (Hannah et al, 
2009; Uitdewilligen & Waller, 2018). 
This study challenges the assertion that the military context is transferable to the 
emergency service context. Assumptions of normality for soldiers and emergency 
response team members are far more nuanced and have some significant variances. For 
example, despite there being some overlap in the contextual nature of danger in military 
and extreme environments, there remain fundamental differences between those 
operating under military structures and public service emergency response. These are 
referred to below. 
Ramthun & Matkin (2014) highlight that the levels of extremity of danger faced by military 
personnel is not in direct comparison to those in emergency response teams, for example, 
military teams may face several days of combat operations cramped in damp, cold and 
isolated conditions which they need to operate within to successfully complete a defined 
mission and often to survive. Emergency response teams in this research do not (under 
conventional) circumstances face this extremity exposure level for their survival. Also, 
soldiers have little or no choice in facing danger, whereas emergency response teams 
have a commitment to their own safety and can refuse to enter a dangerous context. 
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In addressing danger in the context of emergency response, this study is sympathetic to 
the contextual variances from different types of teams identified in the literature and that 
took part in this study. This study did not seek to provide comparative data between the 
teams included in the study and other teams in the literature. Inductively, comparative 
areas have emerged from the data, providing a richer picture of leadership and its 
similarities and differences to other explored teams.  The next category discussed is the 
team’s construction of danger. 
5.6 Construction of Danger 
This study of the concept of danger and dangerous contexts by exploring the construction 
of danger extends previous explorations in significant depth and integrating the team 
member voice. First, all focus group teams were asked what they understood by ‘danger’. 
Their responses were supportive of current understandings, that there was a threat to life 
and a list of potentially dangerous hazards that pose this threat, such as knife attack or 
terrorist activity. All focus group teams concur that danger challenges leadership: 
 
‘It challenges it, to see whether that person can cope or can’t cope. In that sort of 
situation, it’s sink or swim or maybe just float around in the middle. A good leader 
will swim quite easily and someone who’s not so good will sink’ (FG5 FS). 
 
Returning to their discussions about what is understood as ‘conventional’ exposure to 
danger, to the focus group teams, the concept was an interesting discussion. A dichotomy 
between what is classed as dangerous and what the teams acknowledged to be ‘being in 
danger’, emerged quickly. Focus group teams would on one hand acknowledge that there 
was danger present but in conflicting data, acknowledged that they were not in danger. 
Conflictions in teams’ construction of danger, is a theme that stood out. Campbell et al 
(2010, p.3) defined dangerous environments in a similar way to extreme contexts as 
“those in which leaders or their followers are personally faced with highly dynamic and 
unpredictable situations and where the outcomes of leadership may result in severe 
physical or psychological injury (or death) to unit members”. Most studies in dangerous 
contexts have adopted this definition (as discussed in Chapter two - Literature Review), as 
the base line approach to antecedents to dealing with danger. For example, military 
studies continue to use this definition focusing on the concept of a threat to life. These in-
depth discussions around their construction of danger and what is considered dangerous 
was a finding of this study. The teams keenly explored what they believe to be dangerous, 
why they believe it is dangerous and how they respond to the perceived danger(s). Their 
discussions indicated that there had not been previous reflection or analysis by the teams 
of what they considered danger to be. 
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If the definition of danger by Hannah et al (2009, p.3), where “those personally faced with 
highly dynamic and unpredictable situations and where the outcomes of leadership may 
result in severe physical or psychological injury” is adopted, in taking an interpretive 
stance, this study challenges this construction of danger. Based on the findings of this 
study, the concept of the unexpected enables this study to build on current definitions of 
danger. Danger is therefore, conceptualised as the occurrence of unexpected or 
unanticipated events unfolding that pose a serious threat to the life or the individual or 
collective wellbeing of the team, characterised by a lack of time or resources to 
reasonably considered adjusted leadership processes and mitigating responses.  
Table 5.2 - Contributions to the construction of danger  
Area of contribution Contributions 
Context of danger 
Extends literature on dangerous context 
as current understanding of what is 
dangerous is unique to emergency 
response teams 
Construction of danger (Hannah et al, 
2009) 
Builds on current definitions of danger, 
recognising that danger is often as a result 
of the unexpected and unanticipated within 
unfolding events. 
 
Current studies of leadership in dangerous contexts acknowledge, “no one set of papers, 
no matter how large, could address all the implications that danger and threat pose for 
leadership” nor that a single overriding theme could be developed (Campbell et al, 2010, 
p.S6). Danger influences leadership to the extent that the solutions to mitigate danger are 
not and cannot be prescriptive. The incidents described by the teams suggest the 
possibility of unexpected events unfolding, which no one set of studies can account for all 
possible contingencies and implications of danger during an incident. In the time of a few 
seconds, an incident can become dangerous, thereby adversely influencing ‘normal’ 
leadership processes. 
Hannah et al, (2010) suggested that dangerous contexts are not homogenous but 
multifaceted.  This study provides evidence to support this assertion, understanding that 
danger can come from various sources “forms, levels, probabilities and other typologies” 
(Hannah et al, 2010, p.S159). Types of danger were identified as physical, whereby there 
are tangible threats to team members whilst responding to an incident. Mental dangers 
were also discussed which was surprising as although mentioned, this is not focused on in 
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the literature in detail for emergency response and was therefore not part of the 
questioning strategy for this study.  
Also identified is the concept that the teams themselves pose a danger to the public, 
based on the type of equipment they use. This is not previously mentioned in the literature 
and was a surprising finding, which is specific to the context the teams operate in. For 
example, part of managing incidents on scene is to manage the public by cordoning off 
the incident. Another aspect of incident management is to ensure correct handling of 
emergency response equipment, for example, a member of the public who found 
themselves in the firing line of a water jet from a fire engine would likely obtain serious 
injury from the water pressure.  Following on from discussions of conflictions of 
understanding danger, the next area for discussion is the concept of desensitisation to 
danger. 
5.7 Desensitisation 
 
The desensitisation of team members to danger became a prominent theme in the 
findings of this study. The concept of desensitisation is well established in the field of 
psychology, particularly in studies addressing post traumatic stress (Kitchiner, 2004), but 
less so in studies of management. Focus group teams concur that desensitisation often 
occurs as a result of training processes, whereby they are repeatedly exposed to potential 
scenarios of danger. Scenario based training in this instance means that in some 
incidents, leadership responses to unfolding events are pre-programmed in teams. For 
example, teams forward plan, based on the information they have about the incident 
before they arrive on scene. Teams plan for ‘what if’ scenarios and through these 
processes of training, scenario planning and information gathering, desensitisation is 
maximised.  
If desensitisation is discussed in this way, there are positive implications for teams. Firstly, 
teams will respond in-situ to unfolding events with all possible known scenarios 
considered and practiced, based on their previous exposure and training. This means that 
teams will have higher confidence levels and quicker processual responses to an incident 
than a normal ambulance crew of two. Secondly, desensitisation is a process by which 
team members cope with difficult events or the mental dangers of emergency response. 
As a result, they are able to respond in a more detached way and adopt a more objective 
approach to incidents, not becoming too involved emotionally, when they face difficult 
incidents. 
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In contrast to the positive implications of becoming desensitised, the concept also raises 
some issues for leadership when operating in dangerous contexts. There is some failure 
to recognise danger or what could be dangerous at every stage of an incident. There was 
a conflict in all focus group teams whereby they initially recognised the context they work 
in as dangerous and gave examples of this danger, but later stated that they did not feel 
‘in danger’. Interpreting this aspect of the discussion, desensitised teams with repeated 
exposure to similar dangerous scenarios in training or from experience, will not feel 
danger in the same way as a normal team.  In essence, as similar events repeat, this 
begins to become the normal way of working. 
Building on this and aligning with the broad social constructionist position of this study, the 
aspects of an incident categorised by the team as dangerous is based on their perception 
of this exposure. Team members may fail to see danger unfolding as they expect the 
unfolding incident to follow a previous pattern. Decisions are often made prior to attending 
the incident on the basis of this expectation and any information that concurs with this risk 
assessment. Focus group teams display confidence that if a scenario has happened many 
times, it will happen again.  There is significant focus placed on the equipment used by 
the teams to carry out emergency response, particularly ballistic equipment or the use of a 
fire arm. All focus group teams discussed feeling less in danger when they had their 
equipment on. If danger is perceived as reduced due to having the correct equipment and 
ballistic protection, it is likely that teams will enter into environments with increased levels 
of extremity, thus further desensitising team members where these are successfully 
managed.      
The findings of this study focus on the ‘unexpected’ aspects of an incident as being the 
most dangerous components within an incident. The unexpected events are often a result 
of lack of intelligence information being fed to the team. Teams place significant focus on 
pre-planning prior to arrival on scene but described many incidents where they have little 
information to make informed decisions. As discussed, in this instance, teams revert to 
experience and prior patterns of similar incidents.  In contrast to the previous discussion, if 
danger is perceived as a result of unexpected or unanticipated events unfolding within an 
incident, there is little scope for planning processes that can be done prior to the incidents. 
Examples described in the focus groups highlighted danger where there was little or no 
warning of an event that rapidly unfolded. 
“…..started shouting at us “Get your kit now, get straight to scene”.  Everyone felt 
the hairs on the back of their neck.  His panic went through all of us.  Everyone 
started rushing to get their kit together, we all rushed on the scene’ (FG4 PFA).   
 
Page 201 of 273 
 
Danger in this example stems from the leader.  As discussed in chapter four, teams 
question leadership if danger is present and whether to be in that situation was avoidable.  
If danger is unexpected, then teams do not have time to question and thus tend to follow 
the command structure of the team. In the example above, the leadership response is 
unexpected.  
What is surprising here is the concept that experienced team members who, as previously 
discussed, usually have significant previous exposure to these types of incidents, 
responded to the panic of the leader with reciprocal panic and by just doing as they were 
told. In a culture of accepted directional leadership, this is perhaps anticipated but there 
appears to be a dichotomy between the conditioning of being part of a rank structure 
(doing as you are told) and working in a team where you might need to step in or up and 
display leadership (even if it’s not their designated role). 
It can be argued that at this point in an incident, the team members and their interactions 
or social processes, are paramount. Illustrative extracts from the data presented in 
chapter four (Findings and Analysis) demonstrate that when the unexpected happens 
such as leader panic, processes such as team cohesion and trust are essential but can 
also be disruptive as formal direction then becomes unclear. Further processes such as 
decision making, sense making and therefore risk assessment are used to mitigate further 
misunderstanding in-situ. Processes are thereby contingencies to the unexpected and 
must remain fluid in order to provide adaptive responses to the example presented above.  
The next thematic area for discussion is the fluidity of leadership, whereby a theoretical 
framework is presented to further extend current literature in our understanding of 
leadership in dangerous contexts. 
5.8 Fluid Leadership 
 
This study has explored how leadership is formally structured in emergency response 
organisations and specialist teams and the unique way the command structure flexes in 
response to incidents with different levels of extremity. The study has also discussed the 
concept of danger and how teams working in dangerous contexts understand danger. 
This provides a useful foundation for the next discussion. This section discusses in detail, 
fluid leadership; how leadership works during dangerous incidents and provides greater 
insight than previous studies into the unique dynamics of working in an emergency 
response team. 
To justify my approach to the research, it is necessary to remind the reader how this 
research understands leadership and how the concept is applied to the context of this 
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study, namely one that is dangerous.  Drawing from the current theoretical literature, the 
definition of leadership that is adopted for this study is: The social process of intra-
personal and intra-group interaction to achieve goals, by reducing contextual ambiguity 
and generating adaptive outcomes (A synthesis of Lichtenstein et al, 2006; Baran & Scott, 
2010; Bardis, 1979; Eberly et al, 2013).  
5.8.1 Social processes of leadership 
Examination of leadership processes in dangerous contexts is limited (Hannah et al, 
2009).  Reference is made to processes although they are rarely discussed in detail, and 
meaning extracted from their use in dangerous contexts. Baran and Scott (2010) draw 
from Complexity Leadership in their study of near miss reports of firefighters in New York. 
Their premise was to explain the complex nature of contexts such as dealing with fires. 
Despite adopting a complexity leadership approach, their study is predominantly framed 
by a focus on three overarching sense making processes originating from Weick (1993)  
As a reminder, the definition of leadership processes that is adopted for this study is: 
Structured interactions generating outcomes adaptive to need.  These include, 
directive/action-based, and inter-personal/social interactions, such as recruiting, planning, 
visioning, directing, sense-making, motivating, coordinating, monitoring and enabling (A 
synthesis of Morgeson et al, 2010; Fleishman et al, 1991; Weick, 1993; Day et al, 2004; 
Lichtenstein et al, 2006; Uhl-bien, 2006; Barnett & McCormick, 2012). 
 
Referring back to chapter two (Literature Review), Baran and Scott (2010) emphasise that 
the discussion of processes can be enhanced in the following ways: 
• By discussing the importance of processes in the dangerous context leadership field, 
• By defining these specifically as they present themselves in context, under conditions 
classed as dangerous, 
• Showing how they integrate within a given situation, 
• By discussing the relationships/complexities surrounding processes and their influence 
based on how they unfold within an incident. 
Lichtenstein et al (2006, p.2) found leadership to be “a dynamic which transcends the 
capabilities of individuals alone…product of interaction, tension and exchange rules”.  
They found leadership processes to be social, inter-subjectively created and enacted.  
The key impact to this study of this social dynamic is that individual behaviours and traits 
are excluded from the concept of leadership processes, as the phenomenon of leadership 
is the social interaction.  It is useful to remind the reader that for this study leadership 
functions and processes drawn from the literature are interchangeably referred to as 
leadership processes. For example, the functions defined by Morgeson et al (2010) are 
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effectively the same social interactions taking place as Baran and Scott’s (2010) 
processes.  Individual leader behaviours and traits, although acknowledged within the 
theory and captured within the analysis as contributing to processes, are not being 
investigated as leadership processes. 
Based on the limitations posed in the literature, the identification of processes in the focus 
groups and the process card exercise analysis, extends knowledge of leadership 
processes in dangerous contexts (Hannah et al, 2009, 2010).  
First, the importance of leadership processes is discussed with reference to their 
emergence in dangerous contexts.  In this study, incidents are used as a mechanism to 
demonstrate where social processes of leadership appear during the identified stages of 
incidents. A combined synthesis of processes emerging from the focus groups and from 
the process card exercise was presented in chapter four. This demonstrated empirically 
that processes did not appear in linear fashion in definitive stages of an incident but that 
processes such as decision making, shared leadership and sense making appeared 
across four identified stages.  
Secondly, within the identified stages, processes did not happen in isolation, nor did they 
occur only once. Processes appear to operate fluidly and adaptively, as demonstrated by 
figure 4.6 in the findings chapter (p.180). The findings of this study support previous 
definitions in the literature, of specific processes emerging from the analysis. Where this 
study differs is the nature by which these integrate in dangerous and critical stages of 
incidents. Fluidity in this case refers to the interactive nature of processes moving from 
one to the other depending on the criticality of the incident unfolding. The following 
discussions of leadership types and how leadership emerges in dangerous contexts, 
inherently addresses how processes are influenced by situational dynamics and the 
complexities of danger. 
Thirdly, adding to Hannah et al’s (2009) three stages of an incident, two additional 
stages of incident were identified by focus group teams whereby processes 
emerged. These stages are pre-arrival and immediate aftermath. These stages were 
important to identify as they broaden understanding of the build-up and wind-down of 
criticality at incidents. Linking to the idea of convection as described in the process card 
exercise in chapter four (Findings and Analysis), as criticality builds, danger (heat) 
intensifies. In this case, processes of leadership act as a cooling agent to the danger, 
such as sense making, dynamic decision making and continuous risk assessing.  
To discuss the concept of fluid leadership and implications for fluid leadership processes, 
it is useful to first discuss the findings based on the command structure and multi-level 
structure of leadership of the emergency response focus group teams. 
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5.8.2 Command, directional and multi-level leadership 
A further area of exploration into leadership in emergency response is the multi-level 
operational capacity of leadership. This finding supports Yammarino et al (2010) in that 
leadership can be enacted at different levels of rank in the hierarchical structure. In this 
study, leadership is enacted by all levels, including the lowest ranks in the team. This 
study builds on current literature of teams in dangerous contexts, addressing team 
structures, by finding that in these specialist teams, a lower ranking team member may 
suddenly supersede a high ranking officer based on the type of incident they attend. 
“When there’s a firearms incident though there’s a command structure which can 
then take away the rank, it supersedes the normal rank structure, you have 
bronze, silver and gold.  Bronze command can be a PC who is giving direction to a 
sergeant up to Inspector.  You can have an Inspector in a car, taking direction from 
a PC during a firearms deployment.  Then you’ve got silver command and gold 
commander” (FG4 PFA). 
 
Based on the findings of this study, there is not only a multi-level approach to leadership, 
but rather the adoption of an intra-team leadership approach where the normal structures 
do not apply. Leaders in the team do not simply encourage this from their team members, 
it is expected. Although in some cases leadership was often described as becoming 
authoritative during dangerous contexts, this did not detract from the expectation that all 
were able to assume a leadership role. This could be for the task they were doing at the 
moment of danger or by challenging the authoritative figure or by assuming the leadership 
role within a situation. 
Based on a review of current leadership literature in dangerous contexts, this is a finding 
that appears unique to specialist emergency response teams. Similar to studies of 
conventional working environments, studies in dangerous contexts to date have focused 
on top down hierarchical structures where there is a designated selected leader in control 
of teams. Leadership that occurs within the team is therefore controlled in this type of 
environment. For example, responsibilities are delegated by the selected leader and 
therefore prompt leadership processes such as ‘monitoring team tasks’ (Morgeson et al, 
2010).  
In another example, where shared leadership occurs within the team, the study is referring 
to the leader “accepting influence” from the team members (Ramthun & Matkin, 2014, 
p252), rather than team members adopting a leadership responsibility. For example, 
current studies of leadership have focused primarily on the emergence of leadership as 
the selection of a leader in a leaderless group (Ramthun & Matkin, 2014). Shared 
leadership was discussed in chapter two and is a process which has been previously 
acknowledged within teams working in dangerous contexts (Klein et al, 2006; Ramthum & 
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Matkin, 2014; Yammarino et al, 2010). However, shared leadership, adaptive leadership, 
directional and self-directed leadership also emerge as types of leadership in dangerous 
contexts in this study. Shared leadership processes alone cannot be enough to 
conceptualise leadership in dangerous contexts, as leadership appears as multi-faceted 
and complex, as discussed in the next section. 
5.8.3 Leadership types emerging from the study 
This study presents leadership in dangerous contexts as different emergent types.  In 
comparison to Klein et al (2009), who identified shared, hierarchical and de-individualised 
leadership types in a study with trauma teams, and Yammarino et al (2010) in their study 
of dangerous military contexts who identified a multi-level model of leadership pragmatic, 
individual and shared leadership, this study identifies leadership types in emergency 
response teams. Leadership in dangerous contexts is multi-faceted, being directional, 
self-directed, adaptive and shared leadership with associated leadership processes and 
presents themes and sub-themes emerging from the focus group, to aid discussion of 
each type. This combination of emergent leadership types is novel as a finding of this 
study in emergency response teams. To address these leadership types effectively, this 
section discusses the social processes of leadership identified in this study and leadership 
styles, to demonstrate the integrative and fluid nature of leadership in dangerous contexts. 
Following data analysis, the study adapted to acknowledge the concept of leadership 
types because this emerged naturally from the data. Focus on leadership types became 
prominent as a way of thematically grouping processes emerging in teams in dangerous 
contexts. For example, sense making and dynamic decision-making processes fall under 
the leadership type of ‘Adaptive leadership’ based on the concept that these team 
leadership processes are enablers for leadership and its ability to adjust to the dynamic 
characteristics of an incident.  
The complexity of leadership is framed and discussed by leadership type; a process by 
which social processes of leadership emerge and interact. Yammarino et al (2010) asserts 
a conceptual multi-level model of leadership and team dynamics which examines 
leadership in dangerous military contexts at the individual, dyad, group/teams and 
organisational levels. Day et al’s (2014) suggestion that one leadership approach alone is 
not sufficient to meet the demands for leadership in dangerous contexts is supported by 
this study. For example, leadership needs to be pragmatic and there is also a need to 
work on a one to one basis with team members and at times the group, therefore 
individual and shared leadership are also essential components for successful leadership. 
There was consensus in the focus group teams, that an incident is completed successfully 
when all team members return unharmed and the patient/public survived. As mentioned in 
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chapter four, behaviours and traits were captured as part of the data collection of the 
study and are used to inform the study of the team members’ understanding of leadership 
and their expectations for the leadership role. This is useful to inform the study of the 
challenges to leadership in dangerous contexts but is not discussed beyond this. Future 
post-doctoral research can further analyse this data to consider effective leaders and 
leadership in dangerous conditions. 
Previous and recent studies in teams in dangerous contexts have described leadership as 
shared (Burke et al, 2018), distributed (Gronn, 2002), or adaptive (Marion & Uhl-bien, 
2010) and each is discussed in isolation. In this study, fluid leadership conceptualises 
leadership as a series of dynamic interchanges; consisting of type of leadership and 
leadership as a set of dynamic inter-related processes. First, this study recognises that 
every team member can adopt leadership and could ‘supersede’ their normal working 
command structure, as identified by FG6: 
“Every person in this room could be an operational commander at a major incident 
of any size” (FG6 HART). 
 
This study identifies themes in adaptive leadership, directional and self-directional 
leadership and shared leadership. This theme provides insights into how leadership is 
understood in the team context; identifies and describes the nature of how leadership 
operates within the team when they are working in a dangerous context. It identifies the 
emergent styles of leadership, identifies social processes and details the fluid nature of 
leadership processes and responses to the inherent contextual complexities. 
Within an incident, these leadership types, do not operate in isolation of each other. This 
study identifies that they do not operate in a linear pattern. As discussed in chapter four 
(Findings and Analysis), these styles are not new to literature; however, the dynamic 
rotating, interactive and complex integrative nature of leadership within an incident, 
provides a unique perspective on leadership. The fluidity of the way the four types of 
the loci of leadership merge into an integrative flow is a finding that extends current 
knowledge of leadership operating in dangerous contexts. The complexity of 
leadership approach was summarised well in the following extract from a team in the 
police firearms section: 
“It can quickly change going from one room to another where the number 4 
becomes the number 1 and he becomes the leader for that particular area” (FG5 
PFA). 
 
Upon searching a house (directive and delegation), the rotation (sharing) of leadership is 
made clear. First person in the building leads, flipping to first person out the building leads 
Page 207 of 273 
 
(adaptive). If the team come across something during the search that promotes 
uncertainty in the next action, leadership may then be adopted (shared/adaptive) by the 
person with previous experience of the situation and thus will be looked to as the leader at 
that point (self-directed). 
To fully explain how fluid leadership operates; firstly, the designated hierarchical leader of 
the team may issue instructions for a house to be searched for an armed gunman or other 
occupants. This is a directional leadership style where authority has formally been given 
to enter the premises.  A finding of this study is the loss of control that suddenly happens 
upon entry to the house and the uncertainty presented, and this is where the concept of 
team trust is essential. Upon entering a dangerous context, the importance of and reliance 
on team trust is magnified.   
Another example which the fire service discussed was house fires and how there is a 
sudden loss of leadership control when their team enters a building. Once they are 
through the door, there is nothing more the designated leader can do. At this stage, the 
teams are entering the in-situ stage of an incident. This is where this study argues, fluid 
leadership is needed the most. Once in the house a new team dynamic begins to operate. 
There is no single leadership style but a dynamic interplay of delegated, shared, adaptive 
and directive leadership approaches. 
5.8.4 Shared leadership 
Leadership is shared through the team with responsibility placed on skill, experience, 
training, and trust. Shared leadership is conceptualised here as the way in which 
leadership is shared amongst the team based on role, experience, training and specific 
situational needs and knowledge. A team can be sent into a building to achieve one single 
goal (rescue and survival) but have different leadership responsibilities to enable that goal 
to be achieved. For example; one team member is first in the house making initial risk 
assessments, another team member is listening for sounds of anyone in the building, 
another is on point looking for potential dangers, another is there because they have 
expertise in electrics and there may be exposed wiring. Together they operate using their 
training for scoping a building but leadership as a process is operating in a shared and 
collective way.  
Leadership processes are also fluidly applied throughout the incident. Processes such as 
continuous risk assessment, where all team members are continually scanning for 
potential changes in the circumstances of the team and the incident that could pose new 
threats to the team and the goal. One example used was if a team member in this 
situation heard a cry from somewhere in the house, they would immediately divert their 
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attention to assessing the risks of amending the plan of scoping the house to locating the 
source of the cry.  
In the case of police firearms, they may do this with little communication as they are in-
situ, where the possibility of an armed gunman being in the house with them is probable. 
Communication in this instance is silent and through physical movement. Processes such 
as decision making and risk assessment in-situ at an incident will occur continuously, 
simultaneously and in a matter of seconds, in order for the team to respond to the 
developing situation. In a similar incident with the fire service, responses will again be 
quiet in order to hear any cries through smoke, which poses a severe threat. 
In the example of the police firearms, leadership also moves fluidly between one person to 
another person in the team in a matter of seconds. The first team member in is not 
necessarily the designated leader of the team but has adopted this leadership 
responsibility in this instance. As the teams point out, this could be any member of the 
team as they are all capable. Although the concept of leadership rotating within a shared 
leadership style has been referred to in the dangerous context literature (Ramthun & 
Matkin, 2014), this is not something that has been explored in depth, especially due to the 
challenge of accessing emergency response teams (Burke et al, 2018).  
In this study, several focus groups identified the issues of differences of understanding of 
the situation, multiple interpretations and some team members thinking they know better 
than others. Whilst this may be present in this case, based on different levels of 
experience present, the process of rotating leadership can cause some disruption in terms 
of leadership style in the teams. Every team member will adapt their own way of leading 
for the responsibility they have. However, leadership is challenged by others in the team, 
based on experience or on the basis that the team members are not sure of the directive 
they have received. Their perceptions of the way leaders lead, informs how teams 
respond to leadership. When one leader appeared to panic, the teams responded but 
further leadership command was likely questioned and not trusted by the team.  Based on 
the premise that no task in a dangerous incident can be done in isolation or without impact 
on each other, team members will be responding directly or indirectly to different styles of 
enacting leadership within the span of thirty seconds within an incident.  For example, the 
process of rotating leadership can be within seconds and therefore, the team’s ability to 
provide an adaptive response can be hindered. The combination of new information 
presenting by a cry out in another room, what other team members do in those seconds, 
formulating a response as a team to the cry, and the time pressure to respond 
appropriately. 
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The unique aspect of this sharing of leadership is the immediate, adaptive and fluid nature 
of the handover. This process will not normally involve communication other than the 
previous leadership turning to walk out of the room. Processes such as ‘predicting 
actions’ of team members were identified in this study, which have not been 
identified in current leadership studies addressing dangerous contexts. Aspects of 
team cohesion through training, have referenced the nature of team dynamics and the 
interplay of collective understanding leading to action in ‘normal’ working environments. 
‘Predicting actions’ is an additional process in the context of emergency response. It is 
unusual.  Danger challenges leadership and therefore when facing potential danger and 
the possibility of the unexpected, the ability to predict any of the unfolding situation would 
seem unlikely. Yet, the process emerged across several focus group teams and this was 
attributed to trust, team cohesion and their deeper knowledge and experience of each 
other. 
5.8.5 Adaptive leadership 
Adaptive leadership is inherently contextual. In this study, adaptive leadership is 
conceptualised as the way in which the team adapts to the fluid and dynamic nature of 
dangerous contexts. Hannah et al, (2009) highlight the importance of context and identify 
that different contexts will require different forms of leadership and leaders must be able to 
adjust (Baran & Scott, 2010). This study acknowledges that research into different 
contexts is an ever changing endeavour and is continuously evolving to provide 
researchers with a richer understanding of leadership (Hannah et al, 2009).  Mumford et al 
(2007, p.539) also state the importance of further research into domain specific 
approaches by saying: 
“interaction among variables operating in different domains needs attention, in part 
because it will provide a framework for the development of more sophisticated 
theory and better interventions to help leaders think about problems”. 
An example of this in an emergency response setting is from one team leader who 
indicates that in a complex incident, retaining control of every aspect is not possible and 
therefore delegation of leadership is essential: 
“I’m in charge of an incident, I can’t deal with every aspect of the incident. So, that 
could be communications, it could be tactical, it could be rescue procedures, it 
could be health and safety… so I’ll appoint people. So, I’ll take one of those things 
out…XXX might be dealing with 2 or 3 and XXX might be dealing with 1. I can’t 
deal with all those spans of control effectively, so I’ll delegate” (FG7 FS). 
 
In an example like the one stated above, leadership styles continue to operate adaptively, 
simultaneously and in tandem with each other. If leadership is shared amongst the team 
members based on task, ability and experience, then leadership styles are operating 
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collectively. Adding to this discussion, incidents that are large, complex and wide spread, 
geographically benefit from leadership tasks and responsibilities being shared across the 
team.   
During dangerous incidents, an action of one team member can influence the reaction or 
action of another team member. Focus group teams raised the issue of team dynamics 
and the necessity to have an acute awareness of this influence. For every decision made 
individually, other team members need to be able to quickly adapt to the new presenting 
situational dangers and set of decisions that need to be made in its wake.  
Ambiguity created by the unexpected, is the result of “multiple plausible interpretations” 
(Weick, 1995, p.45) which leadership must collectively filter in order to provide an adaptive 
response. There is little to explain how leaders respond or interpret the “multiplicity of 
stories” (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014, p.95) that are drawn from multiple interpretations 
and the ambiguity that this must create surrounding the context. Building on the 
uniqueness suggested by Hannah et al (2009) and Baran and Scott (2010), the context of 
leadership emergency response is unique with its own particular risks. Emergency 
response teams are often negotiating complexity. For example, making timely decisions in 
ambiguous contexts; concerning the safety of all individuals in the team, the patients, the 
public and themselves.  
“Everyone knows what they are facing, everyone knows what outcomes can come 
of it.  If he comes out with a gun, or he doesn’t come out with a gun, or he’s got it 
against someone’s head.  It’s knowing exactly what to do” (FG4 PFA). 
 
Sense making is defined by this study as the way individuals process and create meaning 
in the face of ambiguity and subsequently, the need to adapt. It is a key leadership 
process of “ordering force in the face of chaos” (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014. P80), which 
in turn is inherently ambiguous and creates feelings of uncertainty. Focus group teams 
discussed the potential sudden absence of leadership in critical situations. Schmutz et al 
(2018) describe the difficulties of reflection in the heat of the moment in health care 
emergency teams. There is the potential for leaders to freeze, panic because they are 
unsure what to do, or to simply stop communication because they are reflecting and 
thinking of a solution. Both scenarios mean that the team is vulnerable to threat. Ramthun 
and Matkin (2014) acknowledge that this is when a ‘speak up’ culture is important. Their 
concept of ‘mutual influence’ (Ramthun and Matkin, 2014) is pivotal in averting disaster, 
where the team suddenly needs to adapt. At this point adaptive and shared leadership 
types occur, where a team member may take the lead.  
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Although the teams may not go searching for danger, by the very nature of the role, 
danger finds them because of the types of services they are and therefore the unusual 
situations they find themselves in: 
‘It was a situation with HART, coastguard helicopter, ambulance, police and our 
guys. The only people who could actually get that person out was this team, 
because of where they were. But it’s about the inherent danger in that task, it was 
enormous’ (FG2 MR). 
 
FG2 also raise questions about the nature of danger at multi-agency incidents in the quote 
above. They indicate that a lot is happening at once on scene. This provides a 
complicating dimension to incidents where there are many complicating factors to 
consider when managing an incident. Each emergency service in this case is a variable, 
which needs to be managed alongside the inherent danger of the rescue task. This makes 
danger inherently complex due to the amount of factors to consider, seen and unseen and 
dynamic, because of the fast, changing nature of the circumstances. 
During an incident, sense making is a continuous process adopted by all team members 
throughout the incident. The possibility of the unexpected happening and presenting new 
dangers means that teams collectively seek information to inform their current 
understanding of the incident. Rapidly unfolding events and the potential of danger, 
makes this a difficult process.  
Uitdewilligen and Waller (2018, p.13) state that the process of information sharing within 
teams is to “encourage proactive behaviours”. This refers to a specific phase in team 
communication processes whereas in dangerous incidents this information sharing can be 
disrupted in teams by dynamic and rapidly unfolding events. In a context where rapid 
decision making is necessary, lack of information to make sense of unfolding events 
hinders team leadership processes and forces team members to make decisions based 
on out of date information and therefore hinders adaptive leadership responses. This 
study supports previous studies in the importance of the sense making process, 
particularly in incidents where decision-making processes are dynamic and under 
significant pressure, and builds on current constructs of leadership under the 
unique pressures in emergency response. 
5.8.6 Self-directed leadership 
Self-directed leadership, referred to as ‘individualised leadership’ (Yammarino et al, 2010), 
is the ways in which individuals must take responsibility and accountability for their own 
actions, making autonomous decisions, and the influence of these on the team. 
“Everybody here is a paramedic. So, as a paramedic, you’re an autonomous 
practitioner” (FG6 HART). 
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This statement encompasses the view of all focus group teams, that they are individuals 
working in a team. Despite the inherent closeness of team members and the display of 
profound cohesion, they are all individually trained specialists in that emergency service, 
that have then been allocated a team on arrival to the division or unit. Self-directed 
leadership is viewed as a leadership style operating within the collective of a team 
environment.  
Focus group team members refer to the teams not needing ‘much leadership’ (FG6 
HART), stating that they retain their independence as working within a team.  The 
inherently dangerous nature of the context for these teams means that self-directing 
processes are an essential part of the team role. In incidents where the team may be 
spread out, team members are individually responsible for conducting their continuous 
personal risk assessments and assessing the influence different scenarios will make to 
theirs and the team’s success.  Focus group teams are also referring to the dynamics of 
some dangerous contexts requiring team members to take responsibility for a single team 
task. 
Interpreting the statement that they do not need much leadership, it is probable that due to 
the fluid nature of leadership moving between team members, there is often little need for 
a designated leader. The teams are continuously adopting leadership roles and therefore 
a formal approach to leadership becomes a rare occurrence. This view supports the 
process view of leadership adopted in this study and challenges current literature, as 
studies of leadership in dangerous contexts place significant focus on the importance of 
the hierarchical leader, specifically in military studies. A process view focuses on team 
members’ enactment of leadership as it is required. 
Despite self-directed leadership emerging as a thematic area in this study, there are 
several challenges with this to leadership in dangerous contexts: 
“That can make it very difficult because everyone has got an opinion…and a valid 
opinion but at the end of the day, it has to be one voice sometimes” (FG6 HART). 
 
The presence of multiple interpretations leads to the presence of multiple voices in-situ at 
an incident. This is problematic. In complex dangerous incidents, focus group teams 
identify that one voice is sometimes preferable to multiple voices or opinions. There is no 
discouragement of articulating concerns or posing ideas, but as has previously been 
established, the expectation of leadership is the removal of ambiguity from complex 
dynamic situations. Problems with self-directed leadership continue into processes such 
as decision making and the influence of these self-decided actions on the rest of the team. 
Autonomy is purposeful when working on a patient individually, therefore lending itself to 
particular job tasks at an incident. In some cases, a decision to offload a firearm can be an 
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individual decision that has significant consequence. Although not the normal procedure 
for firearms teams, firing a weapon without permission based on an individual’s 
assessment of a situation is plausible, but this decision will come under immense scrutiny.  
A theme that appeared in the literature was referred to as ‘Encourage team self- 
management’ (Morgeson et al, 2010). In contrast to the discussion here, this was 
described primarily as a leadership function but as a function from a leader perspective.  
The theme presented in this study differs from current literature in that data here 
suggests an extension of current understanding; the team encourages its own self-
management within incidents by having this ability to rotate roles and 
responsibilities within the team. A fluid framework for leadership in dangerous contexts 
will now be presented. 
5.8.7 Fluid framework for leadership in dangerous contexts 
As previously discussed, there are much wider implications from the context, on 
leadership approach and leadership processes (Osborn et al, 2002). This study builds on 
the knowledge that one type of leadership approach does not conceptualise the 
integrative nature of leadership in dynamic and dangerous contexts. Supporting Osborn et 
al (2002), Day et al (2014, p.64) state that “developing effective leadership processes 
involve more than simply deciding which leadership theory is to be used to motivate 
effective development”. 
In essence, teams need to understand complexity dynamics to determine how to respond 
in each situation (Porter & Uhl-Bien et al, 2007; O’Connell, 2014), specifically the capacity 
to remove levels of ambiguity appears to be paramount in emergency response team 
leadership, rather than sense making providing a range of possible options.  
Considering leadership in-situ in a number of incidents, it has been described as complex 
and dynamic, as potentially moving from person to person within the incident, often 
rotating this responsibility within seconds in the presence of danger. The dynamic nature 
of this is the quick time in which this takes place. To add complexity, in the same incident 
at the same time, leadership types will also change to adapt to the dynamic of an 
unfolding situation. The fluidity of leadership emerging in this study is contextualised 
in emergency response teams of how social processes of leadership operate within 
teams in dangerous situations and extends current knowledge. 
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Table 5.3 - Contributions to leadership in dangerous contexts 
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5.9 Summary of chapter and contributions to leadership 
 
Based on the analysis of the findings in chapter four (Findings and Analysis) and chapter 
five (Discussion and Contributions), figure 5.1 below is a visual representation of how this 
study conceptualises leadership in dangerous contexts. A discussion of this 
conceptualisation follows below. 
Figure 5.1 – Visual representation of leadership in dangerous contexts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Fluid Leadership 
Dangerous Context 
            Pre-arrival                Critical point           Immediate Aftermath 
Dangerous Context 
                  Pre-arrival                           Critical Point                 Im ediate Aftermath 
 
Leadership social 
processes act as 
‘cooling agents’ 
Danger represented as ‘heat’. The larger the flame the greater the intensity of danger. 
Effect of 
danger 
shown as the 
incident 
‘heating up’ 
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Building on the incident stages identified in figure 4.6 in chapter four, where the focus on 
social processes was clarified, this diagram shows the five stages that are identified by 
the study. Two stages depict normal and routine operation where procedures are followed 
and three of the stages represent working in a dangerous context: pre-incident, critical 
point and aftermath. 
Drawing further from figure 4.6 in chapter four and the idea of danger in incidents heating 
up and cooling down, the study adopts the concept of thermo-dynamics and convection, 
whereby the three stages representing working in a dangerous context are demonstrated 
by the process of heat (danger) applied to a fluid rising and cooling down. Criticality within 
the incident is demonstrated by the intensity of the fire underneath. The heat is rising pre-
incident, reaches peak heat at the critical point in the incident, where danger is most 
present, and subsides as the moment of criticality passes. 
In this study, type of leadership and social leadership processes are placed as the cooling 
agents to this critical heat (or danger) to the participants, whereby they seek to reduce the 
danger. The blue down arrows demonstrate the cooling of the danger. Leadership is 
conceptualised as directional, self-directed, adaptive and shared across the three stages.  
The diagram demonstrates that this is a fluid, cyclical process of leadership continuously 
being applied across the three stages. Where leadership fails to either identify or manage 
the incident, the heat keeps rising and the participants are further exposed to danger.  
Fluid leadership is represented above as a Venn diagram, demonstrating that leadership 
types and processes do not happen in isolation. The overlap of the diagram shows that 
there is continuous movement of the four types of leadership throughout each incident 
stage. Similarly, social leadership processes that have been found within leadership, are 
fluidly moving backwards and forwards through the incident stages to counteract the 
growing heat of danger. The diagram demonstrates the contribution of conceptualising 
leadership as fluid, to understanding of leadership in dangerous contexts. 
Leaders that work in dangerous contexts face the potential of threat to their lives and 
those to whom they are responsible (Hannah et al, 2009; Busby & Iszatt-White 2014). 
Leaders in emergency response teams often arrive at scenes that are disturbing, 
dangerous to them and others, have high levels of ambiguity and are chaotic, or what this 
study identifies as the characteristics of a dangerous context.   An effective leadership role 
in these circumstances is to create order from this chaos (Weick, 1995). As previously 
discussed, dangerous contexts have unique causes and contingencies (Hannah et al, 
2009) which make the leadership role to create order in complex and challenging 
circumstances. Leadership must respond to contexts that often grow in intensity and 
extremity, have unknown and unexpected risk factors and face situations where the 
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actions of team members can have unintended consequences, negative or positive, and 
where there is significant potential for error. 
Despite over twenty-five years of researchers examining contextual influences on 
leadership, there remains little empirical data on how leadership operates in dangerous 
contexts (Osborn, 2014; Campbell et al, 2010). This study has responded to the “call to 
arms” (Hannah et al, 2010, p. S158) to study leadership where there are severe risks of 
harm to organisational members. This thesis also responds to the call for research into 
new and novel contexts (Grint, 2005; Osborn, 2002), specifically exploring what the 
influences are in these uniquely defined contexts and how these influence cognitive 
adaptive responses of leaders. Most research in dangerous contexts conducted is  from 
historical documented sources or from sources that experienced the aftermath of the 
danger, rather than the danger itself. Campbell et al (2010) categorise emergency 
response teams as those that attend post-danger as the danger is not to them but to the 
patient that experienced the incident. This study challenges this assertion by 
demonstrating that when working in emergency response, the danger has not necessarily 
passed when attending on scene, nor is the concept of rescue, a non-dangerous context. 
Teams also see themselves as dangerous and pose a threat to others. 
In-situ is where fluid leadership is prominent, and the process of fluidity becomes 
interesting as team leadership dynamics flow interchangeably in several dimensions. This 
study presents leadership as different emergent types in dangerous contexts. In 
comparison to Klein et al (2006) who identified shared, hierarchical and de-individualised 
leadership types in urgent but non-dangerous contexts, this study identifies leadership 
types in emergency teams as being directional, self-directed, adaptive and shared. 
Leadership is conceptualised as moving fluidly between these different types of leadership 
dependent on the changing context.  
Considering leadership in one incident, it has been described as potentially moving from 
person to person within the incident, often rotating this responsibility within seconds in the 
presence of danger. In the same incident at the same time, leadership types will also 
change to adapt to the dynamic of an unfolding situation. The fluidity of leadership 
emerging in this study is uniquely contextualised in emergency response teams and 
extends current knowledge of how social processes of leadership operate within teams in 
dangerous situations. 
A key contribution of this study is that social processes of leadership do not 
appear as static within definitive stages in dangerous incidents, but instead are 
‘fluid’. Focus groups themselves used this term as they understand leadership, 
processes of leadership and in turn leadership responses to danger, to be cyclical in 
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nature; continuously moving (fluidly) between the different stages of an incident, 
continuously assessing and evaluating as the incident develops.  
The results of the process card exercise indicate several emergent findings. In addition to 
identifying additional processes across multiple stages, teams also identified new stages 
in incidents (pre-arrival and immediate aftermath) which present an extension to current 
literature in teams facing danger (Hannah et al, 2009). In summary, the process card 
exercise actively engages teams in co-constructing how leadership works in dangerous 
contexts. Examining leadership and leadership processes by this visual method, is a novel 
method in the context of emergency response and dangerous context study.  
5.10 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has discussed the key themes of this study and outlined the main 
methodological, theoretical and practical contributions of this study.  A framework of 
processes for working in dangerous contexts has been presented and discussed. The 
next chapter provides an evaluative framework for the research, addresses the limitations 
of the study, provides concluding comments and finally provides a comprehensive 
reflective account of challenges faced by the researcher.  
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Chapter 6 – Conclusions and reflections of the study 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines the conclusions of the research. The chapter also provides a 
summary overview of the research study and shows how the study has addressed the 
research aims, objectives and research questions. An evaluative framework is provided, 
addressing credibility of the study. Limitations of the research are discussed alongside 
identifying opportunities from the literature and this study, for future post-doctoral 
research. A comprehensive reflective account from the researcher is also presented. 
6.2 Overview of research 
 
The following section provides a summary overview of the study and outlines how each 
chapter sought to address the overall research question and sub-questions. 
6.2.1 Revisiting the research aims, objectives and questions 
This study has responded to the limited amount of research studies of leadership in 
dangerous contexts (Hannah et al 2009; Burke et al, 2018). A review of contemporary 
literature of leadership in dangerous contexts, raised questions of how leadership 
processes enable the enactment of leadership. Therefore, the broad research question 
that this study sought to explore is: How is leadership enacted in dangerous contexts? 
The four additional sub-questions below related to the overall research question, and were 
addressed through the study: 
 
• How do teams working in dangerous contexts construct leadership? 
• How do teams working in dangerous contexts construct danger? 
• How does danger influence leadership processes? 
• What are the leadership processes of teams working in dangerous contexts? 
 
Chapter two identified several areas that influenced the research questions which are 
useful to state again here: 
1. There is limited understanding of the processes of leadership enacted in dangerous 
contexts, specifically in emergency response. The study of how leadership is enacted 
within a team in dangerous contexts, will be a useful area for research (Mumford et al, 
2000 & Mumford et al, 2007) 
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2. There is a lack of knowledge about how leaders think within teams and how teams    
understand dangerous contexts (Mumford et al, 2007) 
 
3. There is a need to focus on identifying further enabling processes that will explore how 
leaders reduce ambiguity of “multiple plausible interpretations” in an effort adapt to the 
context of working in emergency services to minimise errors (Baran & Scott, 2010; 
Wolbers & Boersma, 2013; Colville et al, 2013). 
In order to address the research question and sub-questions, research was conducted 
into leadership processes in teams facing dangerous contexts. Eight focus groups were 
conducted across four emergency services. A total of sixty-one participants engaged with 
the research. This thesis addressed six research objectives and was structured in the 
following way: 
Chapter One – Introduction: This chapter provided an introduction and overview of the 
thesis. The chapter outlined the theoretical focus of the study and contextualised this, 
giving some initial consideration to the gap in the current literature and then addressed the 
motivations for undertaking this study. Finally, the research question, sub-questions and 
six objectives that will guide the study were outlined. 
Chapter Two – Context of team leadership and leadership processes in dangerous 
contexts: The chapter addressed the first two research objectives: 
• To critique and build on existing theory of Leadership by developing the concept of 
leadership in dangerous contexts. 
 
• To explore the theoretical area of leadership in dangerous contexts by identifying 
existing leadership processes in the literature. 
 
This chapter meets the above objectives by critically reviewing contemporary leadership 
literature, drawing from current theoretical bases of teams, leadership processes and 
dangerous contexts. The review conceptualised these terms for the purposes of the study 
and highlighted the limitations of current studies in these areas. 
Chapter Three – Methodology: The chapter addressed the third research objective: 
• To adopt a relevant qualitative methodological framework for data collection and 
analysis to capture the participant voices. 
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This chapter meets the above research objective by addressing the methodological 
approach, study design and methods used to undertake the study. The researcher’s 
philosophical position was discussed and the process adopted for thematic analysis was 
reviewed. Any ethical considerations were addressed towards the end of the chapter. 
Chapter Four – Findings: This chapter addressed the fourth research objective: 
• To conduct thematic analysis of data to generate in depth understanding of leadership 
in dangerous contexts through the lens of teams. 
 
This chapter meets the above objective by presenting the findings of the study. Findings 
were shown by category, themes and sub-themes that emerged during the focus groups 
and were discussed in detail with verbatim comments, capturing the participant voice. 
Chapter Five – Discussion and contributions: This chapter addressed the fifth and the 
sixth research objective: 
• To add to the existing theoretical area of leadership in dangerous contexts by identifying 
leadership processes. 
 
• To develop a theoretical framework with the intent of contributing to theoretical and 
practical bases for enacting leadership in dangerous contexts. 
 
This chapter meets the above objectives by presenting an integrated discussion of the 
main themes in the findings chapter and current literature in chapter two. This chapter 
highlighted where findings of the study challenged, extended or added to the existing 
knowledge base and provided a theoretical framework for leadership in dangerous 
contexts and outlined the methodological, theoretical and practical contributions. 
Chapter Six – Conclusions and researcher reflections: This final chapter revisits the 
research question, sub-questions and objectives and outlines how the study addresses 
these. It also outlines areas for future research. The chapter discusses the evaluative 
framework adopted by the study to ensure issues of credibility, reliability and validity in the 
research are addressed. Finally, the researcher outlines key reflections of undertaking the 
study and highlights important lessons learned throughout the process. 
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6.3 Summary of the research contributions 
 
This thesis provides theoretical, methodological and practical contributions from 
conducting primary research into leadership in dangerous contexts. This study has 
established that there is limited research into leadership in dangerous contexts and 
therefore, there is insufficient knowledge about how leaders operate in dangerous 
contexts and HROs (Hannah et al, 2009). Furthermore, there is a lack of understanding of 
the processes of leadership in dangerous contexts (Baran & Scott, 2010) and 
understanding of how leadership is enacted is limited. As a result, further research of 
leadership in contexts characterised by danger, threat and risk was required (Hannah et 
al, 2009).  
This research responds to this limited research. Viewing leadership as a social process, 
the study focused on the social processes by which groups understand and operate in 
dangerous contexts.  Eight focus groups were conducted in emergency service response 
teams from the ambulance, police, fire and mountain rescue service. Following data 
analysis of the transcripts, categories, themes and sub-themes were presented and 
discussed in the findings chapter. A synthesis of the literature and the findings was 
undertaken in the discussion chapter and areas where the findings challenged, extended 
and supported the existing literature, were presented.  In this chapter, a summary of the 
main contributions to leadership in dangerous contexts is outlined, followed by the 
evaluative framework used to address issues of credibility and reliability of the data. The 
following table (6.1) provides a summary of the main contributions to leadership in 
dangerous contexts. 
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Table 6.1 – Summary of contributions of the research to leadership in dangerous 
contexts 
Area of Contribution Contribution 
Context of leadership Leadership in dangerous contexts is relatively under 
explored. There are few studies focusing on emergency 
response teams.  
 
This study builds on the current empirical knowledge to 
offer insights into the challenges and expectations of 
leadership in emergency response teams and challenges 
the concept of directional and command leadership 
suggesting that leadership is multi-faceted and fluid. 
 
How participants 
construct danger 
This study builds on the definitions of danger by Hannah 
et al. (2009) to recognise that danger is often as a result 
of the unexpected and unanticipated within an incident.  
 
Based on a limited knowledge of emergency response 
teams, further addition to knowledge is the concept of 
how emergency response teams view themselves; as 
dangerous and superheroes. 
The influence of danger 
on leadership 
This study extends current constructs of leadership 
(Hannah et al 2009; Morgeson et al, 2010) in dangerous 
contexts through the identification of two additional 
stages within incidents: Pre-arrival and immediate 
aftermath stages. 
 
This study builds on current understanding of leadership 
processes in dangerous contexts, inductively exploring 
relational processes of leadership within incidents.  
 
Further contribution is the placing of social processes at 
different stages of an incident and understanding how the 
levels of criticality fluctuate within those stages and 
influence social processes.  
 
An additional process of ‘predicting other team members 
actions’ was also identified. 
 
This study further offers the concept that leadership and 
leadership processes are the method for counteracting 
this danger and leadership is thus conceptualised as a 
complex, dynamic and fluid process. 
 
Fluid Leadership and 
processes 
This study conceptualises a new leadership framework in 
which a range of leadership types fluidly interact in 
response to a dynamic environment.  
 
Extending current understanding of leadership in 
emergency response teams, leadership is conceptualised 
in dangerous contexts as directed, self-directed, adaptive 
and shared. 
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6.4 Evaluative framework 
 
This section discussed the evaluative framework adopted by this study. The table below 
highlights an evaluative framework by Lincoln and Guba (1995) and which has been 
adapted to demonstrate how this study responded. This evaluation offers techniques that 
can be employed when conducting focus groups and conducting a thematic analysis of 
the data. As mentioned above, the table has been adapted for the purposes of this 
research and a column has been added to demonstrate how this research has addressed 
these issues of credibility, dependability, transferability and confirmability.   
Table 6.2 – Evaluative Framework - Sourced and adapted from Morrison-Beedy et 
al, (2001, p.51) 
Criteria (adapted from 
Lincoln & Guba, 1995) 
Suggested Techniques Technique used 
Credibilty 
• Truth Value 
• Confidence in the truth 
of the data 
• Reflective of multiple 
constructions of reality 
• Conduct multiple focus 
groups 
• Use detailed interview 
guide 
• Encourage participants to 
share their perspectives; 
consensus is not the goal 
• Go back to group leaders 
for verification of findings 
• Triangulate data collection 
and analysis methods 
• Debrief with every team 
member after each focus 
group session 
• Multiple focus 
groups used with 
different emergency 
services 
• Participants shared 
perspective of an 
incident 
• Participants were 
asked to confirm the 
findings at the time 
of research and 
team leaders sent 
the transcripts of the 
focus group 
• Processes through 
data generation and 
analysis methods 
were mapped out. 
• Focus groups were 
de-briefed 
Dependability 
• Stability of findings over 
time 
• Met if findings are 
credible 
• Analyse data 
independently (sub-team) 
then together (full team) 
• Use same interview guide 
with each group 
• Prepare transcripts 
promptly 
• Overlap methods 
 
• Independent coding 
and analysis then 
secondary person 
coded – Agreed 
descriptions of 
processes made 
• Same interview 
guide was used in 
each focus group 
• Transcripts were 
done concurrently to 
data collection 
• Multiple methods 
used in the focus 
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group to extract and 
verify processes. 
Transferability 
• Applicability 
• Fittingness 
• Use direct quotes when 
presenting findings 
• Provide thick, rich data 
slices for descriptions 
• Describe sample and 
setting so potential appliers 
can make transferability 
decisions 
• Direct quotes from 
focus groups were 
used to form 
descriptions of 
processes and 
context 
• Transferability will 
be to other 
emergency service 
providers nationally. 
Research will be 
disseminated in 
appropriate context 
 
Confirmability 
• Auditability 
• Neutrality of the 
researcher 
• Process Criterion 
• Provide detailed audit trail 
of what was done and why 
• Note agreement amongst 
investigators on 
transcriptions, codes and 
themes 
• Keep notes on processes, 
procedures and researcher 
thoughts 
• Return to the data to verify 
concordance of findings 
with the raw data 
• Methodological 
process of 
identifying 
processes has been 
highlighted 
• Agreement has 
been reached on 
process meaning 
and description 
• Researcher has 
kept notes 
throughout the 
research process 
and focus group 
data collection 
• A mapping process 
against the literature 
has been conducted 
to identify new 
processes. 
 
Several methods were utilised to ensure that the research was credible and reliable, 
which are outlined below.  
 Supervision arrangements: I engaged in supervision meetings every month with my 
supervisory team. This was an essential part of the doctoral processes. This process 
enabled my supervision team to give feedback on my work consistently through the 
doctoral progression process and to question my approaches at each stage of the thesis. 
This helped me to position myself philosophically as a researcher and justify my research 
decisions at each stage. For example, I was asked to demonstrate my coding process and 
to show how I had collapsed codes into the themes I presented (A worked example of the 
coding process can be seen in appendix G).  
Peer feedback: I have received constant peer support and feedback throughout the 
doctoral process and at each stage of my work. Annual progression points provided the 
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opportunity for my work to be read by peers and to get feedback on the content and 
structure of chapters. I attended the Newcastle Business School Doctoral Methodological 
Summer School in July 2017, which provided the opportunity to focus on my philosophical 
positioning and my use of language as a consequence of this. I embraced this chance to 
fully engage with this chapter and to ensure that my methods were appropriate to my 
positioning as a researcher. 
In order to ensure reliability in my analysis of data, I asked a colleague, who had just 
finished her PhD to code a section of one transcript to check that similar codes were 
generated. The same peer also read the main chapters of my thesis and provided useful 
comments and feedback to ensure I was justifying my approach and to assist me in critical 
writing skill development. My overall thematic template generated from my coding strategy 
was viewed by my peers, my original supervision team (who departed from the institution 
during the summer, 2018), my progression panel and my new supervision team, to ensure 
the robustness of my data analysis process. 
I had two research abstracts accepted for conference paper presentation: one at the 
University Forum for Human Resource Development (UFHRD) conference (June, 2018) 
and one at the International Studying Leadership Conference (December, 2018). The 
conferences were useful as they provided the opportunity for peer support, feedback and 
questions from my presentations, which I used to ensure that I had framed my research 
appropriately. I also presented at the Faculty Doctoral Conference, and won best research 
poster presentation (June, 2018), demonstrating positive peer feedback on my emergent 
findings.  
Participant involvement: One team member from each focus group was asked to review 
the focus group transcript. They were able to share this with the team but not anyone 
outside of the team. Due to the size of the teams, this was deemed the most appropriate 
approach to enable the management of responses. They were given the opportunity to 
highlight if there were any inaccuracies in the incidents described and to confirm that this 
was an accurate reflection of what was said. No teams amended the transcripts. 
As previously discussed in the methodology, the participants of the focus groups were 
asked to take part in the process card exercise. This was a sense checking exercise that 
enabled the participants to be involved in placing the existing process cards at the stages 
of the incident they described. They were also able to add processes in the exercise. This 
was a method of checking the reliability of the data and highlighting the transferability of 
the findings. 
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6.5 Limitations, practical implications and future research opportunities 
 
6.5.1 Limitations 
Retrospective accounts of incidents: There is a restrictive nature in the retrospectivity 
of qualitative research, as highlighted in the limitations of the research. Access to teams 
working in dangerous contexts is difficult as it is near impossible to be in the dangerous 
context in real time to observe the team in action. This study explores the retrospective 
accounts of teams working in dangerous contexts, which similarly may not present an 
accurate reflection of the incidents. The strength of the study is the integrative nature of 
the participant voice. Teams in emergency response are rarely explored and the use of 
focus groups adds a new dimension to exploring teams in this context. Additionally, 
participants were able to become involved in exploring the processes of leadership in the 
process card exercise, based on an incident of their choice that they could recall well. 
As previous mentioned in chapter two, access to observing teams in dangerous contexts 
is difficult. However, studies observing the teams’ interactions in simulated dangerous 
environments would extend the study of leadership processes in emergency response 
teams further. 
A limitation is presented in the generalisability of the study. The study is located in the 
North East of England and this poses some challenges for generalisability to other 
emergency services. Additionally, a sample of incidents discussed in the North East of 
England may not be representative of operational emergency response teams in other 
parts of the country. They may not respond in the same way to incidents, nor may they 
have the same types of incidents. The research adopts an interpretivist approach that 
allows theoretical transferability, but limits formal transferability, to other studies (Gill & 
Johnson, 2010). Other emergency services may not operate in the same way as those in 
this demographic. The leadership framework may potentially be transferrable, however, 
participants in this study describe leadership as they experience it and based on the 
incidents they attended, this may not be representative of all emergency response teams. 
The use of focus groups however, has provided a significant sample size for this doctoral 
research, providing credibility to the findings that have emerged. 
6.5.2 Practical implications of the study 
Hannah and Matthews (2010, p.S181) highlight that further studies and future knowledge 
in dangerous contexts must translate into “usable forms for practitioners who operate in 
dangerous contexts”. Their call is particularly for partnerships between scholars and 
practitioners. In response to this call, this study has considered the practical implications 
for emergency response teams throughout the research. Conversations with senior 
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operational managers in these organisations revealed that they place significant value on 
research of this nature and the findings are important for them in the following ways: 
• Reviewing the way leadership is constructed by emergency response teams and 
informing new approaches to recruitment, selection and training leaders: There 
is limited focus on leadership as a concept in emergency response teams. Although 
there is multi-level leadership enacted in the teams, there is still a primary focus on the 
hierarchical organisational structure. There is no structured leadership training within 
the teams and the theoretical understanding of how leadership works and the formal 
vs informal nature of the concept, is not considered in a formal capacity. 
Understanding the processes of leadership will help in the future recruitment and 
selection of team members, ensuring competency of leadership processes, support 
training of leadership in the teams and act as a supportive step to help them 
understand what they do within the capacity of an adaptive framework. 
 
• Improved team cohesion, succession planning, and therefore morale, 
performance and effectiveness: Further understanding of leadership in the teams 
and how leadership is enacted, will enhance cohesion and morale in the team. There 
is a strong emphasis on performance in the teams, as the result of a bad day can be 
the difference between life and death of the patients and/or themselves. Enhanced 
understanding of how leadership operates within the team (not purely by the leader) 
has the capacity to increase team effectiveness. 
 
• Enhancing the structuring of emergency response teams, their processes and 
sense making efforts: Enhanced understanding of how leadership is enacted in 
times of danger and how it influences leadership processes will support their sense 
making of unexpected and unanticipated events unfolding within incidents. An 
increased awareness of the processes employed by themselves and their team 
members in danger, may support training efforts to enable effective dynamic decision 
making and produce adaptive responses when faced with rapidly unfolding incidents. 
 
• Breaking down barriers in multi-agency working, leading to improved 
information sharing and use of information: Although this is outside the scope of 
the study and has been highlighted for future research, there remain issues with multi-
agency incident presence and the processes enacted across emergency service 
teams. Cross-agency understanding of leadership and processes will enhance their 
collective processes to share information, leadership responsibility and respond to 
danger effectively.  
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This section has described the potential practical implications for this research. The 
following sub-section discussed the implications for future and further research in 
leadership in dangerous contexts. 
6.5.3 Implications for further research  
Undertaking this study has raised several areas for potential future research: 
Comparison of military and civilian emergency response teams: This study has 
focused on emergency response teams, whilst acknowledging the potential overlap of 
leadership processes in military contexts. Future studies might explore the leadership 
processes at incident stages in military contexts as a useful comparison to emergency 
services. Further studies might also address the influence on processes of leadership of 
military contexts on civilian  emergency response teams and vice versa.  This would 
highlight the differences in how processes are enacted under these contextual dynamics.  
Research focused on gender, age and experience: In this study, there were five 
females and fifty six males participating in the research. The level of recruitment of 
females in the emergency response teams is low and would therefore warrant further 
investigation into the reasons for this. Future studies in dangerous contexts may also 
explore the dynamics of a team with female members and the influence of gender, age 
and levels of experience on leadership processes. 
Critical incident method: As the strategy was for focus groups to focus their discussion 
on chosen incidents, I previously considered adopting a Critical Incident technique 
(Flanagan, 1954, p.327) to this research. However, this was not the strategy adopted, as 
the focus of the study was not an analysis of the incident itself, rather of the team within 
the parameters of a dangerous incident. To achieve this, it is necessary to explore specific 
incident dynamics (as opposed to team dynamics) in detail and incidents that the team 
deem to be dangerous.  
Multi-agency incident analysis: Future research would look at multi-agency attendance 
at identified incidents. Studies addressing one particular incident attended by all 
emergency services would be useful to understand leadership further and also studies 
focusing on wider scale and/or longer term incidents would benefit extend existing 
knowledge in this area. There remains limited understanding about cross-agency working 
in dangerous contexts despite this being a common occurrence in practice. This study 
highlights that there are issues with information sharing and conflicts of enacting 
leadership across incidents 
Page 230 of 273 
 
6.6 Reflective account of conducting the research 
 
This section provides a comprehensive reflexive account of conducting the research from 
the researcher perspective, discussing how I have influenced the research and how my 
interaction with the research has influenced me. This is also an opportunity to discuss my 
intellectual journey (Trafford & Leshem, 2008) and provide a reflective analysis on my 
development as a researcher. 
My thoughts were captured through the process of reflectivity, consisting of researcher 
diary notes (Nadin & Cassell, 2006) made throughout the study. This was a useful 
exercise to provide evidence of my personal growth as a researcher and to highlight the 
challenges of researching and lessons learned. As a new early career researcher, the 
doctoral process has been a steep learning curve and one which I have found challenging 
but equally rewarding. Undertaking a study of leadership in dangerous contexts has led 
me to research knowledge that was previously unfamiliar to me. Dangerous context 
literature was new to me as was adaptive and shared leadership, and the in-depth study 
of processes of leadership, for example, sense making. These new areas of leadership 
challenged me to critically analyse my approaches to the study and it was an iterative 
process to design a methodological framework that aligned with the research.  
There have been several areas throughout the study that posed a challenge. I initially had 
concern about accessing teams in the emergency services. Although I was fortunate 
enough to have a contact working in one organisation, in order to gain ethical approval, I 
needed to speak to the management of the organisation and then the team leaders. I 
decided to organise a visit to each organisation and speak to the relevant managers that 
would grant access. This also made access to the teams below much easier. However, in 
one instance, I was surprised how one team manager wanted to bargain a professional 
reciprocal arrangement for my access to the team. This was not possible and caused me 
some concern as I was not in a position in my organisation to provide this. The 
management of the organisation supported my study, so this issue did not become a 
problem. 
I learned that gaining access to organisations can be a lengthy process if the organisation 
is unfamiliar to you as a researcher. As managers, they wish to see you first and gain 
some assurance of your motives towards the organisation and character. Being referred 
by a mutual contact was essential as emergency service organisations pride themselves 
on their reputation. Once access was gained to the teams, the next challenge was to gain 
their trust and openness in order to take part in the focus groups. In a couple of instances, 
I was able to meet the teams before the focus group. However, in most cases, I had to 
gain access to their trust at the time of the focus group. This was difficult and I had to think 
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it through before conducting the focus group. I made one diary entry after one focus group 
that demonstrates this point: 
“Me: As a novice researcher, going into these group settings is very difficult if you 
are not confident about what you are doing and within yourself as a person. I felt 
that after doing pilot focus groups earlier in the year, I was much more aware of 
the pitfalls of researching, which was useful. Post Methodology summer school, I 
feel more sure and confident about the method I’m adopting. This confidence is 
evident as I didn’t falter during the focus group and I was able to explain my 
purpose to their sergeants.  One issue is that they don’t know me and I don’t know 
them. It is necessary to establish a rapport immediately. I was keen not to 
influence them as much as possible. For example: they suddenly were trying not to 
swear, but I didn’t react when they did because I’m not trying to influence the 
dynamic of the group. I think my not reacting to anything, even before the focus 
group started, created a better and less restrictive environment”.  
The teams in this study appeared to be very bonded. Most teams knew each other very 
well as they almost lived together at the station on long shifts and they interacted socially.  
I felt that to gain their trust, I needed to discuss how I and they fitted into the research 
process. Teams visibly relaxed when I stated that I was not reporting back to their 
hierarchy and I was not there to judge their performance. Naturally, they were concerned 
that a stranger was coming in to talk about leadership in the team. 
Another role of the researcher is to evaluate the dynamics of the team. Every team 
appeared to ‘test’ me in some way, to ascertain my humour level and general character. 
For example, one team gave me a rude cup for my tea. Another team placed my chair in 
the middle on the room and insisted that was where I was sitting. Making a judgement and 
not wanting to seem ‘weak’ in their eyes, I picked up the chair and moved it to the edge of 
the room stating that I was not going to be in the middle as the focus group was not about 
me. Gauging the dynamics in the team was useful in order to place myself in the research. 
Within thirty seconds of entering the room in the first focus group and meeting the team, I 
saw that they were all drinking tea from a huge silver old fashioned kettle. I used this as 
my bonding technique, asking them to put the kettle on, as a method of breaking the ice. 
This worked every time. 
There were some questions from the teams about the nature of academic work and how 
they fitted into the process. The very mention of the term ‘PhD’ or ‘research’ by their team 
leaders, to some of the teams, created some uncertainty. They felt they were not 
intelligent enough to take part. The following diary entry demonstrates how I changed my 
approach to counteract this: 
“I found that having set questions were useful so that I knew what I wanted to 
know but also restrictive as I found that I needed to re-phrase things quite often to 
get the point of the question across. As a result, I possibly asked more probing 
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questions in this group. The group pointed out that just because of what they did, it 
didn’t make them intelligent.  They joked that I either needed to get more intelligent 
people or ask easier questions. However, I think they were overthinking the 
academic nature of this and this stunted their responses at times. I felt it was my 
role to ask the question a different way”. 
In response to this issue I made the following notes: 
“Me: I am very aware of the reactions of others to what I’m doing. I have a good 
sense when others are struggling. This means that the questions, although similar 
in nature, were tailored to each group as I anticipated the dynamics. I felt that the 
set questions would not all be understood, so I had alternative ways of asking the 
same thing”. 
The nature of conducting research in these organisations has some additional challenges. 
Often, the teams were ‘on call’ and if a 999 call came in, the team had to go out on the job 
even if the focus group was still in progress. On a couple of occasions, I was left in the 
station day room as the teams were required on a job. At one point I was locked in a 
station and not able to leave as my car was stuck in the compound. I thought I would be 
there for hours so I put the kettle on and waited until they returned. Interestingly, I worried 
that this would disrupt the flow of the focus group, perhaps undo some of the trust that I 
had built in the previous hour. However, the team members walked back in, took the same 
seats again and we carried on. If anything, the teams were more energised and keen to 
discuss incidents and issues they faced. They also saw that I was serious about the 
research because I had waited and respected that they needed to do their jobs first and 
foremost. 
After the focus groups, I received some excellent feedback from the teams, particularly 
the designated team leaders. It was useful to interact with the teams and gain their 
thoughts on the research. All teams said they enjoyed the focus groups and they said it 
was a useful study to do and they were interested that they were the voices in the 
research. They all felt they would benefit from the results of this study and would like me 
to disseminate the findings. I will be doing this in a way that is appropriate to each 
organisation. 
As part of my efforts to ensure data credibility, I asked one participant from each focus 
group to read over the transcript of the focus group. This was to ensure that it represented 
an accurate reflection of what was said. No focus group changed the transcript. However, 
one team leader requested the transcript, despite not being part of the focus group. They 
wanted to check what had been said to ensure that there was nothing that could discredit 
the organisation. As the researcher, I was under ethical obligations not to disclose this 
and therefore refused. I was concerned that they would then withdraw from the study and 
this would have been very disappointing at that stage. I provided a full explanation of how 
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the data was used, that the transcript was not going to be published, and I believe that this 
satisfied the team leader.  
The above examples provide a reflexive account of how I have developed as a researcher 
and the challenges I have faced. Demonstrating integrity as a researcher is important to 
me and I believe I have shown this throughout the research process. My knowledge and 
skills of researching have developed by interacting with the doctoral programme sessions 
over the last few years, gaining peer feedback on my work and by undertaking primary 
research with teams working in dangerous contexts. 
6.7 Summary of chapter 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the research study and has discussed the 
evaluative framework adopted to ensure robustness and quality of data throughout the 
research design, data collection and analysis methods. The limitations of the research 
have been addressed and the implications of this study on future research opportunities 
and further research areas have been identified. A reflective account of the research, 
identifying areas of significant influence on the research, and the researcher, has been 
presented; this comprehensive analysis highlights the strengths of the research as well as 
the methodological and practical challenges of conducting this study. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A - Leadership processes in conventional contexts 
Process Sub-processes 
Compose Team Selection of highly competent/motivated team members 
Selects team members with good history of joint working 
Ensures appropriate skill mix within the team to achieve team 
functions/goals 
Define Mission Emphasizes how important it is to have a collective sense of 
mission 
Ensures a clear team mission/purpose and direction to achieve 
Develops a clear vision of the team direction  
Establish Expectations and Goals Clearly determines what is expected of the team by the 
organisation/ environment scanning/forecasting 
Clearly defines and communicates what is expected of the 
team to achieve performance 
Established challenging and realistic goals for the team and 
individual members 
Structure and Plan Defines and structures own work and the work of the team, 
including critical activities 
Works with the team to develop the best possible approach to 
its work/task performance strategies 
Works with the team to develop best approach to work, 
defining standardised processes 
Ensures all team roles are clearly established 
Training and Develop Team Ensures new team members are trained to carry out their 
duties, including task specific instruction 
Ensures team members are continuously trained and 
developed 
Provide stress exposure training/scenario planning 
 Ensure the team learns from events/experience 
Teaching individuals or team for team effectiveness 
Sense Making Facilitates team understanding of events/situations and their 
implications 
Framing/ help the team make sense of ambiguity 
Heedful interrelating/collective sense making 
Adjusting/adaptability 
Groupthink 
Provide Feedback Communicates business issues, operating results and reviews 
team performance results with the team 
Provides constructive feedback, either positive or corrective 
action 
Provides rewards for positive action 
Monitor Team Monitors team external environment, including what other 
teams are doing 
Monitors individual and team performance and interactions, 
ensuring team stay focused on task/coordination 
Requests task relevant information from team members 
Notices flaws in task procedures or team outputs and suggests 
improvements 
Manage Boundaries Buffers the team from the influence of external forces or 
events 
Helps different teams communicate with one another, 
resolving difficulties/obstacles 
Acts as advocate and representative of the team with other 
parts of the organization 
Challenge Team Reconsiders key assumptions in order to determine the 
appropriate course of action 
Emphasizes the importance and value of questioning team 
members 
Challenges the status quo, suggests new ways of working, and 
improvements to team functioning 
Perform Team Task Will actively become involved in team working to ensure tasks 
are completed 
Will intervene directly to help individuals undertake core 
functions 
Solve Problems Implements or helps the team implement solutions to 
problems, task and interaction/inter-personal 
Seeks multiple different perspectives when solving problems 
Participates in joint problem solving with the team, enabling 
team members to create solutions 
Gathers information to support team in problem solving tasks 
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Decision Making 
Provide Resources Obtains and allocates resources (materials, equipment, 
people, and services) for the team 
Seeks information and resources to facilitate the team’s 
initiatives, including 'expert' resources 
Sees to it that the team gets what is needed from other teams 
Encourage Team Self-Management Encourages the team to be responsible for determining the 
methods, procedures, and schedules with which the work gets 
done 
Urges the team to make its own decisions regarding who does 
what tasks within the team 
Encourages the team to assess its own performance 
Support Social Climate Responds promptly to team member needs or concerns 
Engages in actions that demonstrate respect and concern for 
team member's wellbeing 
Engages in actions that demonstrate respect and concern for 
team member's wellbeing 
Develop trust in the leader 
Develops a positive group culture/social cohesion 
Shared Leadership Shared Leadership/role multiplicity/Locus of leadership 
Influence 
Intragroup Conflict 
Consensus Building/coordinated action 
Team Cognition/Macro-Cognition/collective 
metacognition/mental models 
Intragroup trust/shared belief 
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Appendix B – Leadership processes in dangerous contexts 
Process Sub-processes Definition 
Define Mission Ensures a clear team mission/purpose 
and direction to achieve 
Direction setting includes information 
search and structuring and 
information use in problem solving. 
Information search and structuring 
refers to the leader’s search for 
information, analysis, organization 
and interpretation of information 
inside and outside the team 
(Fleishman et al., 1991), (Barnett & 
McCormick, 2012) 
Develops a clear vision of the team 
direction  
 
Establish Expectations 
and Goals 
Clearly determines what is expected 
of the team by the organisation/ 
environment scanning/forecasting 
 
Structure and Plan Ensures all team roles are clearly 
established 
 
Train and Develop Team Ensures team members are 
continuously trained and developed 
 
Ensure the team learns from 
events/experience 
Using information from both prior 
experience and training to purposely 
guide action (Baran & Scott, 2010) 
Sense Making Facilitates team understanding of 
events/situations and their implications 
Leader sense making involves 
identifying important environmental 
events, interpreting these events 
given the team’s performance 
situation, and offering this 
interpretation to the team (Zaccaro et 
al., 2001) (Morgeson, 2005) 
Framing/ help the team make sense of 
ambiguity 
Use of formal and informal authority 
to influence adherence to policies and 
procedures, encouraging vigilance as 
a social norm and properly directing 
actions of those involved in the 
situation (Baran & Scott, 2010) 
Heedful interrelating/collective sense 
making 
Personally enacting examples of 
mindful behaviour 
Believing in the reliability of co-
workers and depending upon them 
when necessary 
Reducing ambiguity through behaving 
in accordance with expected roles 
and using the expected division of 
labour to anticipate others' behaviour 
Personally enacting examples of 
mindful behaviour (Baran & Scott, 
2010) 
 
Collective mind is conceptualised as 
a pattern of heedful interrelations of 
actors in a social system. Actors in 
the system construct their actions 
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Process Sub-processes Definition 
(contributions), understanding that the 
system consists of connected actions 
by themselves and 
others(representation) and interrelate 
their actions within the system 
(subordination)" (Weick & Roberts, 
1993) 
Adjusting/adaptability Maintaining Cognizance of 
surroundings and the environment 
Rapidly adjusting behaviour due to 
changing conditions (Baran & Scott, 
2010) 
Groupthink A style of thinking that rendered them 
unable to consider all the necessary 
components and consequences' 
(Burnette et al, 2011) 
Monitor Team Monitors team external environment, 
including what other teams are doing 
 
Notices flaws in task procedures or 
team outputs and suggests 
improvements 
 
Perform Team Task Will actively become involved in team 
working to ensure tasks are completed 
Leaders main job is to do, or get 
done, whatever is not being 
adequately handled for group needs 
(McGrath, 1962) 
Solve Problems Implements or helps the team 
implement solutions to problems, task 
and interaction/inter-personal 
Information use in problem solving 
refers to the use of information for 
problem identification, development of 
a plan, which coordinates team 
member expertise, and the 
communication of the plan to team 
members (Fleishman et al., 1991), 
(Barnett & McCormick, 2012) 
Seeks multiple different perspectives 
when solving problems 
 
Decision Making   
Encourage Team Self-
Management 
Encourages the team to be 
responsible for determining the 
methods, procedures, and schedules 
with which the work gets done 
 
Support Social Climate Responds promptly to team member 
needs or concerns 
 
Engages in actions that demonstrate 
respect and concern for team 
member's wellbeing 
 
Engages in actions that demonstrate 
respect and concern for team 
member's wellbeing 
 
Develop trust in the leader  
Develops a positive group 
culture/social cohesion 
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Process Sub-processes Definition 
Shared Leadership Shared Leadership/role 
multiplicity/Locus of leadership 
Dynamic, Interactive influence 
process among individuals in groups, 
for which the objective is to lead one 
another to the achievement of group 
or organisational goals or both 
(Pearce & Conger, 2003) 
Multiple members of a given team or 
unit or organisation may enact 
leadership informally, even in the 
presence of a formally designated 
leader (Ramthun & Matkin, 2014) 
Consensus Building/coordinated 
action 
Team members must share and 
integrate diverse knowledge and 
perspectives and eventually reach 
agreement on the best course of 
action (Bergman et al, 2012) 
Team Cognition/Macro-
Cognition/collective 
metacognition/mental models 
Macro-cognition is “the interaction 
between intra-individual and inter-
individual cognitive processes". 
Team-cognition is "knowledge 
representations and transformations 
on those representations occur not 
only within an individual mind but also 
between individuals and the 
environment" (Fiore et al, 2010, 
p.204) 
 2 a team mental model is the 
structural representation of an 
individual group members’ knowledge 
and level of expertise concerning key 
elements of his or her team 
environment...enabling them to 
anticipate one another's actions and 
coordinate these actions in complex, 
high pressure situations in which 
there is insufficient time for 
communication and planning". 
(McIntyre & Foti, 2013, p.47) 
Intragroup trust/shared belief  
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Appendix C - Focus Group Questioning Strategy 
 
Note:  A green shaded cell represents a question which has already been raised in the literature 
  
Focus Areas Literature Support Focus Group Questions Possible Probing Questions
Baran & Scott (2010.,p43) "comparetively few have focused 
on leadership processes employed within extreme events 
characterised by high ambiguity, such as those faced by 
leaders in high reliability organisations"
Morgeson et al, 2010, p.9) “what is needed is a framework that 
integrates existing team leadership research and describes 
the full range of ways in which leadership can manifest itself 
within a team” 
Baran & Scott (2010.,p44) Considering leadership within the 
boundaries of CLT - " shifts the theoretical grounding of 
leadership away from a focus on individual leaders…"  
Zaccaro et al,(2001.,p453) "the difference amongs team forms 
probably alters the specific display of particular leadership 
activities..."
Can you describe the team you work in?
How do you know that you are effective 
as a team?
Generic question to understand participant views of leadership 
as there are many ways of defining the term (Day et al, 2006)
What does the term leadership mean to you?
"...leadership occurs when interacting agents generate 
adaptive outcomes” (Lichtenstein et al 2006, p.3) - Previously 
asked question (Endrissat & von Arx, 2013)
How is leadership accomplished in the team ?
Different events will have differing charecteristics (Hannah, 
2009) - Campbell et al (2013) Previously asked question
What precisely is leadership in dangerous environments?
Can you descibe the characteristics of 
a dangerous context in which you 
operate?
Baran & Scott (2010.,p44) " High reliability organisations…by 
definition continuously operate in dangerous contexts" " 
leaders and followers are personally faced with high dynamic 
and unpredictable situations...to face threats and challenges 
of dangerous environments (Ramthun & Matkin, 2014, p.244) - 
Campbell et al (2013) Previously asked question
What does danger do to leadership?
Baran & Scott (2010.,p44) CLT addresses the nature of 
leadership within continuously changing contexts" "leadership 
is necessitated by team problems in which multiple solution 
paths are viable…" (Zaccaro et al, 2001.,p454)  - Campbell et 
al (2013) Previously asked question
What distinguishes effective leadership in dangerous 
contexts?
What factors made the situation 
complex?
Probing questions will include - What happened?, How did that 
work? Who did what? Why? And When (what order?) to gain 
a richly detailed description and analysis from the participants.
Can you describe an dangerous incident that you as a team 
have responded to? Describe the incident in detail (what 
happened, interactions, thoughts, feelings and response) and 
discuss the incident in stages - at the start, during the incident 
and the end on the incident.
What problems did you encounter as a 
team at this incident?
"in order to learn lessons not only about how to become better 
leaders but also about making tough choices about putting 
individuals in harms way in the first place". ( Kayes, Allen & 
Self, 2012, p.196)  - Previously asked question - Kayes, Allen 
& Self (2012)
What lessons can be learned about leadership in a complex 
and novel and dynamic environment from the case?
Overall Justification
Team and Leadership - 
General
Dangerous Context 
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Appendix D - Leadership Processes 
List of leadership processes used in the process card exercise (adapted from Morgeson et 
al, 2010) 
 
Compose team 
Define Mission 
Establish expectations and goals 
Structure and plan 
Train and develop team 
Sensemaking 
Provide feedback 
Monitor team 
Manage boundaries 
Challenge team 
Perform team task 
Solve problems 
Provide resources 
Encourage self-management (of team) 
Support social climate 
Shared leadership 
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Appendix E - Student Ethical Issues Form 
 
 
Faculty of Business and Law 
Student Research Ethical Issues Form  
 
Student Name: Merrel Knox 
Programme of Study PhD 
Title of Research Project: 
 
What are the leadership processes of leaders in groups 
facing dangerous contexts? 
Start Date of Research Project: 16th May 2014 
Supervisor Johan Coetsee 
 
Risk Status (please 
mark one box): 
x Red  Amber  Green 
 
Please refer to the Ethics Diagnostic Tool for advice on Risk Status (available in Blackboard – 
NB034BC: B and L Research). 
 
 Comments 
Brief description of the proposed 
research methods including (if 
relevant) how human participants 
will be selected and involved.  
 
The research methods for this study will be a focus 
group with a team. One to one interviews of NHS staff 
in the Ambulance Trust, Police, Mountain Rescue 
teams and Fire Service. The participants identified 
and selected to take part in this study are part of 
identified groups (Ambulance - Hazardous Area 
Response Team- HART, Mountain rescue, Fire and 
rescue and Police response teams) that specifically 
work in dangerous contexts as part of their normal job 
role. 
This study will also seek to gather incident reports 
(narrative accounts of incidents by the team 
members) from HART, mountain rescue, Police and 
Fire service teams which will be analysed to identify 
leadership processes. 
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How will informed consent of 
research participants be 
acquired? 
 
(If appropriate attach draft informed 
consent form) 
 
Informed consent will be obtained through Research 
participant consent forms which will seek consent for 
the interviews and to obtain and review narrative 
accounts of incidents. Participants will be asked to 
sign the form before any research activity can 
proceed.  
Participants will be advised of the purpose of the 
study and provided with a statement of intent of the 
study by the researcher.  Transcripts of the interviews 
will be passed to the participants to ensure accuracy 
of the participant’s response.  
The researcher will ensure that participants anonymity 
will be protected by being assigned a code name in 
the research. Participants will be informed that they 
are able to withdraw at any stage of the research 
process. 
 
A draft informed consent form is attached. 
Will the research involve an 
organization(s)?  
 
(If appropriate attach draft 
organisational consent form) 
The study is conducted at individual level and will be 
carried out in teams who are employed in NHS 
organisations, mountain rescue, Police and the Fire 
service. To obtain access, organisations will be 
informed and provided with evidence that the research 
follows the guidelines and governance process of 
Northumbria University and provided with confirmation 
that the research activities to be carried out have been 
approved by the Ethical panel approval committee. 
Organisations will be asked to sign an organisational 
consent form before any research activity can 
proceed. 
A draft organisational consent form is attached. 
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How will research data be 
collected, securely stored and 
anonymity protected (where 
this is required) 
The research data will be collected by a focus group 
with a team and one to one interviews. These 
interviews will be semi-structured to allow for probing 
and conducted in a private and quiet environment. 
The participants will be advised that the focus group 
and interviews will be recorded on a Dictaphone and 
the interviewer will make notes during the interview to 
help inform probing questions. The recorded interview 
will be kept on the researcher at all times or stored 
securely. Individual names will be made anonymous 
during the transcribing stage. Such names will be 
replaced with pseudonyms (e.g. Participant A, or a 
fictitious name). 
The Participants will be advised that the research data 
may be kept up to five years post PhD. Examples of 
incidents used in the research study will be written, 
excluding information of the incident that may lead to 
the identification of a specific person/persons 
involved. 
Incident reports will be identified through document 
analysis. The reports will be selected based on a set 
of identified criteria of a dangerous context. A 
thematic analysis will be conducted to identify and 
code the data. 
Transcripts and incident reports collected, will be 
stored electronically on a password protected laptop 
to which only the researcher will have access. The 
NVivo software that will be used to analyse data, will 
also be stored securely on the laptop. 
Each interview transcript will then be emailed to the 
respective research participant, whereby they will 
have the opportunity to add any data, or to remove or 
amend data on the transcript. The participants will be 
asked to confirm whether they agree that it is a fair 
representation of the interview 
How will data be destroyed 
after the end of the project? 
(Where data is not to be 
destroyed please give 
reasons) 
The recordings on the digital recorder will be deleted 
once they have been saved on the researcher’s laptop 
and work PC. This will be done within 2 weeks of the 
initial recording. The saved audio recordings and text 
transcriptions will be deleted from the laptop and work 
PC folders. However, it is envisaged that they will be 
held for a period of up to 5 years, to allow time to 
maximize the data for publication purposes 
. 
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Any other ethical issues 
anticipated? 
 
 
The research ethical diagnostic tool identifies that 
working with NHS staff and the nature of those staff 
that work in dangerous contexts, has the potential to 
pose ethical issues that are classed as high risk. 
Therefore, this study seeks to scrutinise the ethical 
considerations carefully, to ensure that every care is 
taken to protect participants.  
The researcher acknowledges the sensitive nature of 
the working context of the teams identified. This 
sensitivity is to the nature of the experiences that the 
participants have engaged in in their day to day role 
and the possible trauma that may previously have 
been experienced as a result of these incidents. The 
researcher acknowledges the high priority that must 
be given to the psychological wellbeing of participants 
that decide to recall these experiences of incidents. 
As such, the researcher will brief the participants of 
the nature and intent of the study. The participation in 
the focus group and interviews is entirely voluntary 
and the interviewer will ensure that no participant will 
be ‘pressed’ for details or under any obligation to 
delve further into the example, if recalling an incident 
causes undue distress. If participants find themselves 
distressed by their recall of incidents at any point, the 
participants have access to trauma counselling in 
each organisation. 
 
 
Student Signature (indicating that the research will be conducted in conformity with the above 
and agreeing that any significant change in the research project will be notified and a further 
“Project Amendment’ Form submitted). 
 
 
Date: …13.10.16…………………………Student Signature: Merrel 
Knox……………………………………. 
  
 
 
Appendix E: Participant Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor:  
 
I confirm that I have read this form and I believe the proposed research will not breach  
University policies. 
 
 
Date:…17.10.16……………………………Signature:…W J 
Coetsee………………………………………. 
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Appendix F - Participant consent form 
 
 
Faculty of Business and Law 
Informed Consent Form for research participants 
Title of Study: 
 
What are the leadership processes of 
teams facing dangerous contexts? 
Person(s) conducting the research: 
 
Merrel Knox 
 Programme of study: 
 
PhD 
Address of the researcher for 
correspondence: 
 
 
 
Rm 439 CCE 1 
University of Northumbria 
NE1 8TY 
Telephone: 
 
0191 2274994 
E-mail: 
 
Merrel.knox@northumbria.ac.uk 
Description of the broad nature of the 
research: 
 
 
 
The study seeks to explore the leadership 
processes of leaders facing dangerous 
contexts. The study broadly wants to 
understand how leadership works by looking to 
identify the leadership processes that are used 
when working in contexts where they and their 
groups face threat or risk in the environment in 
which they are operating. These contexts are 
inherently complex and require an adaptive 
response from leaders working in teams. In 
order to understand how leadership works in 
the context of an incident that the emergency 
services face in their normal day to day role, 
the study seeks to answer the following sub 
questions;  
-How do leaders and groups navigate the 
complexities of dangerous contexts? 
-How are leadership processes influenced by 
unanticipated events? 
-How do leaders ensure a shared 
understanding of the dangerous context? 
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Description of the involvement expected of 
participants including the broad nature of 
questions to be answered or events to be 
observed or activities to be undertaken, 
and the expected time commitment: 
 
Participants will be asked to participate in a 
focus group with a team. The questions will ask 
you to draw from your knowledge, training and 
personal experience, with the purpose of 
exploring sub-questions that are posed in the 
research. Participation in the research is 
voluntary and you are able to withdraw from 
the study at any stage in the research process. 
The focus groups will last approximately 1 hour 
and these will be recorded for the purpose of 
capturing the data accurately. The focus 
groups will be conducted in a private and quiet 
environment. Incidents described in the 
research will not be identifiable beyond the 
team. Individuals will remain anonymous in the 
research. 
Description of how the data you provide 
will be securely stored and/or destroyed 
upon completion of the project. 
 
The recordings on the digital recorder will be 
deleted once they have been saved on the 
researcher’s laptop and work PC. This will be 
done within 2 weeks of the initial recording. 
The saved audio recordings and text 
transcriptions will be deleted from the laptop 
and work PC folders. However, it is envisaged 
that they will be held for a period of up to 5 
years, to allow time to maximize the data for 
publication purposes 
 
Information obtained in this study, including this consent form, will be kept strictly 
confidential (i.e. will not be passed to others) and anonymous (i.e. individuals and 
organisations will not be identified unless this is expressly excluded in the details given 
above). 
Data obtained through this research may be reproduced and published in a variety of 
forms and for a variety of audiences related to the broad nature of the research detailed 
above. It will not be used for purposes other than those outlined above without your 
permission.  
Participation is entirely voluntary and participants may withdraw at any time. 
By signing this consent form, you are indicating that you fully understand the above 
information and agree to participate in this study on the basis of the above information. 
Participant’s printed name/signature:     Date: 
Student’s signature:      Date: 
Please keep one copy of this form for your own records 
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Appendix G - Worked Example of Coding 
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Appendix H:  Full Template of the Analysis of Themes 
 
Category Theme Sub-Theme Code 
Context 
Directive Leadership Information 
Leadership as control 
Emergency services have 
a challenge culture 
Impact of procedures on 
team response 
Team Culture and 
training 
Team identity 
View selves as elite, 
often using military terms 
See selves as separate 
from normal jobs 
Highly motivated teams 
Team belief in superiority 
of team 
Team investment into 
role 
Investment of self into 
role in each incident 
Volunteering amplifies 
personal investment into 
role 
Personal life impacts on 
the role 
Team Structure 
Structuring to balance 
experience 
Structuring to promote 
cohesion 
Multiple roles for team 
members 
Multiple roles/skill-sets 
across team 
Specialisms within the 
team 
Emergency services 
attract a certain mind-set 
Team work builds 
confidence in each other 
Training 
Drawing on training to 
avoid danger 
Trained to behave in 
specific ways 
Trained for some 
elements of the job but 
not all 
Trained to do everything 
as a team 
Training is for the 
aftermath, not the 
incident 
Trained to assess risks 
Processes underpinned 
by extensive training 
Scenario-based training 
Responses guided by 
training 
New team members not 
always as well trained 
Team belief in training 
Learn from past 
investigations / fatalities 
Incidents are never black 
and white or as per the 
training 
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Category Theme Sub-Theme Code 
Conditioning to overcome 
disbelief 
Fluid Leadership Adaptive leadership 
Adaptive Response 
Adaptation of approach to 
changing situation 
Procedure vs. dynamic 
adaptation 
Understand that 
information can be wrong 
and support team to 
adapt to changing 
situation 
Ability to adapt planning 
as situation changes 
Changing leadership 
style 
Difference in leadership 
styles over team 
Emergence of natural 
team leaders 
Leadership as leading 
self and also following 
others 
Decision making process 
State of mind in decision 
making 
Assess next moves 
based on actions of 
perpetrator / evolving 
situation 
Situational awareness at 
team rendezvous point 
Decisiveness as calming 
influence on team 
Decision making removes 
ambiguity 
Decision making enables 
team action 
Lack of decision leads to 
uncertainty 
Each person must be a 
decision maker 
Team looks to leader to 
make decisions 
Drawing on experience to 
make decisions 
Enabling cohesion 
Social bonding in the 
team 
Supportive team helping 
one another 
External threat bonds the 
team, in tune with each 
other 
Risk of social exclusion  
Not wanting to let team 
down 
Enabling trust 
Break down in trust if 
Leader makes incorrect 
decision 
Leader proven capability 
enhances trust 
Previous experience 
builds trust 
Micro-management 
reduces trust 
Fluidity Leadership is fluid 
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Category Theme Sub-Theme Code 
Operational command 
changes fluidly 
dependent on who is 
closest on-scene to 
incident 
Multi-level leadership on 
scene 
Sense-making 
Encourage team to voice 
opinions 
Team processing of 
threat 
Ensure team understand 
intended outcomes 
Awareness of team 
assumptions 
Leaders make sense of 
situations 
Build the picture to instil 
confidence in self/team 
Paint a picture of the 
scenario in mind 
Social intelligence 
Consideration of team 
member personal 
circumstances 
Understand personal 
limits of team members 
Recognise team member 
mood 
Presence, if not around, 
not able to judge mood of 
team 
Draw from personal 
experience to understand 
others 
Awareness of crisis in 
others 
Solving problems 
Leaders provide multiple 
options / solutions 
Leaders remove 
ambiguity 
Leaders resolve 
situations 
Leaders remove 
concerns and reassure 
team 
Leaders spread skills 
across team to build 
resilience 
Leaders ensure the 
delegation of knowledge 
across the team 
Leaders are honesty and 
use this to tackle 
problems 
Leaders prioritise under 
pressure 
Continuous risk 
assessment / evaluation 
Compliance with 
procedure 
Concern with level of 
paperwork if something 
goes wrong 
Emphasis on doing things 
by-the-book in dangerous 
situations 
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Category Theme Sub-Theme Code 
Focus on procedure and 
process to guide action 
Critical incident debrief in 
the case of a fatality 
Formalised processes 
HPC Professionals 
Model post-incident 
procedure 
Continuous Evaluation 
Evaluate worst-case 
scenarios 
Constant re-evaluation of 
the situation 
Post-incident evaluation 
can make some 
members insular 
Learning 
Learn by challenging 
selves 
Learn from experience 
Ability to learn from 
mistakes 
Planning pre-arrival 
Scenario planning 
immediately on-scene 
Command pre-plan 
events where possible 
based on information 
Forward planning on 
route to incident 
Pre-planning responses 
on arrival 
uncertainty of exact 
nature of incident or 
present danger pre-
arrival 
Lack of information pre-
arrival causing issues 
with readiness 
Pre-arrival scenario risk 
assessment 
Pre-incident Intelligence 
gathering for planning 
Gather intelligence to 
enhance safety 
Often going into unknown 
dangers due to lack of 
intelligence 
Intelligence Critical to 
planning 
Planning helps team 
appreciate what each 
member will be doing 
Provides an opportunity 
for the team to jointly plan 
Allows for enhanced risk 
assessment 
Safety 
Protect each other is 
paramount 
Safety is a team goal 
Potential contradiction of 
safety first vs job first 
Training mitigates risk 
Team belief in safety as 
part of team 
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Category Theme Sub-Theme Code 
Job first, safety second 
Team and individual risk 
assessment 
Individual risk assessing 
Dynamic on-scene risk 
assessments 
Risk is a constant 
planning and re-planning 
process 
Continuously assess risk 
en-route to incidents 
Leaders assess risk 
Team 
reflection/debriefing 
Debrief used to reduce 
blame 
Debrief can be viewed as 
criticism 
Debriefing due to incident 
mistakes 
Emergency services 
promote open and honest 
debriefing 
Feedback mechanisms 
can improve 
effectiveness 
Hot debriefing 
immediately after incident 
Writing post-incident 
reflections shows 
different recollections of 
same event 
Reflect on incidents to 
learn from them 
Critical incident technique 
used to enrich post-
incident reflection 
Post-incident reflection 
promotes improve action 
in future 
Team taking risks 
Level of risk leads to 
classification of incident 
and response 
Willing to take risks to 
save lives 
Job is to help others 
Leadership is a 
precaution for action 
Self-leadership 
Autonomy in team 
Team members individual 
contribute to scenario 
planning 
Self-awareness to build 
instinct on best course of 
action 
Reliance on personal 
experience 
Autonomous action 
where leader is not 
present on-scene 
Responsibility for self in 
incidents 
Self-reflection 
Responsibility for self in 
incidents 
Self-authorisation 
resulting from leadership 
failure 
Self-allocation of tasks 
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Category Theme Sub-Theme Code 
Shared leadership 
Credibility / respect 
Leaders are looked upon 
as experienced opinion 
Leadership is enhanced 
by experience 
New members look to 
more experienced 
members 
Respect staff to obtain 
their respect in turn and 
improve compliance 
Credibility develops 
through exposure of the 
team and leader to 
incidents 
Team seeing leader in 
action 
There is respect for 
context-based experience 
Team players, respect 
each other no matter the 
level of experience 
Delegated roles and 
responsibilities 
Use the person best 
suited to each role 
Differing levels of 
experience 
Strength of team is 
enhanced by different 
experiences and levels of 
knowledge 
New members can revive 
the sense of purpose of 
more experienced 
members 
On the job supported 
learning of new staff 
Experience informing 
action 
Lack of multi-agency 
training / experience 
compounding uncertainty 
Experience informs 
current thinking and 
future responses 
Experience provides 
additional confidence to 
lead 
Experience highlights 
possible complications 
during incident 
Knowledge/experience 
informs conflict between 
personal safety and 
instinct to help others 
Experience allows 
improved control of 
reactions 
Leader rotation 
Everyone takes a lead 
role at some point in the 
incident 
Rotating the lead role for 
operational experience 
Predictions of actions 
Predicting actions of 
other team members 
Inability to predict hinders 
decision making 
Predicting outcomes of 
actions informs action 
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Category Theme Sub-Theme Code 
The greater the prediction 
the more the team is 
informed of potential risks 
Prediction is a means to 
reduce obstacles to 
successful outcomes 
Specialisms 
Understand different 
physical and mental 
strengths 
Leadership based on 
specialism 
Acknowledging diverse 
strengths / specialisms 
Leaders foster 
environments of 
delegating leadership 
Delegated style promotes 
improved team 
environment 
How participants 
construct danger 
De-sensitisation 
Coping mechanisms 
(pre-arrival, critical point, 
immediate aftermath and 
post incident stages) 
Tunnel-vision to task on-
scene 
Pre-awareness of the 
nature of the role 
En-route adrenaline 
boost based on nature of 
job 
Intra-team reflection and 
black humour as a coping 
mechanism 
Compartmentalising pre-
arrival to cope with 
multiple jobs in 
succession 
Denial of danger 
Team belief that systems 
in place will remove 
danger 
Post-incident denial of 
danger 
Detachment 
Drawing a line under 
stressful incidents 
Emotional detachment 
from post-incident debrief 
Exposure to horrible 
incidents early in career 
helps later  
We deal with people 
trying to cause harm 
everyday 
Mental 
Expectation of rescue 
role 
Describe selves as 
superheroes, but 
acknowledge they aren’t 
superheroes 
Mental Dangers 
Suicides  
Exposure to dead bodies 
Emotional danger 
Incident stress (pre-
arrival, immediate 
aftermath of incident and 
post incident) 
Profound recall of 
stressful incidents 
Reflection of continuous 
mental distress 
throughout incident, 
including immediately 
after incident and post 
incident 
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Category Theme Sub-Theme Code 
Anxiety reaction en-route 
to job 
Reflection of anxiety 
reaction immediately after 
and post incident 
Post-incident feeling of 
guilt and responsibility 
Tangible 
Conflict in understanding 
Doing the job means not 
putting selves in danger 
The team will not insist 
on a particular personal 
action 
Prevention of danger is 
viewed as effective 
adhesion to procedure 
Danger as a perception 
Contradiction of team not 
feeling in danger, in 
control 
Perception that danger is 
the team having lost 
control 
Perception that 
experience reduces 
danger 
Perception that danger 
means the job is being 
done wrong 
Tangible/physical 
dangers 
Knives and guns 
Environmental danger 
Chemical spillages 
Water danger 
Erratic patients 
Medical Trauma 
Incident that affects a 
colleague 
Tangible danger 
Can see and sense it 
Threat to life 
Safety is not guaranteed 
Potential or its going to 
happen 
Teams as dangerous 
We are dangerous 
because of our 
equipment 
We could kill someone 
Influence of 
danger on 
leadership and 
social team 
processes 
Challenge to leadership 
Accountability of 
leadership 
Some leaders pass off 
too much accountability 
Leadership is accepting 
responsibility and 
accountability for actions 
Leaders are accountable 
for their team 
Danger increases the 
stress of leadership 
Communication 
Communications en-
route, on-scene, 
continuously changing 
Communications 
equipment can fail 
Page 257 of 273 
 
Category Theme Sub-Theme Code 
Reliance on 
communications 
Complicating factors 
Hostages/victims can 
behave in unexpected 
ways 
Incapacitation of team 
members 
Stress of leadership role 
Attending multiple 
incidents simultaneously 
Lack of necessary 
equipment on-scene 
Conflict of reality vs 
simulation from training 
Adrenaline dependent on 
severity of incident 
Not prepared for some 
incidents which occur 
Response to the 
unexpected 
Some situations that 
occur are out of the 
ordinary 
Information 
Numerous information 
sources add risk to 
decision making 
Lack of information 
delays action 
Failure of information 
leads to risk 
Need information to avoid 
knee-jerk responses 
Cross-functional 
information sharing 
Expectation that 
information will become 
increasingly relevant as 
the incident progresses 
Reliance on others for 
information 
Leadership is trusting 
information provided by 
the team 
Time pressure / instant 
decisions 
Over reliance 
Over-reliance on uniform 
/ equipment 
Over-reliance on training 
Reliance 
Reliance on 
communications 
Reliance on electronic 
tools/systems 
Reliance on Personal 
Protective Equipment 
Reliance on 
resources/equipment 
Reliance on tactical 
training processes 
Reliance on personal 
experience 
Reliance on others for 
information 
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Category Theme Sub-Theme Code 
Team reliance on leader 
Leader reliance on team 
to check their decisions 
Responses to danger 
Awareness that briefings 
will not always dictate 
action 
Fight vs. Flight 
Internal processing of 
threat 
Stress response to 
uncertainty 
Acting without thinking 
Risk aversion 
Consequences of 
unwillingness to take risk 
Risk aversion leads to 
delayed action 
Stress levels 
Stress is a continuous 
pressure on team 
Stress of context, risk 
enhances contentious 
behaviour 
Uncertainty/ambiguity 
Lack of control leads to 
uncertainty 
Uncertain of team roles 
when in danger 
Expectations of 
leadership 
Leadership as 
competence 
The ability to recognise 
experience in the team 
Leaders have the 
confidence of the team 
Leaders are calm under 
pressure 
Leadership by example 
rather than instruction 
Leaders know what to do 
even in stressful 
situations 
Leader provides 
motivation 
Manages diverse 
experiences 
Manages differences of 
opinion on-scene 
Leader as being in 
control of self 
Leaders admit when they 
are wrong or have made 
a mistake 
Leaders are open to 
challenge from the team 
Leaders develop the 
team 
Providing clear direction 
Holistic view of the 
incident 
Steering team to end goal 
Providing information 
Lead by voice and 
example 
Leadership as 
responsibility for 
wellbeing of team 
Responsible for team 
members health and 
wellbeing 
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Category Theme Sub-Theme Code 
Leaders can be seen as 
being a parent of a family 
Leaders ensure the 
psychological wellbeing 
of the team post-incident 
Leaders take pride in 
looking after their team 
Leadership is looking 
after their team as well as 
the victims on-scene 
Multi-level leadership 
Chain of command 
Changes in authority on 
scene 
Recognition of rank 
structure as lead role 
Team must have a 
designated leader 
Command versus team 
Rank structure vs 
experience 
Leadership is shielding 
the team 
Reduces risk of 
challenging decisions on-
scene 
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